SURVEY

A Journal of
Soviet and East European Studies

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The Retail Trade	*William Tresise*
Automation and Employment	*S. Moos*
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July–Sept.: CHINA : *A special issue*

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CONTENTS OF THE FEBRUARY 1964

JOURNAL OF POLITICS

Volume 26, Number 1

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Contributors

The Changing Mind of the South: The exposed Nerve by Leslie W Dunbar, Southern Regional Council

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No. 51 **April 1964**

Editor: Walter Z. Laqueur **Associate Editor: Leo Labedz**

Gorki and Others ..... *Irwin Weil* 3
Meeting the Philosophers ..... *Lewis S. Feuer* 10
Moscow State University ..... *David Robert* 24
A Good Kolkhoz ..... *Robert F. Miller* 32
Bulgaria's Golden Sands ..... *Viktor Meier* 44
Of Walls and Utopias ..... *Melvin Croan* 52
A Plan for all Seasons ..... *John M. Montias* 63
The Art of Survival ..... * * * 77
Soviet Studies, the Press, and the Public ..... *Leopold Labedz* 87
Russia in German Eyes: 1964 ..... *Wanda Bronska-Pampuch* 93
Osric ..... *Ronald Hingley* 102
Political Realism in Poland ..... *Adam Bromke* 111
Germany's Eastern Frontier ..... *Otto Stenzl* 118
Poland in Several Lights ..... *K. A. Jelenski* 131

Views and Reviews: S. V. Utechin: Education—John Keep: Father of Russian Marxism—A. Zauberman: Comecon—Andrzej Brzeski: The Advantages of Backwardness—A. K. R. Kiralfy: Soviet Treaty-Making — J. F. Brown: Albania — Leopold Labedz: The Sino-Soviet Rift 140

Our Contributors 160

Communications 62

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GORKI AND OTHERS

Impressions of a Visiting Professor

Irwin Weil

AFTER walking approximately two-thirds of the way from Moscow's ancient Arbat Square, formerly the site of a merchant mart, towards the Square of the Insurrection, an American Slavic specialist used to gaze at a statue of Gorki in front of the museum and literary institute named in that writer's honour. Both the face and the thrust of the figure successfully represent the *burevestnik,* literary harbinger of a coming insurrectional storm, two-thirds removed from the locus and habits of ancient Russia. Gorki's statue turns its back on the Institute; he is gazing half sadly, half defiantly into the bustling street named after the Soviet diplomatist, Vorovsky. I have some difficulty remembering whether he looks towards the ancient Arbat (now being reconstructed) or towards the Insurrection Square (already planted with a Muscovite style skyscraper). I do remember the emotions aroused by that statue, however, when I arrived in Moscow for the first time, in 1960, after twelve years studying the Russian language and reading Russian literature in that New World which is not the title of a Soviet literary journal. Gorki's singularly photogenic face was familiar to me from literally hundreds of photographs—indeed, I believe his face is one of the unlisted assets of Russia—but the statue in front of his documents, in front of scholars many of whom have spent long years mastering the corpus of his works and manuscripts, behind an iron fence so typical of Russian architecture and cemeteries—this statue has an extraordinary effect.

And so do the people and manners inside. Both the first time I was there, for a month in the summer of 1960, and the second time, as an exchange professor for an academic semester in 1963 (at Moscow University), I never quite got over the impression of something slightly antique and musty when I hung up my outdoor clothes in the wardrobe, the smell of old tea leaves whose brew has refreshed generations of literary scholars, and the formal shaking of hands every time one meets. To a certain extent, this was simply an American's reaction to European custom and tradition; but it was also the Russian way: hospitable, sympathetic, and yet somehow '*na dyby*' before a visiting American; in a similar way Vronsky describes the Muscovites, in contrast to the people from Petersburg, to Steve Oblonsky in *Anna Karenina.* Here they were, preserving the tradition of the most flamboyantly and consistently revolutionary Russian writer, and yet they were acting as 'official' critics and 'official' greeters. When a group of high school students, going through the Gorki Museum, started behaving in the high-spirited fashion of schoolchildren everywhere (just as they passed a manuscript in Gorki's hand telling how as a boy he despised the dead

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routine of school), the accompanying guide rebuked them with all the practice of an old schoolmarm.

Now the notion of official critics, preserving an officially defined and encouraged literary tradition, is not necessarily in itself a bad thing. If other individuals are free to attack or defend the parts they choose, knowing in advance more or less how the representatives of the official tradition will react, the latter can perform a useful function of orientation. Gorki himself found this in the response provoked by his attacks on the '*merzosti*' (abominations). Soviet critics and scholars, of course, will not spend their time attacking Russian '*merzosti*'; times have changed. But they do want Soviet youth to see in Gorki one who exemplified those 'standards of the Revolutionary Fathers' which Khrushchev urged upon the younger listeners to his March speech. And the Soviet scholars, like the Soviet rulers, know that one of the most crucial issues of destalinisation, which occupies the attention of the student generation, is in what fashion they will assimilate the kind of tradition represented in the Gorki archives. One official representative explained to me that in the name of all that is sensible and civilised they simply cannot tolerate youth 'wiggling in front of a saxophone'. When I replied that my generation of Americans did its own share of wiggling in front of saxophones and then turned into a perfectly respectable generation of progenitors (criticising its children for wiggling—twisting—in front of a saxophone), he said that maybe such things could happen in America but not in Russia, where wiggling youth meant that Beethoven was gone for ever. Gorki, of course (like my interlocutor and myself), is unequivocally on the side of Beethoven.

Both the official scholars and the politicians realise that Gorki, through the fault of others rather than himself, suffered from excessive and uncritical adulation during the Stalinist epoch. He was praised so extravagantly, and sometimes in such a deadly fashion, that the man disappeared and a sort of ikon of Soviet dimensions took his place, *prepodobny* A. M. Gorki. It is still the fashion among certain groups to denigrate Gorki; when they learned that I was interested in him, they turned on a sneer which became positively Bostonian in its bland intensity. The intelligent official Gorki critics, including a number of people who earlier refused to jump on the bandwagon, realise that they must overcome this kind of attitude, which, I would agree, is just as misguided in its extremism as the former adulation. They therefore welcome serious foreign interest in Gorki, even when they consider it as ideologically mistaken as mine. When I talked about problems of fathers and sons in Gorki's writings, and problems of love among his characters, they gently but firmly tried to nudge me away from my quaint bourgeois notions. When it came to an esthetic judgment of his writing, much (but not all) of which I consider very good, they were happy to take up and even to further the argument. In general, they seemed refreshed and pleased by the parts of our discussions where we had a chance to talk almost pure, unadulterated esthetics. While there was

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often the suggestion, even stated explicitly once, that a mere non-Marxist is something of a '*nakhal*', a nervy non-gentleman, to think that he can understand Gorki (although they certainly laid claim to understanding Shakespeare without becoming full-blown Elizabethans), they seemed satisfied that every American is something of a *nakhal* in any case, so that it must not be held against me personally. And who knows? Maybe a *nakhal* is not the most inappropriate person to study '*ekh, vy, farmazon, bonapart-tsena-kopeika*'! (Grandpa's curse on the young Gorki who has just butted the old man in the stomach: 'You Freemason farthing-Bonaparte'). As one Russian girl told me, 'You are not a real American, since all Americans are *nakhaly*'. While flattered that her opinion differed from that of the official critics, I asked her how many Americans she had met. 'You are the first one', she replied. Confronted with such wisdom, I felt myself disarmed.

IN the old building of the University, where one looks out on to the Kremlin cathedrals rather than a statue of Gorki, the office of the Sector on Soviet Literature, part of the Philological Faculty, presents a picture so familiar to the academic man that he almost forgets he is away from home. Brisk young female secretaries shepherd abstracted professors through their official appointments and routines, showing the deference of cultured youth to erudite old age, and knowing that the weight of the university's everyday work rests on their own secretarial shoulders. The professors amble with glazed eyes through the halls, but the mere hint of an intellectual proposition is enough to bring their eyes into focus and halt their steps. They will argue all day over the ninth part of a hair, expecting you, in turn, to defend that same ninth of a hair. In general, the somewhat less formal discussions with colleagues at the University were both cantankerous and useful. All the stress points of my logic were thoroughly battered, from a point of view and with an erudition (concerning the works of Gorki) that I would not meet at home. I think they understood my point of view and found a good deal of interest in my own case, which they considered novel and somewhat naïve, but showing the promise of youth. It sometimes reminded me a little of Leo Szilard's parody on scholars from planet X investigating the ruins of New York's Grand Central Station. When one of the young men suggests that the little booths with coin slots might have been places for the unloading of accumulated body wastes (rather than theologico-meditational retreats), an old scholar replies: 'I like young Smith and think he has a bright future, but, really, he should curb those wild ideas of his'.

My major connection with Moscow University, from the point of view of time actually spent, was with the living quarters of the dormitory located on the Lenin Hills, about a half hour's bus ride from the old University building in the city. Among the young men living around me, most of them five to ten years younger than I, I found some very sympathetic characters, particularly among the men in the literary

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faculties and in the physics faculties. I was particularly impressed by their immediate and genuine responses to the consciously apprehended cadences of their native language and to poetry. I was equally impressed by their informed interest in American literature, about which they would question me endlessly. What surprised me was that, although they love to sing and to listen to music, a group of students singing together often sounded more like tuneless, cacophonous kettle-banging than the Russian harmonies I had always imagined after reading Tolstoy and Gorki and listening to Soviet phonograph records. On the other hand, I heard some really splendid voices among younger children, when I sometimes gave spontaneous concerts with my guitar at children's libraries and a few schools. The younger children reacted sensitively and immediately to the American melodies and the old Russian melodies I knew. Although I met some good musicians among university students, they seemed the exception. And to stroll in the parks near the University and hear groups of them singing off-key was pure torture, almost as bad as listening to blaring American jukeboxes. If they want peaceful coexistence but ideological conflict with the United States, they might stack up those park singers against our jukeboxes—and may the best cacophony win!

The declamatory Russian style of poetry reading at first took me aback. Since poetry readers in English usually achieve their best effects by relative degrees of restraint, the emotion being strengthened by the sense of what is held back, it was personally jarring for me to hear the almost unrestrained outpouring of emotion. Once I got over the immediate shock, however, I found that many of them make quite effective use of their own style. The genuine intellectuals delight in playing with the language, exploring its possibilities, and they would joyfully join me in my periodic expeditions to seek the proper word and the proper sentence while I was trying to write Russian. Among themselves they would often engage in word and rhythm competitions in trying to turn out a Russian phrase, and they would revel in the pleasures of the game. When some of them learned that I was a '*filolog*', they played a kind of language game every time I passed the main desk leading to my corridor. It was made emphatically clear that I had to come up with the proper pun or rhythmic cadence, in grammatically and syntactically correct Russian, before I was allowed to pass. If I tried to avoid it, they let me know, without ever saying it outright, that my reputation as a Slavist would be ruined from this time hence and forever, *vo veki vekov, amin*! Several times there were political types who tried to trap me into political knockdown dragout fights on these occasions, arguments which, in public, I tried to avoid but could not decently do while passing the corridor desk. Although my linguistic friends could not stop those who tried to turn the game into international political polemics, they made it quite clear that they abhorred such tactics and considered them boorish. When this did happen, once or twice, they would always invite me to the television room afterwards, as a kind of blue-lighted silent

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smoking of the peace pipe. They asked me if the average American TV programmes were as bad as they were reputed to be; I answered truthfully yes. They said just wait and see their own old grade 'B' movies: cowboy film, thou hast met thy match! Many of the people I talked to were worried about the effect of such American films as 'The Magnificent Seven', which seems to have caused half the juvenile Soviet population to start shooting up the local turf with imaginary pistols. But it could not possibly have been worse than the juvenile imitations of the movies I saw on the Soviet TV about Ilya Muromets and Baba Yaga; these two are excellent and sturdy characters, but beware the Moscowboy movie man who takes them out of the old folk tales and puts them on film!

THERE are, of course, outstanding intellectuals and writers outside the universities and institutes who remain in certain ways akin to our free-lance writers. Among them are many who have preserved a great deal of the manners of the old intelligentsia in their everyday life and in their style of action. They respond very quickly, and at length, to any suggestion in the realm of esthetics or philosophy, and it is both exhilarating and reassuring to be ground through their intellectual mills. In many cases they are men with decades of experience and achievement behind them, and they cut to the centre of an abstract argument with breathtaking rapidity and agility. I was impressed by their continuing productivity. The younger generation rightly respects them highly, for their enduring vitality and the high level of their culture, which far transcends national limits. The purity and clarity of their language is also highly respected. One of the most common goals of the younger generation of intellectuals whom I met was to achieve the same universality of vision, the same breadth of knowledge as the grandfather generation of Russian intellectuals—their ability to walk at ease with their Russian selves and with the part of themselves steeped in the best products of foreign culture. Very often the attraction of crude popular culture from abroad (even less sensible in the context of Soviet life than it is in the American context—oh, those Moscow tape recorders blaring Elvis Presley!) wars directly with the Soviet younger generation's sense of national self-identification. At such moments, the young people find the oldest living generation a very reassuring guide to the more creative and adaptable elements of Western culture, as well as to the riches of their own.

No literary journey to Russia would be complete without a visit to Leningrad, unshakable as Russia, '*Nekolebimo kak Rossiya*'—it is wise to have the opening stanzas of Pushkin's 'Bronze Horseman' well in hand before visiting the city. Leningraders are impossible chauvinists about their city, and Pushkin, as well as others, has made it almost justifiable for them to act that way. The style of the city differs enormously from Moscow and is fantastically permeated with the great moments of Russian literature. Many of my Leningrad friends would

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complain that Moscow had usurped the institutes and cultural legacies which were rightfully the property of the former capital. One even suggested that I write to Khrushchev and explain why the Gorki Archives really belong to Leningrad, where they were up to the 1930s, not in Moscow. I told him just how efficacious I thought such a letter from me would be. The institutes and the university have their own specifically Leningrad characteristics. Their inhabitants are at once more vivacious, more nervous, more chain-smoking—their very language sounds different. After I became attuned to the differences between the Moscow and Leningrad dialect, I saw how much of the difference in behaviour is reflected in the octave drop in pitch of the Moscow '*khaaa-raaa-sho*' contrasted with the slight tremor of the Leningrad pitch, ending just one quarter of a tone higher on the last syllable than it starts on the first syllable: '*praav-da*?' They all made merciless fun of my poor little interjection '*Ne pravda li*?'

In spite of the concentration of Gorki materials in Moscow, there is some very interesting Gorki criticism being done in Leningrad, deriving from the splendid bibliographical work of Balukhaty and Muratova. We had some very interesting and intense discussions, while the old master herself raked me over the coals for some earlier articles of mine. The old Bolshevik fire still burns purely and brightly in those eyes, and it was a pleasure and a wonder to behold. The younger disciples are also doing good work, and I am sure we will hear from them in the future. I recognised in their reactions some of my own generation's reactions to the world of the twentieth century. I regret very much that I had too little time for more extensive discussions with the people at the Leningrad Institute of Russian Literature, and I hope there will still be opportunity for it in the future.

But there is nothing, absolutely nothing in this world, to match walking along Nevsky Prospekt and the River Neva embankment, especially during the time of white nights, the season of the midnight sun. It is a universe of its own, its beauty spread out on a scale whose vastness can only be caught by calling it 'Russian'. Walking along Nevsky late on a warm night, with the sidewalks gleaming ahead, with patches of wet and dry between the caretakers' hoses, one finally understands Gogol's warning not to trust that damned Nevsky, if you don't want your senses turned topsy-turvy and your overcoat smeared with obnoxious grease. Nevsky at night seems to dissolve into a kind of never-never land.

And Falconnet's monument to Peter the Great demands its tribute. One can stand there and watch the policemen chase away the local hooligans for making a disturbance with their motor-scooters. One can also stand or stroll on the opposite bank of the river, just as Pushkin did, and see Peter's horse galloping under the ghostly light that shines on it throughout the night; it is as if one sees all of Russia galloping with him.

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The Russian people are marvellous and terrible by turns, speaking a language about which Turgenev, who well knew the despair caused by what 'goes on at home', said: 'It is impossible to believe such a language was not given to a great people'. It took my stay in Russia to really understand what Turgenev was talking about.

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MEETING THE PHILOSOPHERS

Lewis S. Feuer

I MAKE no claim to being an 'area specialist' on the Soviet Union, but for many years I have read the literature on Soviet society and ideology. For several years I attended courses in the Russian language, and acquired a stuttering knowledge. My hope in going to the Soviet Union was to do what I had once done in Japan—namely, to engage in discussions with its philosophers, sociologists, and students, to speak with them while their doubts and searchings had not yet been blue-pencilled out of existence by editorial committees, administrators, and bureaucrats. I was to find that it took a month or more to learn in the Soviet Union what needed only a week in Japan. One could meet readily in Japan, for instance, with a variety of factions in the Zengakuren, but in the Soviet Union my meetings with free student circles had to be arranged with caution. Where Marxist professors in Japan would speak freely of their different tendencies, among Soviet professors there was a conditioned preliminary response to profess a unanimous consensus in dialectical materialism, even when their differences were patently straining the consensus into a dissensus, and tearing the ideological garments at the seams.

During four and a half months, I talked with upwards of a hundred and fifty Soviet philosophers and social scientists, sometimes for an hour, sometimes for five hours. At the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Moscow, I gave five lectures to the research workers, ranging in number from twenty to fifty. I went to Tashkent to talk with the Institute of Philosophy and Law in Uzbekistan, and to Tbilisi, for long discussions with scholars at the Georgian Institute of Philosophy. At Leningrad, I inquired into the projects of the hard-working sociologists of the Social Research Laboratory. Most of all, I learned from discussions with Soviet philosophers who raised objections and questions at my lectures.

My first lecture was on 'The Development of Dewey's Pragmatism'. The audience consisted largely of the Institute's Section on Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology. I suggested this subject because I thought it would enable me to raise directly what I regarded as shortcomings and misstatements in the studies by Soviet ideologists of American philosophy. The discussion which followed showed how hard the Soviet ideological stance makes it for them to approach the history of ideas in an empirical spirit.

In the last few minutes of the lecture, I considered the allegation which I found in Soviet books that Dewey was the philosopher of American imperialism. I said that from his first political writings, Dewey had been a critic of all imperialist ideology; that his essay on savage mind in 1902 had been directed against racist imperialism in

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the aftermath of the Spanish-American War; that he had lived in China for two years and had witnessed the May Fourth movement in 1919, and had written a series of remarkable articles defending its anti-imperialist programme; that he had been a critic of American imperialism in Mexico; that he had been personally invited by Krupskaya, presumably on Lenin's behalf, to help in reorganising Soviet education; that he had visited the Soviet Union in 1928, and written a series of warmly enthusiastic reports concerning the Soviet experiment; that, finally, the Soviet attacks on Dewey as an imperialist philosopher had begun only in the mid-thirties when Dewey criticised the Moscow trials and purges. 'You yourselves,' I said, 'have since then come to recognise that with regard to these trials Dewey was right and Stalin was wrong.'

The young philosophers in the audience listened intently, and did not challenge these observations. But the chairman cautioned everybody to remember that I was giving my 'personal opinions', and that they should bear in mind that Dewey had supported Trotsky, and that Trotsky had been trying to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union. It was amazing. These were not illiterates; these were the picked Soviet research workers on Western thought, and all had to acquiesce in this nonsense. Questions on my findings and method followed, and then the floor was taken by the Soviet authority on American pragmatism, Yuri Melvil. Dewey, he asserted, *was* the philosopher of American imperialism, and all the facts I had adduced were trivial; for 'objectively' Dewey was a supporter of imperialism; he quoted from an American book which said that Dewey had become anti-communist long before it was fashionable to be so.

I prevailed on the chairman to allow me a few minutes to reply (it is the custom of the Communist Party to allow its spokesman the last word). I pointed out what a 'dogmatic Marxist' he was, for his dogmatism was such that no set of facts could possibly move him from his belief that Dewey 'objectively' was a philosopher of imperialism; this was using 'objectively' in an unverifiable sense to conform to dogmatic preconceptions. (There was a round of pleased laughter from the younger side of the room.) I then tried to show how the history of American philosophy did not confirm the Marxist formula that materialism was the progressive philosophy, and idealism the reactionary. Transcendentalism, for instance, was the philosophy of the most radical group of reformers in American history—the New Englanders, who, before the Civil War, dedicated themselves to socialist and abolitionist movements. I said I had once been a Marxist, but that my experience, and philosophical and sociological studies, had persuaded me there were basic limitations to Marxism.

IT would be hard to exaggerate the degree to which the Stalinist era extirpated original philosophy and social science, and how

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its effects still persist. The sense of a continuing and supporting tradition of philosophical discussion is absent. I asked one young philosopher, the author of a work on English intuitionist ethics, if he could give me the title of a good history of Soviet philosophy; I remarked that in the United States we had several histories of American philosophy. He replied, after a moment's thought, that no such history of Soviet philosophy existed. The reason, he said, was simple: they had no need of one because, unlike America, they had no different schools of ideas; everybody worked within the framework of Marxist philosophy. This struck me as tantamount to admitting that the philosophical life of his country was so uninteresting that it didn't deserve to be written; why bother writing a history of commentaries and explications of the Truth which was already written clearly enough by Marx and Lenin? The young philospher went on to add that a chapter on philosophy during the Lenin period had been prepared for the sixth volume of their collective history of philosophy, but it had been so much criticised that it had never been published. Clearly, silence about the destroyed generation of Soviet thinkers is still regarded as judicious.

An incident during the discussion of my second lecture on 'The Sociology of Science' illustrated vividly the official obliteration of the Soviet philosophical past. I was presenting material which was published the following month in a book, *The Scientific Intellectual*. In reply to a question, I said that I disagreed with a seminal Marxist essay in this field. Someone asked to what essay I was referring. I answered it was an article by the Soviet scholar, B. Hessen, 'The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's *Principia*', published in 1931 in a book called. . . . The chairman looked at my interpreter, an unspoken message seemed to flash between them, and the interpreter interrupted me: 'We do not know anything of the author. I do not know his name.' The chairman nodded assent. I looked at the audience. Not a word, not a question about the Soviet scholar to whom I had referred. In any normal gathering, the scholars would have been eager to get the exact reference to an important, neglected essay of one of their own countrymen. But with one glance they had been warned: Do not ask about this man. No doubt the book *Science at the Crossroads* was known to both the chairman and interpreter; its opening essay was by the still unrehabilitated Nikolai Bukharin, and Hessen himself evidently vanished during the Stalinist era. Their names are still enveloped in the collective repression of Soviet memory; references to their writings are to be avoided by the prudent Soviet scholar.

My third lecture was on 'Contemporary American Thought'. I chose this subject because I wanted to emphasise the tremendous variation in American philosophies, the 'law of the spectrum', I called it, according to which the distribution of philosophies was primarily the outcome of differences in individual temperament, and the 'law of the

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wings', in accordance with which every philosophical movement, whether pragmatism, idealism, or materialism, tended to evolve into right, left and centre wings. I spoke of the generational differences among American philosophers—how the older philosophers were idealist, realist, or pragmatist, the middle-aged ones naturalist or positivist, and the younger ones, existentialist or ordinary linguisticians, and suggested that under normal conditions such a spectrum of philosophies would manifest itself in the Soviet Union, that this was typical of societies where the spectrum was not deflected by external pressure.

I was promptly challenged at that meeting and at subsequent discussions to apply these 'laws' to Soviet philosophy. When I first did so, and pointed to the emerging diversity which I had encountered among Soviet philosophers, I was told that a few weeks of discussions were no sufficient basis for such a judgment; all Soviet philosophers were dialectical materialists. As the months went by, and the discussions accumulated, it became still more evident to me that a variety of conflicting philosophies is emerging in the Soviet Union, and that they are housed together under the rubric 'dialectical materialism' in an unstable equilibrium. Dictatorial power, not intellectual agreement, imposes the harness of a planned ideology on recalcitrant temperaments. Nevertheless, even within the framework of the mandatory creed, one discerns the workings of the law of the spectrum. In the Soviet Union, the counterpart exists for every philosophical movement in Western Europe and America. If planned ideology was eliminated, one might expect a flowering of these diverse philosophical trends.

AMONG the young philosophers, I found chiefly three trends: scientific realism, existentialism, and pragmatism. The scientific philosophers are (what I called) 'scientific realists', that is, their 'materialism' is simply a belief in the reality of the physical world. They are engaged in catching up with problems and readings which were central in American philosophy thirty-five years ago. I found circles, for instance, studying such works of Bertrand Russell as *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* and the more recent *Human Knowledge*. They are intrigued by the concepts of 'structure' and 'isomorphism', and talk very much in Russell's terms about how only the structure of the physical world can be known. They tend to reject Engels' theory of sensation as a 'reflection' of the world, and find this to be 'mirror-magic'. They take the basic meaning of 'reflection' to be 'isomorphism'. The scientific realist group is on friendly political terms with the Soviet existentialists, that is, they regard them as 'moral people'. They do not, however, think highly of the philosophical merits of the existentialists, who in their opinion have not yet broken with the Hegelian concept that contradictions can exist in reality.

What characterises the Soviet existentialists? In the first place, they prefer to study the humanistic Marx of the *Economic-Philosophic*

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Manuscripts, the Marx of the concept of alienation. As one professor observed: 'They are interested in Marx when he was not yet a Marxist.' When I noted that this was the precise point—that they preferred the Marx who was not a Marxist—he retorted: 'They will evolve towards Marxism.' The Soviet existentialists are concerned with problems of freedom and ethics which were banished from the consciousness in the Stalinist era; they are concerned with the quality of individual life rather than with the tactics of ideological class struggle. They enjoy reading such authors as Berdyaev and Solovyov, and take an interest in Freud. They find German existentialist philosophy more interesting than American thought, and feel themselves closer in spirit to the Germans than to the Americans. The Germans are said to be deeper, to raise at least the problems of existence even though they cannot solve them; the Americans are regarded as proponents of common sense, as relatively superficial.

Both the scientific realists and the existentialists are together in one camp as 'anti-dogmatists'. 'The dogmatists', said a young philosopher, 'are the previous people, the immoral ones, who fear that logical methods will unmask their foolish doctrines.' 'In what way,' I asked, 'are they immoral?' 'They are immoral,' he replied, 'in their daily practice; they try to suppress their enemies administratively. When a person can prove something, he doesn't need illegal methods.' The scientific realists and the existentialists regard each other as 'socially progressive' because both oppose the dogmatic Stalinists. This fact of their political unity is perhaps an item of evidence against the historical-materialist theory of ideas, since, on the face of it, their philosophical differences correspond to no differences in politics, and this indeed may be the beginning of philosophy and the end of ideology in the Soviet Union.

The existentialists and scientific realists do not, of course, exhaust the modes of philosophy found among young Soviet thinkers. A significant group, particularly in the social sciences, is drawn to American pragmatism. The dogmatists continue to insist that pragmatism is a form of subjective idealism, but some younger thinkers are turning to the study of Peirce and Dewey. They are concerned with clarifying such an ambiguous concept as 'practice'. As Marxists, they hold that the Marxist sociology of revolution is confirmed in 'practice', but what does this mean? There is not a large collection of revolutions which would give meaning to probability-frequencies as the verificational basis for their assertions. Confronted by a series of ambiguities in 'practice', they propose vague solutions which are remarkably akin to Dewey's logic.

ALL the varieties of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union fasten on different texts of Marx, Engels, and Lenin for their support. The scientific realists make their appeal to Lenin's *Materialism*

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and Empirio-Criticism. Neo-dialecticians prefer to quote from Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*. The positivist-inclined cite from *Anti-Dühring* the passages where Engels speaks of the replacement of philosophy by science. The historicists quote the second Preface to Marx's *Capital*, whereas the anti-historicists cite Marx's letter to Mikhailovsky and Engels' letters on historical materialism. The pragmatists like to recite Marx's *Theses on Feuerbach*. The existentialists quote from the *Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts*. When will the revolt against canonical texts begin?

The younger sociologists have as quietly as possible discarded the dialectical methodology. According to Marx, there were no universal laws of social science; each social system had its specific sociological laws, but a law common to diverse social systems was out of the question. The Soviet sociologists, under the pressure of their actual researches, have found themselves obliged to drop this dialectical outlook. Professor Kharchev at Leningrad, for instance, found that one-fourth of the married couples were living under 'abnormal housing conditions.' This was a situation, he argued, common to all industrial countries; France for example, with its 'hotel families' was in a similar position. I observed that he was engaged in a revisionist enterprise, for according to the dialectical standpoint there should be a capitalist law of population and a socialist law, but not one common to all industrial societies, socialist or capitalist. Professor Kharchev, of course, denied that he was a revisionist; it would be revisionism, he said, to assert that history knows no progress, or to deny that existence determines consciousness, but it was not revisionist to ascertain a general law by means of concrete researches. Thus the dialectical method is being revised out of existence by Soviet methodologists, even as they continue to profess their unswerving loyalty. Similarly, in Moscow, one investigator has found a decline in the average size of the urban family which evidently brings it even lower than the comparable American figure. At any rate, he supports the view that a general pattern with similar birth control practices is emerging in all industrial countries, socialist as well as capitalist. But what then of Marx's attack on the Malthusian notions as arising from specific capitalist conditions? To their great good fortune, the young Soviet demographers have managed to find a canonical text, a letter of Engels to Kautsky in 1881, which acknowledges that even communist society may find itself 'obliged to regulate the production of human beings', and 'to achieve by planning a result which has already been produced spontaneously, without planning, in France and Lower Austria'.[1] They are thus in a position to argue that a universal law and pattern of population common to both socialist and capitalist countries does not contravene their philosophy. Thereby the long paragraph on the dialectical method in Marx's second Preface to *Capital* is rescinded.

[1] *Cf. Marx and Engels on Malthus* (London, 1953), pp. 108–109.

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THE official conception of philosophy as ideology makes it difficult for the ideologists to understand the nature of American philosophy and society. They project the Soviet model on American thought, and regard American philosophy as a kind of official ideology akin to their own. I encountered this projection many times. For instance, when I lectured on 'Contemporary American Thought', one questioner asked me about the influence of such Catholic philosophical journals as the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, *New Scholasticism*, and *Thought*. When I replied that their influence was small, he was extremely sceptical, and said that after all President Kennedy was a Catholic, and that consequently, the importance of Catholic ideology must have increased. I assured him that despite President Kennedy's election, I did not know a single colleague who read the periodicals he had named, that the fact that the President was a Catholic had in no way affected philosophical teaching in the United States, and that, if anything, I felt that Kennedy's election had strengthened the liberal rather than the ideological side of Catholicism. The questioner was puzzled. In the Soviet Union, the philosophical views of the head of the government do become those of the universities, and he found it hard to conceive that the religion of the American President was not reflected in the American universities.

The primary task of Soviet philosophers, in the government's eyes, is to serve as officers of ideological warfare against the West and against 'ideological coexistence'. The Institute of Philosophy should be renamed more accurately the Institute of Ideological Warfare. The Section on Bourgeois Philosophy and Sociology, for instance, instructs each research worker to prepare an authoritative refutation of some bourgeois representative; such 'ideologettes' are in preparation against Husserl, Hartmann, Santayana, the German realists, Whitehead, personalism, French Positivism, German neo-Thomism, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

This conception of philosophy as ideological warfare enforces on its practitioners a spirit which we might call '*protivism*'. The word 'protiv' means 'against'; it is the most characteristic word in Soviet philosophical essays. They are 'protiv' existentialism, 'protiv' pragmatism, 'protiv' realism, 'protiv' abstractionism, 'protiv' whatever emanates from the bourgeois world. Whether it's a biography of Marx, a treatise on Buddhism, or an analysis of American culture, somewhere the Soviet ideologist is called upon by the Institute head, or his section chief, or the party group, or the magazine editors, to sound the keynote of protivism which alone shows that the given work is helping to fulfil the role assigned to philosophy in the seven-year plan.

This protivism ramifies throughout Soviet ideology in manifold ways—choice of titles of books, choice of subjects, choice of arguments. A young scholar told me of the book he is writing on the emergent

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evolutionists; he would like to call it, he said wistfully, *Man and Movement*, but its title will be *English and American Philosophy in the Epoch of Imperialism*. Another scholar who has turned from contemporary philosophy to ancient Asian thought in order to escape ideological pressures told me he would probably have to compromise by studying the philosophy of Nehru. I encountered an amusing instance of protivism in the person of Professor Sokolov of Moscow State University. He had reviewed my book in Spinoza recently in *Voprosy Filosofii* on the whole favourably, while regretting my lapses into 'Freudo-positivism'. I mentioned to him that I had sent a copy of my book to Premier Ben Gurion of Israel who had then responded with a friendly appreciative letter. Professor Sokolov was incredulous: 'But how can that be?' he said. 'Your book is against (*protiv*) the Judaistical interpretation of Spinoza. How could Ben Gurion have written you a friendly letter?' I replied that Ben Gurion was keenly interested in Spinoza's philosophy, and that I believed he would appreciate my study for whatever scholarly merit it might have. But Professor Sokolov remained adamant. The logic of protivism dictated that the Israeli Premier should have taken a stand against my book; my friendly philosophical correspondence with him violated the 'laws' of ideological warfare.

The language of protivism, militant, hortatory, embattled, finally becomes a meaningless literary convention. I met a smiling young author who presented me with a passionate pamphlet 'protiv' Sidney Hook. I looked at the author and looked at the pages, and decided one was alienated from the other. He was a protivist only when engaged in the ceremonial ritualistic exorcism of some name which was not really a name but an intimation of an unreal bourgeois ghost.

The Soviet bureaucratic ideologists, moreover, evaluate their participation in international philosophical and sociological meetings in strict protivist terms. One day I asked an Institute official which Soviet philosophers were going to attend the forthcoming International Philosophical Congress in Mexico. No Soviet philosopher, of course, can decide simply on his own; he has to be chosen by the Academy of Sciences, and only after having been thus chosen is he allowed to receive the customary invitation and announcement which individual scholars receive, as a matter of course, all over the world. I said I hoped the Academy would send some of the young philosophers who were really interested in discussion with Western and Asian scholars, and whose own thinking was alive. I hoped they would not send a delegation dominated by some of those familiar official figures who had already made their appearance at the International Sociological Congress. The official replied with simple, straightforward bureaucratism. 'You are wrong,' he said. 'Our delegation must be made up of men who can make decisions. Perhaps we can have some young philosophers accompany them, but above all we need experienced men who can make decisions.' I said that no decisions were made at an international

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philosophical conference. The Soviet Academy, however, regards such congresses as international ideological skirmishes in which tactical decisions have to be made on the spot. Theirs is a 'delegation', not a group of individual scholars who have decided entirely on their own to attend and who speak for themselves only. The Soviet delegation is organised hierarchically with a chain of command. It holds meetings at which tactics are determined. It is all thoroughly protivist, but the consequence is that the abler Soviet thinkers generally remain at home while the bureaucrats make the jaunts abroad.

THE restless searching for a new philosophy manifests itself in the purely voluntary students' discussion groups which have come into existence in the universities. There is a tacit understanding within them that their discussions are sincere and private, and not to be repeated to the authorities. I got to know one such group, and found in it a curious mixture of political idealism and technocratic views, and a yearning for more intellectual freedom. The circle was composed of about twelve young instructors and graduate students. We began one evening with a discussion of the theory that the intellectuals were the ruling class in the Soviet Union. 'That is not true,' said one of them; 'if you examine the lists of directorships of big enterprises and leading positions, you will find that most of them are held by uneducated men. The machine-bureaucrats rule, not the intellectuals.' Another continued in the same vein: 'I think the intellectuals should rule. I believe in technocracy. What is scientific is moral, and what is moral is scientific. Not the voting of the uneducated and ignorant, but the rule of the scientists, that is the best.' Another man, however, disagreed. Although a scientist himself, he said he remained a communist, that it was a question of liberalising the system—allowing foreign papers, journals, magazines, and statistics to circulate so that they could make meaningful comparisons.

They wanted to know all about the American beatniks, with whose anti-organisation and anti-establishment attitudes some of them clearly felt a kinship. They were much interested in hearing also about the all-night vigil in Berkeley after the Soviet resumption of nuclear bomb testing, and about the proliferation of student magazines. Their longing for a single free students' magazine in the Soviet Union was patent. Their ignorance of the details of international political debate was astonishing. What impressed me most was how even in such an intelligent circle the capacity for thinking in terms of political alternatives and concrete reforms has been almost extinguished. The organs of independent political reasoning have atrophied in the Soviet Union from compulsory disuse. It struck me that the most significant practicable reform in the Soviet Union today would be a simple one—to begin the publication in the newspapers of the differences of opinion in the

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Central Committee, or to start the regular publication of a *Central Committee Record* like our *Congressional Record*. Then the habit of political discussion might re-awaken among the Soviet people, and they would begin to emerge more fully from their Stalinist torpor.

THE younger generation of Soviet thinkers asks above all for a final reckoning with the ethical and sociological problems of the 'cult of personality'. They do not share the guilt which haunts the older generation, almost universally involved in different degrees in Stalin's guilt. The older men wish to repress the problem; the younger generation observes their evasions; it is around this problem that the future of Soviet thought will be determined. A successful outcome will mean a Renaissance of Soviet Thought, as the burden of guilt is lifted from people's minds. A defeat will mean the repartition of guilt among the younger people, and another Time of Torpor.

The problem of the 'cult of personality' virtually haunts Soviet social science and philosophy; the cost of its repression is the destruction of their sincerity. I asked almost all the 150 scholars I interviewed whether he or she was in any way concerned with the sociological and philosophical problems arising from the 'cult' phenomena. The most frequent answer I got was 'that is not my problem'. A young member of the editorial board of *Voprosy Filosofii*, for instance, knows all about alienation in bourgeois society, and can discourse at length on how Jaspers and Freud show the bankruptcy of their society, but when I asked him for his explanation of the Stalinist era he took refuge in: 'I am not a specialist in this field.' A lecturer at the Institute of International Relations pursues his labours by reading the critiques of America by Americans, and rewriting them in the clichés of the decline of capitalist society. He too is facile in depicting the common man's alienation in Western society, but when asked about the Stalinist era and present-day Soviet alienation will just pass the former over with an unctuous phrase of how regrettably bad it was, and then go on to a glib misdescription of an all-contented Soviet citizenry.

Next to taking refuge in one's specialty, the most frequent answer I got was that the explanation for the cult of personality was well-known, inasmuch as it was based on Stalin's mistakes. How often I heard that self-exonerating phrase about the *oshibki* of Stalin. What is a 'mistake', an *oshibka*? A child does an arithmetical problem for homework; it makes a *mistake*. The child wanted to solve the problem, but its skill with numbers was inadequate. Or a child makes a mistake in its spelling. The person who makes a mistake is always credited with motives that are sound; a mistake is a reminder of human fallibility; it does not proceed from vicious motive. Thus, the very use of *oshibka* implies that Stalin was trying to do the right thing. Its use is part of the continuing repression in the Soviet Union of the facts of Stalinism. One Soviet sociologist in Tbilisi said that when something

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unpleasant has occurred, we prefer to avoid speaking about it; that was why they avoided discussing the causes of Stalinism. I replied that in America the depression was unpleasant, but that we analysed and discussed its causes. The point, of course, is that a terrible guilt is felt about Stalinism; large numbers were involved in its operations, and that is why the phenomenon is repressed by making Stalin the bearer of all that was rotten in themselves, and mitigating it all with the mild, de-emotionalised word, *oshibki*. No American felt guilty for the advent of the depression; therefore no one feared the analysis of its causes. The continuing use of *oshibki* as an explanation for a whole era's distortions is a sign that the mentality of that era persists. For there is a callousness in equating the millions of destroyed lives with a child's spelling mistakes through the use of the same word.

Soviet philosophers and sociologists are vaguely apprehensive that there are problems whose honest study might shake the foundations of their theoretical structure. For the 'cult' confronts Soviet ideology with what we might call its 'Great Contradiction'. On the one hand, the Soviet ideologist can remain loyal to historical materialism, and explain the Stalinist superstructure in terms of the underlying economic foundation; in that case, he finds himself a critic of the Soviet social system. Or, on the other hand, he can attribute the 'cult' phenomena to the effects of Stalin's paranoid personality, his persecution complex, his fears, his irrationality. In that case he would have to have recourse to psychoanalytical concepts; he would find himself becoming a Freudian despite himself, and raising such problems, furthermore, as the factors which made the Communist Party so sado-masochist in its psychology that it collaborated in and glorified Stalin's rule during all that time. All sorts of intermediary theoretical positions are possible, but every intermediary position would involve an admixture of an acceptance of the totalitarian potentialities of the Soviet system and the crucial role of unconscious, irrational, 'Freudian' factors in history.

Soviet ideologists still shrink from the serious study of Freud. They say the study of 'subjective' motives is futile. Once I asked whether the motives of intellectuals in the socialist movement were those ascribed to them by the *Communist Manifesto*. I was told this was an unsound approach 'because on this level an antinomy arises between ethical and material motives. The problem has to be dealt with objectively', they said. 'One must study the laws of development which determine the shift of intellectuals without reference to their subjective motives which they think determine them.' This repression of the 'subjective' is probably the most basic reason for the antagonism to Freud in the Soviet Union. Psychoanalytical ideas are suspect because the Soviet regime wants people to accept all its propaganda on the manifest level, and never to enquire into latent meanings. Psychoanalysis threatens the 'official face' with the underlying 'real face'.

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MY last talk at the Institute of Philosophy brought forth an outburst of populist bureaucratic denunciation on the part of the Director. I was asked, now that my travels in the Soviet Union were over, to give a last report on my impressions of their philosophy and sociology, and had been reluctant to do so. I explained to the Institute official that were I to speak, much that I would have to say would be unpleasant, and that perhaps it would be better if such a last report were omitted. He said they regarded me as a friend, and that the Institute had had such talks in the past from visiting Americans, whom he named. The names in question, however, were with one exception those of American communists or fellow-travellers, who, I suggested, had probably told their hosts what the latter would like to hear; the exception, a professor of sociology, had been in the country too short a time to have learned very much of what was going on. The official insisted, however, that it would be a worthwhile occasion especially for the audience which, he said, would be made up of the young researchers with whom I had had individual discussions several times. On the day in question, however, although the younger researchers were present, the discussion was monopolised by older ideologists, who had rarely participated in our previous meetings.

So the meeting began. Soviet thought, I said, was at the crossroads; its mood was best described in Turgenev's title, *On the Eve*. I proposed to raise problems to which I did not know the answer, and which I did not know how I would face were I in their place. But I had talked with scholars and students in institutes and universities in a series of 'interview-dialogues', the oldest philosophical method in the world. I would compare their sociological studies with work in America.

Soviet social science seemed to me to have failed to confront four important problems: First, there was no research on the conflict of generations. In America we had several studies under way on student movements. In the Soviet Union it was denied that there was any conflict of generations. I had in the course of my travels, however, found ample evidence of such a conflict. At Leningrad University, at an open meeting of the Communist organisation of the Philological Faculty, students had challenged and ridiculed the apology which the editor of *Neva* tried to present for the new party line against abstract art. There were recent occurrences at Moscow State University into which I would not enter. No Soviet sociologist, however, had shown any readiness to study the phenomena of conflict.

Second, I had found not a single article or book on anti-Semitism. They denied that there was anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union but I had visited the synagogues of four Soviet cities, and everywhere had been told that the Jews lived in fear. I could not tell how much anti-Semitism there was; this was a subject for detailed investigation. But questions such as why there had been a recrudescence of anti-Semitism would have to be dealt with scientifically. In America, I added, where I

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believed there was much less anti-Semitism than in the Soviet Union, the problem was nonetheless studied extensively. At the University of California, several hundred thousand dollars were being spent in such an investigation. (The argument which followed, begun by the chairman calling me 'an agent of the cold war', would take too long to tell; and there were several more heated interludes.)

I then spoke of the lack of any sociological article or book analysing the 'cult of personality'. I said that in America we devoted much time to the sociology of political leadership. In the Soviet Union, however, although they evidently knew all about racial problems in Birmingham and imperialism in Asia and Africa, they could produce no scientific study of the most important recent phenomenon of political sociology in their own country. I said I didn't mean by a scientific analysis their repeating Khrushchev's phrase about the mistakes (*oshibki*) of Stalin. I could read those speeches too. I meant a sociological analysis: How many victims had there been, year by year? From what social classes had they come? What varieties of accusations had there been? Who were the accusers? How did the accusers profit by the accusations? I said they should study, too, what happened to the children of the people who were sent to Stalin's camps. When millions of people had been killed and tortured, it was not sociological analysis to refer to it as '*oshibki*'. I had asked upwards of 150 sociologists and philosophers whether any one of them was studying the cult of personality, and without exception they had all replied: 'That is not my problem.' I had been told that historians at the Marxism-Leninism Institute were preparing the publication of the documents on the 'cult' period; I had gone to the Institute to confirm this report, and spoken with its secretary. He told me emphatically they have no plans whatsoever for such a publication. I said Marx would never have concealed such documents.

I tried next to consider the sociological study of Soviet mass culture. I said that though they criticised American culture, they did not study their own culture as the Americans did theirs. There was no study extant of the appeal, for instance, of American jazz to their youth. (Someone interrupted and said they have had other things to do.) I continued and said they had not studied the social consequences of tying their moral education to historical models—Lenin's picture as a hunter in a rifle-shop, Lenin playing chess for the chess club, Lenin with children telling them: 'study, study, and study'—and presenting Marx's character as the model for family life. Questioned, I replied that the letters of Eleanor Marx, the daughter who had killed herself, showed there was a deep-seated unhappiness in the family, and that one factor had probably been the birth of an illegitimate son to Marx by the maid of the household, Helene Demuth. I said that on my way to Moscow I had visited the International Institute of Social History to confirm the existence of documentary evidence on this matter, and had been informed

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the evidence was incontrovertible. The chairman was quite interested, and one of his colleagues then piped up: 'That accords with Marx's saying "*Nihil humani a me alienum puto*".' The only Marxian joke I ever heard at the Institute.

Many of those present had to leave at this time for a candidate's examination. The chairman proposed another meeting but I said I was leaving shortly, and would summarise briefly what I had to say concerning their philosophical work. I discussed my characterisation of their philosophical attitude as 'protivism', and the development of 'Soviet existentialism'. I spoke of the interest in Freud, despite the great difficulty in securing his books. Then I went on to develop my 'law of the spectrum', the emergence of diverse philosophies in the Soviet Union, with critical realists in the Russell fashion, positivists, mathematical logicians opposed to the dialecticians, and those who emphasised 'practice' indistinguishable from American pragmatists. Heads were shaken in vigorous disagreement. Finally, I said that if I had a 'last message', it was that Soviet thought now needed someone who would do for it what John Stuart Mill did for England and Ralph Waldo Emerson for America—to emphasise not 'class', not 'people', but the importance of the individual.

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MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

David Robert

IT is with considerable pride that the Intourist guide takes her group of visitors through the corridors and up the elevators of the 32-storied skyscraper on Lenin Hills which houses Moscow State University. Russia's oldest university, it is today the best-known institution of higher education in the USSR and the Kremlin's most highly-publicised cultural showpiece. If we are to accept the image which the regime tries to project, the entire Soviet Union looks upwards towards the tower of Moscow University.

Throughout most of its 200 year history, Moscow University has been the centre of Russian higher education. As the University's guidebook for entering students points out, not only have such outstanding writers and poets as Turgenev, Lermontov, Griboyedov and Chekhov attended its classes, but a number of the founders of the Russian revolutionary movement, such as Herzen, Ogarev, and Belinskii, were students at Moscow University. In addition, the greatest of Russia's scholars, from Pavlov and Lebedev to Kliuchevskii and Soloviev, worked and studied here.[1]

In the years since the Bolshevik Revolution, Moscow University has maintained its leading position. Among the forty major universities in the USSR, Moscow State University of the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labour, named for M. V. Lomonosov, usually referred to as MGU, has elite status. Its senior faculty roster reads like a 'Who's Who' of Soviet science and scholarship. Among its 3,000-odd professors, instructors, and scientific associates, there are 27 full members of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 46 corresponding members, 57 members of various Union Republic academies of science, and four Heroes of Socialist Labour. Furthermore, given MGU's outstanding history and reputation and its location in the capital, each year brings a torrent of applications for the available first-year vacancies. It can be assumed that, in terms of the criteria applied in the selection process, the 26,000 students now attending MGU are the cream of the Soviet secondary school system.

For the edification of her visitors, the Intourist guide will enthusiastically repeat such facts about the University's past glories and present role in Soviet life and proudly show them the modern laboratories, lecture halls, and library facilities to be found there. There are, however, many problems concerning the educational system at MGU about which she will not speak during her tour. It is to some of these less familiar features of university life in Moscow (which I became acquainted with during a long period of residence in the University) that I should like to turn.

[1] *Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v Moskovskii Universitet* (Moscow, 1962), pp. 5–7.

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THE lot of the Soviet student, even those at MGU—the pinnacle of Soviet education—is extremely hard. First of all, a large number (in some faculties over 80 per cent) of the students are accepted for admission only after they have worked for two years after graduating from secondary school. Second, approximately 40 per cent (11,000) of the students at Moscow University work during the day and study either in the evening division or by correspondence courses. Third, the 15,000 full-time students not only spend five to five and a half years in completing their undergraduate degree requirements but they devote, particularly in the earlier years, extraordinarily long hours to classroom work. I was told by several students that an average week included 35 to 45 hours in class. (The higher figure applied to those students in the natural sciences doing laboratory work.) This was confirmed by a *dotsent* (Assistant Professor) from one of the humanities faculties who regarded the practice of spending long hours in class as a desirable one. ('Well, I went through it myself and it worked quite well.') He did note, however, that this highly intensive approach was being modified and that the number of hours devoted to lectures and recitations was scheduled to be reduced in the near future.

Among those students with whom I had contact, the practice of spending long hours in class tended to discourage them from doing any work on their own. Homework was virtually unknown. After returning from six to eight hours in class, they had little time or desire left to do any serious reading. In order to relieve the tension built-up during long and arduous hours in lectures and recitations, the students generally shunned their books and spent their evening listening to jazz records, playing chess, arguing, reading poetry, going to the University cinema and attending Komsomol and student group meetings. The only exceptions to this pattern were the graduating (fifth year) students who spent most of their final year working on a diploma project (*diplomnaya rabota*), a minor exercise in independent research.

Thus, compared with his Western counterpart, the average student at MGU works quite hard and has little time to partake in the proverbial joys of student life. And a considerable part of such free time as he does have is spent standing in queues. Despite the fact that the new University building was completed only eleven years ago, the facilities at the Lenin Hills campus (not to speak of those in the Old Buildings in downtown Moscow) are already inadequate. Eating in the University cafeteria, for example, is a very time-consuming affair. Though there are two large student cafeterias (plus two smaller dining rooms and a number of snack bars), it usually takes the better part of an hour simply to get your food. (One Western exchange student claims to have read all of *War and Peace* while standing in queues for the cafeteria.) The queues at the University cinema are even longer. Here a wait of 45 minutes to one hour for tickets for a popular film was not unusual. On one occasion, I queued for over two hours to see 'Lady with a Dog' (a particularly good film based on the short story of the same

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name by Chekhov) despite the fact that I arrived at the box office twenty minutes before the tickets went on sale.[2]

Though life at MGU is demanding, it is not without its compensations. Filled with energetic and vigorous young Russians, the University dormitories are lively places in the evenings. This is particularly true on the great national holidays—May Day and 7 November—when the echo of laughter and the sound of clinking glasses can be heard throughout the University. All this, however, changes markedly during examination periods. At this time, the noisy if not always gay atmosphere of the dormitory gives way to last-minute cram sessions which go on late into the night. Examinations are of considerable importance at MGU and failure carries with it harsh consequences. Not only is each student who does poorly on his exams subject to public censure (by his Komsomol group or other student *kollektiv* of which he is a member), but his stipend may be reduced. In some cases, as we shall see, a reduction in the size of the stipend is a major catastrophe. There is also, of course, the danger of 'flunking out'.

Although taken seriously, examinations are regarded with equanimity by students at MGU. In fact, they use the same technique to beat the examination system as do Western students, viz., cheating. And in this respect, at least, they seem to have overtaken and surpassed the West. As a student from Siberia explained it to me, cheating on exams at MGU generally works in the following manner: each student in preparation for his examinations makes up crib sheets for the various parts of the subject on which he is being examined. Thus, a student of Western European literature, for example, might write out descriptions of the works of Heine, Goethe, Shelley, Byron, Wordsworth, etc., on separate sheets of paper which he would fold up into the shape of a tiny accordion and tuck into various parts of his clothing. In addition, he would make up a special 'location index' which tells him precisely where the various crib sheets have been placed. Thus, upon learning that there is a question on Byron, the student will check with his index, located usually in the palm of his hand or under the band of his wrist watch, and find that the crib on Byron is in his left sock. Discreetly, he will remove the tiny piece of paper from his sock and review his notes on Byron.

According to one source, not only do most students use the crib-sheet system (or one of its variants) but most faculty members are aware of its existence and simply overlook it. 'If cheating were not used, and if it were not tolerated by the faculty', declared one friend, 'we would all flunk out'. Thus, despite the great stress officially placed on examinations as a measure of academic progress, the students (with some faculty connivance) manage to dull the cutting edge of the examination system.

[2] In many respects, the new campus on Lenin Hills is a self-contained entity. Within its gates can be found two cinemas, medical and dental clinics, a butcher shop, shoe and watch-repair services, a laundry, a tailor, a large grocery and numerous other facilities usually not found in Western universities. In all cases, however, these facilities are terribly overcrowded.

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ONE of the most daunting features of university life in the Soviet Union are the rigorous entrance requirements. All prospective candidates for admission must pass competitive examinations of extraordinary complexity and difficulty. Given the sharp competition for the 6,000-odd vacancies at MGU each year, one would expect that the minimum level of performance on the entrance exams would be extremely high. Ability, however, is not the sole criterion employed in the selection process. According to occasional newspaper reports and numerous personal accounts, situations frequently occur where good students who have done well on the entrance exams are rejected in favour of intellectually inferior but politically more reliable students. An active *Komsomolets* is invariably in a favoured position in the selection process.

In addition to political factors, a student's ability to gain admission to the University is affected by financial considerations. A sizable bank account, I was told, is extremely useful in helping less qualified students to bribe their way past the entrance requirements. One young fellow from Armenia told me that in order to gain entrance to Erevan State University he would have had to spend several hundred rubles to bribe the examiners.

Apparently, therefore, though Soviet higher education is technically free, coming from a wealthy family helps considerably. This is particularly true because of the inadequate stipends awarded by MGU. According to the guide-book, 'the overwhelming majority of students at the University receive State stipends', but the amounts paid are very low, ranging from 29 rubles a month during the first year to 40 rubles in the final year. In an effort to maintain a high level of performance, the University authorities have introduced an incentive system. While stipends are not directly linked to grades (they are said to take into account both financial need and academic progress), 'students having received excellent grades exclusively are awarded a 25 per cent increase in their stipends'.

However, just as stipends can be awarded and increased so can they be decreased and withdrawn entirely. Such action is normally taken in order to discipline a student should his grades slip or his 'social behaviour' violate the norms established by the authorities. This penalty is imposed in cases of minor infractions of the rules. For cases of major violations, the penalty is expulsion. In the fall of 1961, for example, it was reported that a young *Komsomolets*, possibly over-stimulated by the severe public denunciations of Stalin at the 22nd Party congress, called into question the existence of 'real democracy' within the Komsomol itself. 'We are still not free to voice our true opinions within the Komsomol', he declared. For this he was dropped from the Komsomol and, upon the request of the Komsomol organisation within the University, expelled from MGU. One Party member explained that this was the only action possible. 'This student was a potentially harmful influence and therefore had to be removed to protect the others', he declared.

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While geared, in part, to reinforce academic and social discipline, the stipend system is a source of considerable tension at MGU. First of all, and most easily observable, it builds into the University student body an 'upper crust', i.e., a group of rich students whose families can afford to bribe the right people to ensure their child's selection for admission and, of equal significance, to help maintain their sons and daughters at the University for a five-year period. For this group, the stipends are little more than pocket money to be used to cover incidental expenses. Money for food, clothing, and books are supplied mainly by the parents.

In contrast to this wealthy group, there are considerable numbers of poor students who must count their kopeks carefully in order to survive. Towards the end of each month they frequently skip meals or feed themselves by purchasing a few ounces of cheap sausage which they eat with bread available (without cost) on each table in the University cafeteria. Such meals are usually washed down with a glass of unsugared —hence free—tea. (Tea with sugar costs three kopeks.)[3] These students frequently get into debt during the last week before the new stipends are paid.

Another feature of life at MGU encouraged by low stipends is promiscuity. As a female undergraduate explained it to me, many girl students at MGU distribute their favours to anyone who is willing to take them to dinner or to give them gifts of food or clothing. Outright cash transactions are virtually unknown. One result of this situation is an extraordinarily high incidence of abortions (available in the University medical clinic for five rubles) among unmarried female students. According to one account, the results of a University-wide physical examination showed that about 40 per cent of the unmarried women students had had abortions during that academic year. Amused by the look of amazement on my face upon hearing this report, a girl undergraduate laughed: 'Don't be so naïve. The real figure is probably closer to 80 per cent.'

The Soviet authorities are aware of what is going on. *Pravda* (2 February 1962), for example, speaks about the fact that in many academic institutions 'one still meets those young people who, contaminated by petty-bourgeois ideology, violate the rules of socialist dormitory life and condone amoral behaviour'. In order to eliminate such 'amoral behaviour' and to see that students are 'educated in the highest principles of the moral code of the builders of communism', the University authorities have cracked down hard on promiscuity. I was told that the Komsomol had organised what the students called an 'anti-sex league' which would patrol the corridors each night, particularly in the girls' dorms—known as the *monastyr* (convent)—looking for violators of the 'rules of socialist dormitory life'. A Ukrainian girl student reported that these groups, organised as 'Police Assistance Brigades' (*Brigady*

[3] During the fall months, a considerable addition is made to the diet of these students by the availability without cost of large supplies of cole slaw on each cafeteria table.

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sodeistvia militsii), were responsible for maintaining discipline in the University at night. Whatever their origin, their vigilance is confirmed by the account of an American woman exchange student residing in the *monastyr* who was awakened at 3 o'clock one morning by a group of people pounding on the door of her room demanding to know 'Are you alone? Do you have any "foreign bodies" in your room?'[4]

Petty theft, an all too frequent feature of Western dormitory life, also plagues MGU. One Western exchange student had his room broken into and several articles of clothing, a camera, and a typewriter were stolen. An Iraqi friend reported that his wardrobe was virtually stripped every time he returned from a visit to Baghdad with some new clothes. While such stories are frequently told, it is in fact surprising that there are so few thefts. Not only is the average student tempted by the clothes and belongings of his wealthier Russian compatriots and the well-to-do (by Soviet standards) foreign students,[5] but, should he be so inclined, theft is incredibly easy. Though each student is provided with a rather formidable looking four-inch cast-iron key, each key can open several locks. Thus, even an amateur thief could break into quite a large number of dormitory rooms simply by using his own key.

In an apparent effort to discourage theft among the students, a special trial was convened by the judicial authorities in one of the large lecture rooms of the University in which a young man of about 22 was charged with having committed a number of robberies in the dormitories. The evidence was overwhelmingly against him. The absence of an attorney reasonably committed to his defence made the accused's position even more hopeless. Quite obviously this was a 'show trial' designed to educate the student audience, to teach them that crime does not pay, rather than to mete out justice. Interestingly enough, the part of the proceedings which caused the greatest commotion among the students was not the sentencing of the defendant to two years imprisonment, but rather the admission by the accused that his father, now retired, had formerly been an officer in the MVD. More significant, perhaps, than the noisy student reaction to this announcement was the eagerness with which the prosecution made this fact known. How the mighty have fallen!

THE exposure of Soviet students, particularly those in the social sciences, to training in ideology and doctrine is well known. This characteristic of the Soviet educational system plus the high degree of political sensitivity of these disciplines and the occupational hazards in careers based on them, help to explain why the best students at MGU invariably avoid the social sciences and choose to work in the natural

[4] The timing of such raids is known in advance. The more seasoned participants of MGU's night life are tipped off and remove all 'foreign bodies' prior to the arrival of the night patrols.

[5] By agreement, Western students generally receive a stipend of 150 rubles a month, i.e. anywhere from three to five times that of the average Russian undergraduate.

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sciences, or in language and literature. In my experience, the average student of history, law, or economics tends to be a duller fellow than his counterpart in mathematics, engineering, or linguistics. In 1961 only twelve graduate students entered the fourteen departments (*Kafedry*) in the History Faculty of Moscow University. Of these, not a single one enrolled in the highly-sensitive Department of History of the Soviet Period.[6] The average Soviet student is simply not interested in staking his future on a career which may prove politically hazardous. Moreover, he is reluctant to become involved in a political discussion, particularly about current Soviet politics. In contrast with some accounts which have appeared in the Western press, I heard no reports of violent student reactions to the attack on Stalin at the 22nd Party congress or to the removal of his body from the mausoleum. In fact, it was virtually impossible to find anyone except Komsomol *aktivists* willing to discuss these developments. A fifth-year student of nineteenth-century Russian history had absolutely no comment to make on the recent rehabilitation of the historian Pokrovskii. A young law student sat blankly when I asked him about the role of Vyshinskii and the procuracy during the period of the ' cult of the personality '. Soviet students, like the citizenry as a whole, still seem wary of speaking out on political questions. With infrequent exceptions, they maintain silence if they are uncertain about a political issue.

This is not, however, just a matter of caution. Students as a group tend to be apathetic about things political. On one occasion, just before the opening of the 22nd congress, I attended an open meeting of students of the *Istfak* (history faculty). The gathering of about 250 students was addressed by a senior member of the faculty on the draft of the new Party programme. The speech lasted about an hour during which the appropriate remarks were made on the wisdom of the Party, the superiority of the socialist over the capitalist system, the appropriateness of the policy of peaceful coexistence and the impending (within the next 20 years) transition to communism. The reaction of the students to the speech was quite interesting. Though Russian university audiences are frequently ill-mannered, this gathering was unusually inattentive. Throughout the whole speech, most of the students ignored the speaker. Not only were many of them either reading or doing their French homework (as were three girls sitting directly in front of me), but some were engaged in active conversation. When the speech ended, the student *aktivist* in charge of the meeting repeated over and over again ' Are there any questions, comrades? ' Finally, to relieve the tension, a young faculty member spoke for five minutes, praising the speaker and lauding the draft programme. The students, it should be added, were not for a moment embarrassed by the awkwardness of the situation. From all appearances, this was not the first time that they were not inspired to ask questions.

[6] ' XXII syezd KPSS i podgotovka spetsialistov po istorii SSSR ', *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 5, 1962, p. 11.

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Uninterested in domestic politics, ill-informed about and generally unconcerned with international politics (with the exception of *the* inevitable question: will there be another war?), the average Russian student is highly apolitical. On domestic issues, he is either cautious or indifferent; on foreign affairs, he usually lacks sufficient information to engage in serious discussion. Preoccupied with more immediate and mundane questions, the average student is not terribly concerned about the intricacies of world politics. Very few students knew about the Soviet-American confrontation in Berlin in 1961 and fewer still cared.

* * * *

Despite the many unseen pressures and the trials and tribulations of university life in Moscow, the Soviet student survives and takes on jobs leading to positions of responsibility in Soviet society. It is from the ranks of the graduates of MGU and the other large universities and institutes that the leaders of tomorrow are being selected. That these graduates survive unscarred the rigours of Moscow University and grow into productive citizens is less a result of their experience at MGU than a tribute to the vitality of the people of Russia, a land where, as Gogol so aptly put it, 'people tend to expand rather than to shrink.'

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A GOOD KOLKHOZ

Robert F. Miller

THE average or typical Soviet collective farm is, unfortunately, inaccessible to the Western observer. Quite naturally, Soviet officials direct all visitors to the most successful, best equipped and managed farms. And, indeed, if the observer were to judge exclusively from the kolkhozy he is permitted to see, he would be hard put to explain the need for the recent wheat purchases and the perennial reports of shortages of vegetables and animal products.

Nevertheless, it is possible to learn something from an extended visit to a model kolkhoz. Usually, it has enough of the characteristic problems of Soviet agriculture to give one an insight into the general picture; and since all farms employ the same standard procedures and deal with the same state institutions, the observer can obtain much information on how the Soviet agricultural system works.

I had originally requested permission to spend several weeks in Ukrainian kolkhozy to study the current techniques and facilities for maintaining and utilising farm machinery. My research project, an analysis of the Machine-Tractor Stations as a device for organising and controlling kolkhoz agriculture, was basically an historical study, since the Stations had been abolished in 1958. However, I had a visit to the countryside included in my study plan, in order to interview former MTS workers and see how the machinery was organised at present. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian authorities rejected my request, saying that the farms were too busy to receive me then (although it was winter—not a particularly busy time). By way of consolation, however, the Foreign Department of Moscow State University arranged for me to visit a kolkhoz in the Moscow Oblast. As it turned out, the kolkhoz was more than a 'Potemkin Village', and I was pleased with the frankness, the cooperation, and hospitality with which I was received during my five-day stay.

Kolkhoz 'Bolshevik' is located about twenty-five miles from Moscow. It comprises eight separate villages, each of which had been an individual kolkhoz before the amalgamation campaign of 1951. The final merger had taken place in 1958, when the three remaining enlarged kolkhozy were joined. The total land area of the farm is 7,700 acres, of which about 4,100 are ploughland. This is a moderate size by Soviet standards. Its main commercial activities are dairy farming and vegetable growing for the Moscow market. Field crops include winter wheat (740 acres), winter rye (25 acres), corn for ensilage (500 acres), and oats and hay—mainly timothy, vetch, alfalfa, and sweet clover—(250 acres). Sugar beets, carrots, fodder beans, and potatoes are also grown for cattle fodder. Except for a small portion of the winter wheat

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crop, which is sold to the State, all grain and fodder crops are grown for the internal needs of the kolkhoz.

The kolkhoz maintains a substantial hot-house complex for cucumber growing, with 24 large green-houses located in the two largest villages. Other vegetable crops for marketing are cabbage and carrots, which are shipped to Moscow at various times during the year. Considerable acreage is also devoted to strawberries and apple trees.

The leading personnel of the 'Bolshevik' appeared to be quite competent and business-like, although at that time of year there was a generally relaxed atmosphere. The chairman, P. N. Smirnov, a veterinary doctor by training, had held this post for eleven years, no small achievement by kolkhoz standards. He was a very pleasant fellow, who seemed to have an admirable working relationship with his subordinates. The only time I saw him exert any pressure was at a meeting of the field brigadiers. He asked about the progress of manure deliveries to the fields and was not satisfied with the report; he issued a mild exhortation to speed up the operation: *'Nado forsirovat, tovarishchi, nado forsirovat'* ('You've got to speed it up, comrades, you've got to speed it up').

It was an indication of Smirnov's status in the region that he was a Deputy to the oblast Soviet and had been a member of several agricultural delegations abroad.

Other important members of his entourage were his assistant, who was also the chairman of the village Soviet; the chief agronomist, a pleasant and capable man from the Ukraine, who had formerly worked in the MTS; the chief bookkeeper, a woman; the chief engineer, also a woman (she, too, had worked in the MTS); and the Party secretary, a rather quiet young man from Perm. These people all had their own responsibilities and apparently possessed a considerable amount of decision-making authority to carry them out. At any rate, they did not bother the chairman on minor substantive matters. As it was, the chairman's office had a steady stream of visitors, from rank-and-file kolkhozniki on personal business to oblast and territorial administration representatives.

IN general, there was an atmosphere of satisfaction and relaxed self-confidence in the kolkhoz high-command. Things were going well with production, and, as is the case everywhere in the Soviet system, when production is satisfactory, everything else seems rosy, too. The good farms are guaranteed a share of scarce commodities, such as mineral fertilisers and spare parts, and they receive a minimum of harassment from the regime. When I asked, for example, how the kolkhoz had managed to adapt to the new territorial-production administration setup, the chairman replied that everything was normal. The inspector-organiser, a woman, had been seriously ill for some time and, consequently, had not paid them a visit recently. He added that in

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any case there was little to worry about from her visits, since everything was in order. The impression was clear that the higher-ups did not bother the successful kolkhozy.

I was to see several illustrations of the latitude given to the good kolkhoz in its planning and operations. For example, I was told that the average annual milk production per cow is 8,100 pounds. The potential production with optimum feeding is 11,000 pounds; but this level of production is unprofitable to the farm, given the cost of feed. Apparently the Government was satisfied with its milk procurements at the lower level, which allowed for a satisfactory rate of aggregate increase each year without undue strain on the kolkhoz.

Two years previously the kolkhoz had decided to give up a substantial hog-raising enterprise. It couldn't raise enough concentrated feed itself, and outside purchases of concentrates were, of course, out of the question. In this case, as well as the less-than-optimum milk production, the low State purchase prices for meat and dairy products, even after the increases of June 1962, did not provide enough of an incentive for the kolkhoz to produce at its potential level, although the chairman told me that the price rise had helped the farm considerably.

Another example of relative freedom was in the delivery of vegetables to the city. The kolkhoz was permitted to withhold a considerable share of its produce during the summer months, when prices are lower and storage facilities overcrowded. The plan for vegetable deliveries was divided up into quarterly instalments, and within this framework the kolkhoz could operate to maximise its profits. By withholding cabbage until April of the following year the kolkhoz could realise almost three times as much per kilogram as in November-December. Carrots bring their highest unit price in March. The 'Bolshevik' kolkhoz could afford to hold out for these higher prices, because it had the financial resources to build the necessary storage facilities.[1] It had the additional advantage, to be sure, of being located only a short distance from Moscow.

The kolkhoz also had considerable freedom with respect to crops. In response to Khrushchev's summons to plant corn throughout the country at the expense of hay crops, the 'Bolshevik' had converted almost 750 acres of land to the 'Queen of the Fields'. The chief agronomist and the chairman were not especially happy to discuss the results of this experiment. In the previous year they had harvested a meagre 150 cwt. of green maize per hectare from this considerable area. Some fields had yielded next to nothing. The kolkhoz had consequently decided to reduce the corn acreage by one-third in the coming year, eliminating hilly fields where corn should not have been planted in the first place. They seemed fully cognisant of the folly of such a blanket

[1] See the article 'Nash "monetnyi dvor"' ('Our "Mint"') in *Selskaia zhizn*, 17 September 1963, in which the chairman of a similar kolkhoz explains how he was able to maximise profits from vegetable sales.

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approach towards particular crops. Except for the corn experiment, where they were clearly under pressure to make the initial conversion, the farm seemed to be fairly free of outside pressure to introduce prescribed crops. The chief agronomist and the chairman told me that they were continually testing new varieties on their own initiative in small experimental plots, and that many new strains that gave high yields in other regions did not take to Moscow conditions. Their latest tests were on new varieties of feed beans and peas, also a pet project of Nikita Sergeyevich.

THE chief agronomist, G. I. Mikolenko, was a particularly able if easy-going young man. I was much indebted to him for his patience in explaining the planning process and other phases of kolkhoz operations to me. Fortunately for me, the kolkhoz was then in the middle of working out its production-finance plan for the coming agricultural year. A set of provisional plans and control figures had already been received from the production administration, where they had been sent for approval after compilation by the kolkhoz. They were expressed in rough quantitative terms, showing the amounts of produce and animal products to be sold to the State. In the case of vegetables, as already mentioned, the targets were broken down into quarters. On the basis of these figures the kolkhoz was proceeding to the more detailed parts of the plan. In this kolkhoz, this part of the planning was done without further outside interference. The preliminary plan would soon be presented to a general meeting of the kolkhozniki, and then, in late February or early March, sent to the production administration for review and registration. Mikolenko told me that there had never been any trouble over radical revisions by the higher organs. This is undoubtedly an unusual situation, for a major long-term problem for the regime has been the coordination of procurement tasks with intra-kolkhoz planning. Several revisions in the structure and responsibilities of the procurements network have focused on this problem in recent years. Now the production administrations are supposed to give it their particular attention.

Mikolenko had been a sector agronomist of the MTS. I asked him how he would compare the present planning methods with the system that had prevailed under the MTS. He replied that the present system was far superior; that, actually, before 1954 there had been no real planning in the kolkhozy at all. They were told how many acres of each crop to plant and how much they would have to deliver to the State. Many kolkhozy did not even have a formal crop rotation. As an MTS agronomist, he said, he had felt uncomfortable at having to prescribe measures that he knew were harmful to the kolkhozy. Moreover, he had no real power over the agronomic practices of the kolkhozy; he could only suggest measures to the kolkhoz chairman, who was as much his boss as was the MTS director. He had to please both of them. Although he lived and worked in the kolkhozy, he said, he used to have

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the feeling that he was not really connected with their productive life, especially when he was called upon to represent the interests of the MTS —which were often substantially at variance with those of the kolkhozy. Under the present system, on the other hand, his word was law in production matters. He was in daily contact with the activities of the farm and could, therefore, plan and prescribe more rationally.[1a]

Of particular interest to me was the question of farm machinery on the kolkhoz. The chairman of the farm took me on a tour of the garage and repair shops and arranged an interview with the chief engineer, Potapova, who would answer my technical questions.

The kolkhoz had bought 800,000 rubles worth of machinery from the MTS in 1958, paying the entire amount in one lump sum! [2] The MTS had been located right next door to the kolkhoz, and its buildings were visible from the central square, but the kolkhoz had waived an attractive opportunity to acquire the buildings and facilities for itself. Subsequently, the MTS plant had been given to a Moscow enterprise manufacturing the large portable construction cranes that are everywhere in evidence in the city. The chief engineer told me that in 1958 the kolkhoz had not thought it would need such a large, well equipped base for its own needs. This was a mistake, however, for now it was faced with the need to build an expensive new complex of garage and maintenance buildings.

The kolkhoz now had 24 tractors of various types, from a large S-80 bulldozer to small row-crop models. It also owned five combines, two large grain machines and three smaller silage combines. There was also a large potato-picker, which, it had turned out, was too large and cumbersome for the size and configuration of the land suitable for potatoes. In addition, the kolkhoz had four good-size excavators. (The chairman told me, with great pride, that the MTS had not had one.) These were used for land melioration work and general construction. One of them, fitted with a dragline, was at the time being used to dig peat on the territory of the kolkhoz. The peat was being mixed with cow manure to stretch the supply of fertiliser, a measure suggested by Lysenko. This provided a major winter occupation for the kolkhoz tractor and truck drivers, who were kept busy on a continuous route: from the peat bog to the cow barns, where the peat was mixed with manure, and from the barns to the fields.

The external condition of the machinery left much to be desired.

[1a] I found this favourable attitude towards the abolition of the MTS to be universal among people who had been actively engaged in agriculture. To them the MTS had been a fetter on good farming practice, at least in its final years. Other people, such as doctors and other service personnel, whose work sometimes took them into the countryside, had just the reverse opinion; when I asked them how they viewed the post-MTS system they said that the peasants could not manage for themselves, that they were making a mess of the machinery sold to them, and that the Government should take it over once again.

[2] This was exceptional. Most kolkhozy had required several years to complete payment on their machinery purchases.

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Except for those tractors being used for the peat project or placed in the repair shop for servicing, all of the machinery was lying about in the snow, either in the open or under a huge lean-to shed that provided just about as much protection. Machinery that was pointed out to me as brand new looked quite rusty and weather-beaten. When I commented on this to Smirnov, the chairman, he replied that he was well aware of the problem, but that there was no room for the machines indoors. The kolkhoz was scheduled to begin construction of a new repair and storage complex in the spring. I enquired about the lean-to, which appeared to be quite new. He said that it was a standard type used throughout the country. It was supposed to be constructed with the open face away from the prevailing wind direction; but, unfortunately, in that region, the wind was quite unpredictable, hence the heavy snow cover on the machinery.

Although the tractors all appeared to be running smoothly, very little care was devoted to their external condition. I assume that the same was true of the other equipment, which I did not see in operation. All were caked with dirt, tractor engine cowlings were dangling, and everything was badly in need of paint. This was one of the most striking visual differences from an American or West European farm.

The repair shop of the kolkhoz was quite small for the amount of machinery it was supposed to service. The machine-shop, however, did contain fairly large and respectable universal machines—three good-sized lathes, a new milling machine, and a drill press. There was only one chain hoist for engine repairs and a few instruments for motor tuneups. But I was informed that most of the major engine repair work is sent out to plants in the oblast. For example, large diesel engines, such as the ones used in the DT-54 and S-80 caterpillar tractors, are sent to one specialised plant; smaller engines are sent to other plants. Crankshaft grinding and balancing is also done outside the kolkhoz. All of the other, non-precision, repairs are done in the kolkhoz shop.

Recently, the 'Selkhoztekhnika' organisation has inaugurated a new system of contract servicing for kolkhoz machinery. Potapova informed me that its local office (in the production administration) signs contracts with the farms to conduct periodic checkups on their tractors, according to the number of motor-hours, although she said that another system, based on fuel consumption, was also in use. A specialist from the agency visits the kolkhoz and makes minor repairs and tests on the tractors according to a fixed schedule.[8]

[8] Since my conversation with Potapova I have noted several references to this contract service activity. It has apparently become quite widespread. The State has obviously had second thoughts about entrusting the care of farm machinery to the kolkhozy, even though the latter are still required to pay for it. See, for example, the speech by K. T. Mazurov at the Belorussian Party plenum, *Sovetskaia Belorussiya*, 24 March 1963; also the article 'Registratory braka' (Registrars of Defective Work), *Pravda*, 3 October 1963.

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The training of new machinery operators is usually done in the kolkhoz. Occasionally, however, young men are sent for special training as 'machine-operators of comprehensive qualifications' (*mekhanizatory shirokogo profilia*) at two-year mechanical schools. One afternoon, while I was sitting in the chief agronomist's office, two rough and ready young men in their middle twenties entered and announced that they were students at the Podolskii Raion[4] Mechanical School. Their assignment was to advertise the school and inform the kolkhoz that there were still two or three openings for the next session. Mikolenko told them that it would be difficult to spare any young men during the crop season, but the two men assured him that those selected would be back for work in the kolkhoz for the spring and summer. They would begin their theoretical studies in February and return to the kolkhoz in April. This would give them a chance to put their book-learning into practice. In the fall they would return to the school for further studies. Mikolenko then asked what kind of machinery was available at the school. (He wanted to make sure that the training would be of use to the kolkhoz.) They assured him that the school had the full range of modern machines, including all those on the kolkhoz. The kolkhoz would pay for the room and board of the men it sponsored; the food, they said, was excellent. Mikolenko expressed his interest and said he would let the school know when a decision had been made. This dialogue was particularly interesting to me, for it showed how the training of machine operators was handled now that the MTS was no longer in charge.

Another aspect of mechanisation on the farm was the milking apparatus. The only mechanical apparatus in the dairy sheds were the milking machines and water cups. The kolkhoz kept about 700 head of East Frisian cattle, 65 per cent of which were producing cows. During one of the days of my visit the electric power was cut off in the region. (A new power block was being connected to the oblast power system.) This meant that the milkmaids had to milk more than 450 cows by hand. When I asked one of the women whether she had forgotten how to milk by hand she said, 'Of course not; this sort of thing happens all the time'.

There was no stand-by electricity generating equipment on the farm, although the chairman agreed that this might be a good idea. The farm was planning to begin construction of a new barn and milking shed complex the following spring.

In addition to its mechanical draft power the kolkhoz continued to use horses for much of the lighter hauling operations, such as transporting silage from trenches to the cow barns. The kolkhoz had 90 horses, although the number has been declining steadily. One reason for the

[4] It is common practice in all but formal communications to continue to use the term 'raion' for the secondary level of administration. It is often quite confusing to hear the new production administrations referred to as raions. One man told me that it was just simpler to say 'raion' than 'territorialno-proizvodstvennoe upravlenie'.

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decline is the fact that few kolkhozniki wanted to work with them. The rate of pay for the horseman is one-half that for a tractor driver. Most of the horsemen seemed to be older men, and as they retired the kolkhoz got rid of their horses. The sight of horsedrawn sleds everywhere in the villages was quite picturesque, and having gotten bogged down in the deep snow in motor vehicles on several occasions during my stay, I could see why the horse and sleigh remain a valuable adjunct to the kolkhoz draft power supply. However, as a consumer of fodder supplies that have become relatively scarcer than petroleum products, the horse is doomed to a steady decline in Soviet agriculture.

THE Communist party organisation of the kolkhoz is a large one, with about 150 members, and a committee run by a full-time secretary and his assistant. The secretary was a rather colourless young man of peasant background from Perm oblast, who had had previous kolkhoz party experience. He was taking a three-year correspondence course at the Higher Party School in Moscow and was in the middle of his examinations. The chairman was proud of the secretary's academic achievements and asked him to show me his report card—his grades were almost all 'otlichno' (excellent).

The duties of the secretary are of a dual nature: those directly involving kolkhoz production, where he acts as an inspector or general deputy of the chairman; and those connected with his purely party tasks, where he works independently of the regular kolkhoz hierarchy. The two types of functions were carried on simultaneously in the course of his daily activities.

I accompanied him on one of his tours of the kolkhoz one day. Our first visit was to the peat bog. There the secretary checked the morning load figures and watched to see that the trucks and tractor-drawn wagons were running so as to keep the dragline as busy as possible. He spoke a few words of encouragement to the drivers, and we left on our next call.

This was the dairy shed in the village of Shchukino. The secretary asked the head milkmaid whether her team was receiving its newspapers and journals on time. Then he checked the wall graphs to see how the individual milkmaids were doing and to make sure that the figures for socialist competition were up to date. (There was competition among the villages in the kolkhoz and also between the kolkhoz and its neighbour.) We stopped and chatted with the women for a while. As was the case everywhere on the farm, they wanted to know something about American practices in their particular field. There were also, naturally, the usual questions about American life, especially farm life and the standard of living of the American farmer.

One of the secretary's major missions that morning was to find a party member to conduct the agitation and propaganda campaign for the coming elections to the oblast Soviet. He was looking for a person with

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a certain amount of authority, but all those who were suitable were declining the responsibility on the grounds that they were too busy with their production work. One of the stops on this quest was a sovkhoz agricultural school, located, for some strange reason, on the territory of the kolkhoz. The Director of the school, it seemed, was one of the secretary's chief consultants on such matters. The Director himself had declined the honour, on the usual grounds, but he suggested a certain retired kolkhoznik, whom several others had also mentioned. The question was thereupon settled. The candidate had not yet been consulted, but the secretary was sure that he would accept. He had always come through for them in a tight spot before.

The relations between the party secretary and the other members of the kolkhoz management were cordial but not close. It was clear that he represented an independent authority and was something of an outsider. Yet he was obviously accepted as a normal part of the system, which required someone to carry out those educative and exhortative functions which the regime considers necessary to increase productive efficiency. He performed his tasks quite unobtrusively and was anything but self-important in his dealings with others. He was conscientious but did not seem to be killing himself with his responsibilities. For instance, when his assistant told him that the oblast Committee had called to inquire why he hadn't as yet reported on the farm's socialist obligations for the coming year—he was the last in the oblast to file—he didn't seem to be over-concerned. His composure was probably a reflection of the general relaxation of tensions which characterises Soviet agriculture in the winter time, although the good condition of the kolkhoz was undoubtedly an important factor, too. The life of the party secretary of an average or poor kolkhoz is apt to be much less serene, judging by press accounts. I should imagine that even 'Bolshevik' pressures mount considerably during the spring and fall campaigns, although the dairy farm has the advantage of keeping a large part of its forces active throughout the year.

WHAT of the lives of the kolkhozniki? Having been on the kolkhoz for only five days, I am hardly in a position to make profound comments on the attitudes and desires of its rank-and-file members. Most of my observations must, therefore, be confined to the more superficial aspects of their condition.

There are 871 families in the kolkhoz, with 636 persons listed as full-time workers as of the end of 1961. The great majority of them are women, whose menfolk work in the various plants and enterprises of the oblast. More and more people have been going off to work in industry, although continuing to live on the kolkhoz.[5] The average

[5] The kolkhoz itself recruits seasonal workers for industry from among its members. The chairman posts a list of jobs available in industry and releases kolkhozniki for outside work from November until April, when they must return for the crop season.

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annual kolkhoz labour force had declined from 1,063 in 1953 to 636 in 1961. To retain title to a house and private plot a household must contain at least one full-time worker in the kolkhoz.

Fewer than 10 per cent of the households keep a private cow. There are several reasons for this unusual state of affairs. For one thing, the kolkhozniki receive their wages entirely in cash; cattle fodder is not made available to them as part of the value of their accumulated labour days. Those few kolkhozniki who do maintain their own cows are forced to rely on the meagre supplies of grass in the nearby forests or by the roadsides. Another reason is that the kolkhoz sells them milk at the low State procurement prices in the two stores maintained by the Oblast Consumer's Cooperative Society in the kolkhoz. There was a brisk trade in milk and bread in the store I visited, with apparently no limits enforced on purchasable quantities. The kolkhozniki are presumably satisfied with this arrangement.

On the other hand, many of them raise chickens and hogs for both internal consumption and sales in the city. I wondered how much of the bread and milk bought from the stores was going into home hog and chicken raising, although I saw no evidence of unusually large purchases in the store I visited.

Many of the private plots were planted to fruit trees and small vegetable gardens, with considerable areas of free space. This is certainly a sign of affluence in a country where the private plots account for up to 40 per cent. of the output of certain types of vegetables.

The cottages looked relatively prosperous from the outside, much more so than others I had seen on trips through the North-Central part of Russia. Many of them had television antennae. Most were of the common log-type construction, but a new trend towards brick and concrete block houses was in evidence. I was told that these materials had recently been made available for home construction. The kolkhoz construction brigade builds the cottages for the peasants on the basis of three-year interest-free loans. There was some discussion of building apartment-type dwellings of two or three storeys on the kolkhoz, complete with modern conveniences, as was being done in several neighbouring sovkhozy. When I asked one of the women in the book-keeping office what she thought of the idea, especially since it would entail a loss of privacy and of a private plot close by, she answered that she would give them up in a minute for some indoor plumbing and a chance to enjoy some of the 'culture' of urban living.

The chairman told me that a few years ago there had been a proposal to convert the kolkhoz into a sovkhoz; the kolkhozniki had rejected it. Apparently there is not as much opposition to such a change as many in the West might imagine; sovkhoz workers live considerably better than kolkhozniki in the average kolkhoz. The major advantage of the former is trade-union membership, which carries an old-age pension, albeit a small one. Even the 'Bolshevik' kolkhoz does not

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seem able to provide satisfactorily for its retired members, according to Smirnov, although he assured me that the old folk manage with the aid of their private plots. He mentioned that there was a movement afoot to make kolkhozniki trade-union members. This would eliminate one more element of difference between the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz.[6]

Obviously, it is not possible to draw sweeping conclusions about the state of Soviet agriculture from a five-day stay on an exceptional kolkhoz. Nevertheless, the fact that the regime considers the 'Bolkshevik' kolkhoz a model does give it some significance for understanding the system as it is intended to operate. Thus, by the same token, any shortcomings may perhaps be taken as immanent in the system itself. In the opinion of the writer, then, the following observations may have more than local validity.

On the positive side, a key element in the success of the 'Bolshevik' *kolkhoz is the quality of its top-level management.* Through their efforts the kolkhoz has been able to accumulate enough capital to give it a certain freedom of manoeuvre and a chance for profitable investments. For example, it could purchase heavy equipment for its peat bogs and build proper storage facilities for vegetables. Good management has also earned for the kolkhoz an equally important store of moral capital—a reputation for reliability and competence—which has given it a degree of immunity from stultifying petty interference in daily operations by the local Party and State organs. It follows from this that the good kolkhoz is not seriously affected by the incessant reorganisations of Soviet agricultural controls. These are directed, almost by definition, at the weaker kolkhozy, which the State feels it must supervise more closely. This was as true under the MTS as it is now. Yet, in a sense, it was only the abolition of the MTS that gave competent kolkhoz managers and specialists the opportunity to prove their worth and escape from the continual interference of the bureaucracy. To this extent, the 'good kolkhoz' is a new phenomenon.

On the negative side, there were several shortcomings, even on this exceptional kolkhoz, that are endemic in the Soviet agricultural system. The size of the labour force is one of them. Although steadily declining, the number of permanent workers on the kolkhoz was still ludicrously large. There is certainly no need for so large a corps of milkmaids and auxiliary service personnel in a dairy that claims to be mechanised. A small investment in such relatively simple machines as barn cleaners and the transfer of feed storage facilities to more strategic locations could probably reduce the labour force by at least one-half. It is obvious that the collective farm continues to be a huge make-work project for perhaps 20 per cent. of the Soviet population.

The condition of farm machinery still leaves much to be desired.

[6] Former MTS workers on the kolkhozy have retained their union membership and are entitled to pensions. This, I was told, has acted as a spur to the remaining kolkhozniki to demand pension rights and union membership.

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Even though the machines are now kolkhoz property, the kolkhozy do not take proper care of them. The supplies of machinery are not ample enough for the State to permit the kolkhozy to bear the full brunt of their delinquency in this respect, however, as the current trend towards the reintroduction of a measure of centralised control bears witness. The contrast between the appearance of the Soviet citizen's privately owned 'Moskvich' car and the kolkhoz tractor indicates that there is nothing inherently Russian about this attitude towards machinery.

If one assumes, as I do, that private farming, such as in Poland, will never be permitted to return in the Soviet Union, the good kolkhoz promises the best chance of a fairly tolerable life for the Soviet peasant. If for the average present-day kolkhoznik the transformation of the farm into a sovkhoz would represent a marked economic improvement, the same could not be said for the member of the good kolkhoz. Under competent, reasonably unfettered management the kolkhoz system theoretically provides greater scope for individual betterment. Whether, for ideological, political, or economic reasons, the regime would countenance a large number of wealthy kolkhozy is another question. In any case, the problem will probably never arise, for the number of good kolkhozy is pitifully small. As one of my Soviet friends of peasant background said to me after I had described the conditions on the kolkhoz 'Bolshevik', '*Esli tam tak khorosho, eto ne kolkhoz*' ('If it's so good there, it isn't a kolkhoz').

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BULGARIA'S GOLDEN SANDS

Viktor Meier

SOFIA is one of those towns which make a good initial impression on the visitor. Lying in a fertile plateau between the Balkan range and the spurs of the Rila Mountains, and with its numerous green parks and *gemütlich* old buildings in the *Residenz* style of central Germany, its façade is decidedly friendly. The population has increased rapidly since the war and today numbers 800,000; everywhere, in the centre as well as on the outskirts, there are new housing settlements and other buildings where Stalin-style architecture has, to some extent, survived as an uneasy memorial. However, at that time Bulgaria did not have the resources to build flashy monuments of the type that can be seen in East Berlin and Warsaw; an old mosque from the Turkish period or a small church unintentionally relieve the monotony of the uniform lines of stone, and in the suburbs there are scattered modern blocks of flats, such as can be found in any Western city.

This first impression of *gemütlichkeit* is somewhat disturbed on picking up a newspaper the following morning. 'Unflagging work for the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of the industrial and agricultural plans.' 'General mobilisation for the fulfilment of the plan.' 'Every effort to be made in the struggle to bring in the harvest and increase production' —this is the gist of the heavy black headlines on the front page of the party organ *Rabotnitschesko Delo*, or the tabloid *Otechestven Front* (Home Front), as in every other newspaper. During our stay there was not one day when these headings, hardly varied at all, did not appear and frame the pages of the Bulgarian papers, accompanied by commendations for some collectives or criticisms of the backward ones, as well as lists of the individual districts in order of achievement. One saw again and again on television and on posters in the streets this 'General Mobilisation' or some variation of it, so that in the end the visitor from the 'capitalist' world almost figures as a superfluous idler.

Our visit actually took place at a time when Bulgaria was in a tight economic situation. Since about 1960 (in certain sectors since 1958) the communist regime of the country has pursued a policy of mass industrialisation with the emphasis on heavy industry. The most conspicuous symbol of this policy is the construction of the giant iron and steel plant at Kremikovci near Sofia, which is due to start operation in 1965. It is being built by a labour force of 20,000. The plant was begun in 1961; on completion it should produce 1·1 million tons pig iron, 1·3 million tons steel, and 1 million tons of forged castings. The ore as well as the coke will in part have to be imported, since the country's own supplies of these materials are not highly thought of by experts. In addition to Kremikovci a number of other schemes are under way which were all begun simultaneously, including the chemical plant (mainly for fertilisers)

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at Stara Zagora, the shipyards at Varna, as well as extensions to the already existing metallurgical plant in Pernik, and several large thermal generating stations. Greater expansion is also envisaged in the electrical industry and in machine building (especially agricultural machines); finally, a petroleum refinery on the Black Sea coast is being built which will eventually be equipped as a complete chemical plant.

It can easily be realised (and observed at every stage) that this intensified industrialisation places a heavy burden on the country and in particular on the standard of living of its population. According to the tentative plan for 1961–80 adopted at the eighth congress of the Bulgarian Communist party in November 1962, investment accounts for 27 per cent of the national income, an exceptionally high figure, even on the assumption that in practice it will not be fully reached; only at the high point of Stalinism—1953—and again in 1959, the year of the abortive 'leap forward', did Bulgarian statistics show higher investment rates—*about 30 per cent—while the corresponding figure for 1956 was 14 per* cent and for 1958 19 per cent. In 1956 Polish economists calculated that an investment rate of more than 18–20 per cent imposed intolerable burdens on the population.

SINCE the currency reform of 1962, pressure on living standards is exerted by the wage level. Many people earn only 60 to 70 leva a month (1 dollar = 1·17 leva at the official rate; relative purchasing power, all things considered, would make the rate higher). In normal circumstances hardly anyone earns more than 140–160 leva a month. To show what this means, here are a few prices: 1 kilo of meat costs 2 leva, 1 kilo sugar 1 lev, one egg 0·1 lev, and we saw plain cardigans marked at 20 to 30 leva. Only the price of bread is kept artificially low, and as a result steps have to be taken in the country to prevent the farmers feeding their privately-owned cattle on bread. Scarcely anyone pays more than 10 leva rent for an apartment, but this means that repairs and upkeep are totally neglected. In communist countries currency reforms like that of 1962 are primarily intended to mop up excess purchasing power; before the reform, and in particular before 1958, the population had more money at its disposal, but to counterbalance this, the choice of consumer goods and especially the variety and assortment of commodities was much poorer. Now it is the other way round.

Over and above the pressure on wages, the standard of living is also kept down by other factors, especially by agricultural policy, which has made it impossible to increase farm production up to the required level. In the summer of 1962, to stimulate production, higher prices were fixed for agricultural products, and the increase was passed on to the producers; and in 1963 encouragement was given to private production. However, the population as a whole do not profit from these measures as yet, since their effects will only be felt later. On the contrary, it is carrying the burden of these new regulations in the form of higher prices.

Furthermore, intensified industrialisation necessitates more exports,

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and here Bulgaria is still mainly dependent on her agricultural products. Thus, despite perhaps fairly adequate production, certain things like eggs and meat are either not available at all, or not always. This situation is especially bad in the provinces. In the town of Stara Zagora, with 100,000 inhabitants, we were told that meat could only be bought on Saturdays, and in the first-class hotel of Plovdiv it was impossible to get eggs. Certainly part of the blame lies with the very badly organised system of distribution (much criticised by the regime). On the roadside in the fertile district of Plovdiv you can see mountains of splendid fruit and vegetables, while in Sofia, not 200 kilometres away, people are queueing for the same products. It is little wonder that the people talk even of Yugoslavia as of a paradise; and this reporter too must confess that, on his long journeys through the undeniably beautiful and tidy but joyless Bulgarian countryside, and in particular on his tiresome hunts for a relatively decent eating place, the fleshpots of Schumadija rose before his eye like a *fata morgana*.

WHEN reporting on the Bulgaria of today, however, one must not linger on these things. Much has changed for the better in this country, and since the 1962 Party congress these changes have even assumed a fairly swift pace. They are perceptible in the very atmosphere. The police grip has loosened, and the apparatus of the Ministry of the Interior has been substantially reduced under its new head, an army general. Today one can travel throughout the whole country without restrictions. Above all, the move towards a realistic approach to problems, in particular economic problems, is noticeable. In contrast to the Stalinist era, the people are no longer being told that their misery is their happiness; it is frankly admitted in the speeches of the leaders today that the present period demands sacrifices of the population.

This greater frankness certainly does not make up for the dearth of beef-steaks, but it does improve the general atmosphere. The communists declare that the step towards large scale industrialisation had to be made, for by exporting agricultural products alone Bulgaria could not gain lasting prosperity; when the new policies were begun in 1960–61, the national income had expanded enough to permit larger allocations to investment. Care was taken to avoid such mistakes of the Stalin era as the building of the soulless new industrial town of Dimitroffgrad in the lower Maritza valley. Todor Zhivkov, the first party secretary and Minister-President, justified the turn to intensive industrialisation on the further ground that jobs had to be found for the labour force put out of work by the mechanisation of agriculture. This is disputable, but it demonstrates how eager the party leadership is to find ' real ' arguments for its policy and to present economic construction as meeting the needs and interests of the country.

On the other hand the Bulgarian Party leaders must be aware that their policy of austerity is not compatible with Khrushchev's thesis of communist abundance. One has the impression that this problem is

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acutely felt and that it even gives Bulgarian communism, in all its varying aspects, the strongest creative drive. The regime wishes to impose on the population the exertions and deprivations of the Stalinist era, but today it must for the most part renounce the weapons of terror and force. The consequences are indifference and bad labour discipline; nowhere did we find any enthusiasm for the present construction programme—only resignation and apathy. In the long run this is an impossible situation; either there must be a return to a Stalinist type of regime, or new paths will have to be found. In recent years these have been indicated within the communist bloc; Yugoslavia has started on one line, Poland and Hungary have found new roads, and now Khrushchev seems to be unambiguously on the side of the 'innovators'. All these attempts centre on that well-known problem of 'material incentive', i.e. the producers have to have a greater share, a more material interest, in the fruits of their labour. This is not simply a question of purely technical adjustments of norms, of wage rates, of payment according to turnover, etc.; the issues are much more crucial; economic interest in the success of the undertaking, real remuneration in the form of adequate consumer goods, promotion prospects for all, including non-party members, and generally the creation of an atmosphere in which the workers can lead a free existence worthy of a human being. At present the pressure in this direction is considerable throughout the entire communist empire.

In this respect one gets the impression that the Bulgarian communists are lagging behind their comrades in other countries. The dogmatic, fearful thinking of officials brought up in the Stalinist era still predominates, and these are to be found in the middle and even higher ranks of the party. They fear that any concession would immediately endanger the whole foundation and ideology of the communist system. But these questions, once raised, cannot be suppressed. Many communists are already saying that it will be better once Kremikovci and the other large schemes are ready; then a greater share of investment would go to the consumer goods industries, and the investment rate would go down again —although in the long-term plan there is no suggestion of such a decrease, whether in absolute or percentage terms.[1] A communist colleague explained to us that the headlines on the front pages of the newspapers were a façade, because there is no longer a policeman with a revolver behind the call for 'All reserves to action stations'; but the slogan can also be seen as a call, irrespective of ideological considerations, to mobilise everything which can be useful to the economy. One may be mistaken, but at least one gets the impression that behind the old slogans there are things in Bulgaria which were not there a short time ago.

NORTH of Varna on the Black Sea coast there is a magnificent stretch of sandy beach extending for miles—Bulgaria's famous Golden Sands. Here, between rich lawns and green copses, there is a succession

[1] In the plan for 1964, adopted in December 1963 by the Sobranje, the investment rate has been reduced to 24 per cent. of the national income.

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of hotels, almost all of them built in a pleasant, modern, airy style. One can walk for hours along the long promenade without being disturbed by cars, and despite the crowds of tourists the spacious layout prevents one ever having the feeling of being lost in the mass. From the vantage point up in the pine wood there is a splendid view of the whole bay of Varna, with the famous vineyards of Euxinograd to the north; behind them shimmer the white rocks of Balchik, formerly Rumanian, where Queen Marie built for her Turkish lover a romantic little castle with a terraced garden falling steeply down to the sea. A good hundred kilometres to the south, just before Burgas, on a rather austere sand dune coast, known as the 'sunny beach', rises a second series of modern skyscraper hotels; also laid out in the same pleasing, roomy pavilion style and surrounded by endless expanses of green.

These two places make up Bulgaria's tourist centre. Everything here has come into existence only in the last few years, since about 1956. So that the Eastern bloc countries could avoid spending Western currencies, and avoid too the risk of issuing passports for the 'capitalist' countries, Bulgaria was apparently given the task of putting luxury holidays in the warm south within the reach of all the sea and sun-starved members of the 'new class' of Eastern Europe. Tourism is in fact an important part of the trade agreements that Bulgaria has made with the other communist countries; from these she receives every year perhaps some 200,000 visitors, who come on relatively expensive full board terms, and with a small sum of pocket money for personal needs—scarcely enough to cover a night out in the only night club along the coast. The hotels of these Bulgarian resorts, some of which, according to good communist custom, do not have names but numbers, are also the places where the higher officials up to the most senior leaders of the bloc countries, can meet now and then informally to exchange views.

The most interesting thing about these holiday resorts is, however, something quite different: about two or three years ago, the Bulgarians suddenly and deliberately began to make their tourist amenities accessible to visitors from the 'capitalist foreign countries'. In this policy Bulgaria stands alone within the Eastern bloc, for in all other communist countries (with the exception of Yugoslavia) Western travellers, should they wish to come, are certainly received hospitably, but there is no question of making a real commercially-minded and vigorously-promoted business, indeed an industry, out of Western tourism, as is now the case in Bulgaria. Here the Bulgarian communists have shown considerable initiative; up to now this has been the only manifestation of 'Bulgaria's own road'. The Bulgarians are not aiming at attracting only 'friends of socialism'; the usual hotel arrangements are made in the normal business way in West Germany, England, or Scandinavia; the tourists are flown in by special planes direct to Varna, no restrictions are imposed, and then the sun-tanned visitors are flown home. Of course the Bulgarians know that, unlike the Greeks, they cannot hope to attract luxury tourists or the American luxury tourist traffic; they direct their efforts towards

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the European mass tourist, who generally cares little whether he enjoys the holiday sun in Spain, in Italy, or elsewhere. What is important is the competition in prices, and here one can see that the Bulgarian full-board rates are slightly cheaper than an equivalent stay in Sicily or on the Balearic Isles. Technically speaking these are probably dumping prices, but from the point of view of the Bulgarian economist Western currency earned in this way is of course worth much more than the equivalent sum at the official rate in his own currency, or than what he receives from Eastern bloc tourists in their currencies.

How does a Western tourist feel on the Golden Sands? We spent a few days in a large hotel, completed last year and specially reserved for 'capitalist' tourists. The rooms, which are cosily and pleasantly furnished with all the necessary fittings, have a superb view of the sea. In other respects one certainly will not find the standards of a West European hotel of the same class. It would be possible to draw up rather a long list of complaints, which, though in themselves small, are precisely those things which contribute to what is known in the tourist industry as 'atmosphere', and which would be unusual at this price level elsewhere. They are in part more than compensated by the friendliness of the staff, from the housemaids to the waitresses, who are all eager to learn foreign languages and who go out of their way to make the guests' stay in Bulgaria as pleasant as possible. However, modern tourism, and especially mass tourism, is an industry, and if, like the Bulgarians, one intends to make a business out of it, neither beautiful scenery nor the natural hospitality of the people is enough.

AS we were not holiday-making on the Golden Sands we were interested not so much in the blocked water taps as in certain basic aspects of Western tourism in Bulgaria. Here the communist economic system is confronted by a completely different sort of demand, which the responsible officials have difficulty in understanding but to which they must make concessions if they wish to 'sell'. This problem causes headaches; perhaps nowhere can the disadvantages of a centralised planning system be seen so clearly as in regard to tourism, which, like few other branches of the economy, calls for independent initiative, individual attention, and detailed work. The organisation of the Bulgarian tourist industry is in the hands of the mammoth central organisation 'Balkan Tourist'. As tourism, in the eyes of the communist planners, is still classified as 'unproductive', this organisation seems to serve as the place where deserving officials, who cannot be usefully employed elsewhere, are sent. It is not at all rare to find among them former members of the Ministry of the Interior. At any rate, we did not come across anyone among the senior officials of the 'Balkan Tourist' (down to the hotel or restaurant manager) who had undergone regular training in the tourist business. The organisation seldom functions efficiently: in Sofia we made a hotel reservation at the Golden Sands but this never arrived. The same thing happened to others. The individual tourists who

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cannot be herded into a group have a particularly hard time of it under the 'Balkan Tourist' regime. When the Yugoslavs began to build up their tourist trade about ten years ago, one of the first things they did, significantly enough, was to dissolve and decentralise the central travel organisation.

To pass to the internal organisation of the hotel business: at the head of all the Golden Sands hotels 'Balkan Tourist' appoints a general manager; each hotel, however, has its own manager with another for the restaurant; these work and settle their accounts separately. Both must fulfil a quota covering accommodation and catering for a given number of people; if the quota is exceeded, the otherwise extremely badly-paid staff receive a bonus. There is no other kind of 'material incentive'. Thus it makes no difference at all to a hotel director whether the guests are satisfied or not, since they are directed to him by the central organisation without his moving a finger, and he neither loses nor gains anything if they come again or stay away the next year. In the restaurants payment according to turnover has been introduced, but here, too, the guest cannot get many of his individual wishes satisfied, for the attitude seems to be that he must eat anyway, and, according to the plan, meat is meat and wine, wine; methods of preparation and variety of choice are accordingly unimportant. The only problem is tipping, which the Western guest does at the displeasure of the communist planners, for this distorts the wage fund. On the other hand, the guest has few possibilities to spend money 'outside the plan', although if he had this could only be to the advantage of the host. There are few cafés and bars; the only dancing place does not open until 11.0 p.m., when the quieter visitors feel ready for bed. With regard to entertainment facilities in general, there is an atmosphere reminiscent of all the jokes made about Zürich night-life. The Bulgarian communists may well feel the urge to moralise to the younger generation of decadent capitalists by enforcing rigorous bans against strip-tease and twist, but then is it reasonable to seek to attract those people for whom a holiday consists, in addition to sun and sea, precisely of such amusements?

The Bulgarian tourist planners have very little feeling for those small services which make the foreigner's existence pleasant. Changing money, buying cigarettes or little souvenirs is frightfully complicated and often entails a lengthy procedure. We had to drive seven kilometres for petrol. The visitors are unable to buy Western newspapers (apart from communist papers), although their hosts by no means despise the visitors' money. This too is part of the atmosphere: the Western tourist, having just heroically coped with the bathroom installations, does not wish to be reminded by the tirades of, say, Ulbricht, which lie in piles on the hall tables as the only reading matter, that he is living in a hostile environment.

The insecurity and fears of the Bulgarian communists can, of course, be understood. If they began to decentralise tourism, to meet the needs of the industry, then the question would everywhere be raised, why should the same thing not be done in other branches of the economy. This

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applies also to the wages system, and the foreign newspapers which would have to be imported would no doubt not be read by foreigners alone. The Yugoslavs faced similar problems at one time, but they decided to make the necessary concessions and as a result have had success. The Bulgarians, who are ahead of the Yugoslavs in their hotel-building, are at present shying away from them, although their holiday resorts are somewhat isolated from the rest of the country and the authorities are fairly successful in getting it across that contact of the population with Western tourists is undesirable. Perhaps all this may well change in the near future, but as things are now, Bulgaria cannot present any serious competition to other European holiday centres. Last year 20,000 to 30,000 Western tourists are said to have visited the country, bringing with them perhaps five million dollars. This is a bit more than in the preceding year, but considering that Greece, for example, now draws about 90 million dollars annually from her tourist trade (and this figure is usually raised every year by a good 10 million), Bulgaria's rate can be seen in the right perspective.

A consideration of Bulgaria's Western tourism would be incomplete without a look at another of its aspects. Many foreigners, especially West Germans, come here to meet their relatives from the East Zone, or even from Poland or Czechoslovakia. The Bulgarians have no objection, but unfortunately some of the East German guides in charge of tourist parties try to deprive their groups of this opportunity. In Varna one really has the chance of moving in a completely different milieu of Eastern tourists. For those whose interests extend beyond sea and sun to politics, stimulating contacts can be made. Visitors from Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia by no means avoid conversation with Western visitors, and one soon discovers with what burning impatience these people, who are mostly civil servants or at least members of the privileged classes, await greater freedom and better living conditions from their regimes. The East Germans alone are a notable exception. In any dealing with DDR apparatchiks, not only their especially abhorrent behaviour comes to light but also the fact that even the citizens of the other Eastern bloc states try hard to avoid them. When mixing with the ordinary citizens from East Germany, one is struck by the extent of hatred and bitterness with which these people talk of conditions in their country. If ever the present perceptible emphasis on moves towards coexistence were to be interrupted by unexpected events in the DDR, few questions would need to be asked about whose was the blame.

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OF WALLS AND UTOPIAS

Melvin Croan

'ON the inside face of the wall of the first circuit there are painted all the mathematical figures; more in number by far than all those discovered by Archimedes and Euclid; each figure drawn with care in proportion to the wall itself; every one of them with its own little verse containing definitions and theorems.'

The narrator is a Genovese sea captain whose travels have taken him to a unique commonwealth, a veritable City in the Sun. But he is not speaking now directly from the pages of Thomas Campanella's sixteenth century utopia, *Civitas Solis*. His narration appears instead in the issue of *Neues Deutschland* for 13 August 1963. For a member of that paper's editorial staff, whose name happens to be Wessel (Harald—not Horst), has chosen the second anniversary of the erection of a different wall to acquaint the SED party daily's readers with Campanella's vision. The olden visionary, he assures them, would applaud the Berlin Wall. It may lack the graphic lessons in the arts and sciences which Campanella would have liked. But it goes one better—at least as concerns history. 'Our protective wall imparts historical instruction even without reliefs', for 'it helps the politically retarded in Schöneberg [the seat of the West Berlin Government], Bonn, and Washington, to learn to understand somewhat better the laws of development of our time.' And even more remarkably, 'it has saved the peace in Europe . . . by thwarting the aggressor before he could undertake his aggression'. Thus, if Campanella could come back to life and see for himself the many wonders of the present-day Wall, he would, according to Herr Wessel, be 'made very happy.'

Even the most party-minded of *Neues Deutschland's* readers can be excused for reacting to this pointed lesson on walls and utopias with something other than sympathetic agreement. Of all people, precisely these steadfast adherents of the official line are most fully aware that, the prevailing euphemism notwithstanding, 'the anti-fascist defence wall' was needed not so much to keep the undesirables out as to keep the unwilling in. They know too that the Berlin Wall—and the popular reaction to it—necessitated still further restrictive measures. In the summer of 1962 the Baltic sea coast was effectively sealed off; its beaches and playgrounds now give over a goodly portion of their sandy expanse to the contrived desolation of prohibited zones returning only the eerie shadows of barbed wire and watchtowers. And in May 1963 there was issued an administrative decree which prohibited private individuals from making contact with foreign embassies in East Berlin without prior official authorisation. The decree, it was rumoured, aimed to curb the subversive activities of the ever eager embassy of the Chinese People's Republic. That may well have been true. But it was certainly

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only one part of the full explanation. Another important reason was the regime's embarrassment at having its citizens turn up in Warsaw in the vain hope of discovering an unobstructed route of final passage to the West.

All of these 'protective' measures could hardly fail to convince the population that East Germany has been deliberately made over into a forbidden country. In fact, travel to the world outside has become a virtual impossibility for the average East German. With travel to the East, including the Soviet Union, now as tightly controlled as travel elsewhere, a sanctioned leave of absence from the GDR stands out more clearly than ever before for what it was always intended to be: an integral and carefully manipulated component of the regime's elaborate system of rewards to socially productive and ideologically reliable elements of the population.

LEST this discovery have too demoralising an effect on the vast majority who can qualify on neither count, the regime has been compelled to undercut its own propaganda on the purposes and benefits of the Wall. Thus it happens that the East German authorities currently promise a cordial reception for all outsiders, not merely visitors from the communist countries and the non-aligned nations, but also tourists from the West and more especially visitors from West Germany. So far, however, this promise of cordiality has consisted of about six parts pretence to less than one full part of practical programme. To the first category belong such items as two recently published guide books. The first, a handsomely illustrated *Guide to the German Democratic Republic*, appeared well over a year ago. As such publications go, it is quite serviceable, but it is also heavy and bulky because so much of the lengthy text is taken up by a clumsy exposition of the familiar propaganda line: viz., the GDR constitutes a separate but sovereign German state, where life is entirely normal and energies fully engaged in the peaceful pursuit of building socialism. To supplement this inclusive volume, there appeared in the summer of 1963 a more specialised and less expensive paperback guide to Berlin, 'the Capital of the GDR' (i.e. East Berlin alone). Once again the political message is the same; once again the guide is nonetheless a useful one. Both guide books have sold well. Who buys them? In the main, it is the East Germans themselves. This does not displease the regime. For the books were really produced for their benefit. Beyond the opportunity thus provided to acquaint the readers yet again with the regime's view of its own *raison d'etre*, the very fact of the publication of aids to tourism can perhaps serve to dilute the population's sense of being entirely cut off.

This is not to report that no outside visitors come at all. If there are not many, there are still some. West Berliners, of course, are still excluded. They are not even welcome in the eastern sector of their

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own city.* (This, ostensibly, in retaliation for the refusal of the West Berlin authorities to allow representatives of the East German travel agency to sell visas in West Berlin.) West Germans, however, are in a considerably more favourable position. For cause—to visit relatives mainly—and with the prior permission of the local police to travel and reside within precisely circumscribed areas of the GDR, they may enter. But even then their entry will be no simple formality. The delays to which citizens of the Federal Republic have been subject are notorious. Wherever they may choose to cross, be it in Berlin or at one of the other points along the zonal barrier to the West thrown up as long ago as 1952, all of their papers must be 'strictly in order'. The painstaking check for irregularities is the border bureaucrat's passion. Scratch a West German and you find a fascist. So long as that is the official watchword, and it can scarcely be otherwise, no amount of vigilance is really sufficient. From which there follows a natural bent to petty harassment of all West Germans, indiscriminately and on principle. (When I complained of the inconvenience of a two-hour delay in crossing into East Berlin to a border guard who seemed friendly enough despite the submachine gun slung over his shoulder, his answer was that I should consider myself lucky not to be a West German. 'They', he confided, 'really get the works'.) For all that, though, West Germans can visit the GDR much more easily than most other Westerners. With the conspicuous exception of certain professional anti-Germans from the West who, with quite good reason, are counted as present or potential sympathisers of the SED regime, the prospects for a chance Westerner to receive anything more than a transit visa are still problematic. If nothing else, the elaborate and cumbersome East German bureaucratic machine which demands multiple copies of a lengthy application form and requires at least a month to digest the information, works against it. And should the would-be visitor be admitted, his troubles will only have begun. Among other things, he must expect the close surveillance of the secret police, according to that law of modern dictatorship which holds that the perfection of police control is directly proportionate to the state of backwardness of tourism from abroad. Despite the guide books and posters, the Western visitor is not really very welcome. The Wall remains a wall.

THE Wall in Berlin, though of one piece, nonetheless exhibits an astonishing variety of exterior faces. At Bernauer Strasse, in once Red Wedding, the Wall's otherwise unimpressive height is greatly enhanced thanks to the tallness of the emptied and now bricked-up buildings which flank it from behind. Here the odour of death is still strong, for its cult is perpetuated by memorials erected on the Western side to those who vainly attempted to plunge to freedom. Near the Brandenburg

* [*This article was written before the agreement on Christmas passes to East Berlin.* —ED.]

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Gate, however, where the greenery of the Tiergarten softens the scene, a quite different atmosphere prevails. The endless balls of barbed wire, unrolled this time by the West to guard the Soviet War Memorial and the approaches to the Wall itself from the storm which they might otherwise invite, somehow seem to add to the sense of a showplace. Here, on a balmy summer afternoon, the air is full of the flavour of a pleasant Sunday outing. The throngs who jostle to mount the viewing platform for a fleeting gaze into the East seem utterly divested of political cares. Should individual figures appear upon the opposed platform behind the Wall, they will sooner receive a friendly wave than a hostile jeer. Here the West German tourist is in charge. Camera-happy as ever, his basic preoccupation is to position his chubby youngsters properly, so that they may be duly photographed against the backdrop of masonry. *Berlin ist eine Reise wert!* At Potsdamer Platz the scene is once again a different one. This is the intersection of the Soviet, American, and British sectors of Berlin, and the impression is that of a battlefield temporarily silent but still quite alive. No matter how bright the day or pleasant the weather, the atmosphere remains heavy and grey. The reason may be the desolation of the immediate environs on both sides of the Wall. In the West, a cluster of hastily improvised shops, selling postcards, cheap souvenirs, and other worthless trinkets does little to relieve the oppressive forlornness. One of their best-selling items turns out to be a view, available in a variety of sizes, in black-and-white or colour, of Potsdamer Platz as it once was, a bustling centre and crossroads of prewar Berlin. The original was taken unmistakably in the thirties; judiciously enough, it is offered now as the Potsdamer Platz of the summer of 1932.

The lot of the East German National People's Army detachments who must patrol these forbidding ramparts is not an enviable one. Mostly they are young recruits who have been brought in specially from the provinces for the job. Their ignorance of what lies beyond the Wall in West Berlin is rapidly becoming proverbial. (When I replied 'Kurfürstendamm' to a query about my own address in West Berlin, I got only an uncomprehending stare. 'Where is that?' 'In what district over there?') Every patrol consists of two men who are constantly rotated so that at any given time each soldier is in the suspect company of a total stranger. The regime has taken good care that there should be no buddies here. To make matters worse yet, there is confusion in their orders. They are to shoot to kill but they must now avoid at all cost shootings that can be witnessed from the West. There must be no escapes but equally there must be no visible blood. From these tensions of duty an occasional pass provides little or no escape. East Berliners publicly display their contempt for the youngsters of the National People's Army. There have been repeated incidents of the man in uniform being refused service in restaurants and pubs and, it is said, denied the favours of the ladies of the street. The army newspaper has recently complained of a wave of destructive hooliganism and roaring

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intoxication among the troops in the barracks. It promises a thoroughgoing investigation of the social causation. That hardly seems necessary.

IN Campanella's walled utopia there is but one 'great ruler'. He is, we are told, 'head over all . . . the supreme authority', holding his office 'in perpetuity'. Although no one in East Germany, an editor of *Neues Deutschland* least of all, would venture to compare Walter Ulbricht to the pontiff of the City in the Sun, the comparison is nonetheless irresistible. Having gathered for himself all the leading party and state offices, Ulbricht is unquestionably 'head over all'. Such were the excesses of Ulbricht's seventieth birthday celebration—which dragged on throughout the entire summer in a spectacle rarely if ever before equalled in German history—that he seemed truly destined to hold power 'in perpetuity'. Amidst the flood of books, articles, and production pledges in his honour, who could recall that ten years ago the odds seemed entirely against his celebrating a single additional birthday in office?

To be sure, Ulbricht's survival over the past decade owes less to any hidden magic of his own than it does to a peculiar concatenation of circumstances; circumstances, however, which he has been able to exploit quite skilfully in the interests of his own power. This acumen and the extraordinary display of the 'cult of personality' which it permits have convinced some Western observers that Ulbricht is both a ruthless cynic and an unreconstructed Stalinist. Beyond the fact that nowadays it is quite difficult for any communist to be simultaneously both a cynic and a Stalinist, neither accusation really hits the mark. To the present day, Ulbricht remains essentially what he has always been: a disciplined apparatchik. However absolute his power in East Germany may currently seem, no one knows better than Ulbricht himself that circumstances have precluded any real independence of policy on his part. *Salus sovieticae suprema lex.* When Stalinisation was the order of the day, Ulbricht proved its effective practitioner. If Khrushchev calls for destalinisation, Ulbricht is ready to carry out that order too—albeit within the limits imposed by East Germany's 'specially complicated circumstances', complications which Khrushchev seems fully to have understood. The zigs and zags attendant upon the policies Ulbricht has executed over the past four decades lie entirely beyond the reach of conviction and cynicism. Beneath the man's extraordinary instinct for power, its uses and manipulation, there also exists a residue of Victorian bourgeois morality in the guise of Marxism of the sort so widely prevalent in German Social-Democracy at the turn of the century. It expresses itself in Ulbricht's simple life, a remarkable capacity for sustained hard work, a devotion to nature and the out-of-doors, and abstinence from alcohol and tobacco. In most men, Ulbricht's appallingly narrow and permanently fixed set of mental images would be taken as a sign of stunted intellectual development. That too is less important

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than the capacity of this man's mind, such as it is, to banish self-doubt and thus to concentrate on the pursuit and exercise of power.

Not the least of Ulbricht's accomplishments has been to impart the style if not the substance of his own personality to the men around him. To the extent to which they all appreciate their common role as apparatchiki who must work in a hostile and potentially explosive environment, this has served to arrest and sublimate tendencies to factionalist politics within the SED leadership. Their shared realism helps to explain the notable continuity in the leadership during the five years between the fifth SED congress (1958) and the sixth (1963). While the oligarchs have co-opted some young men such as Günther Mittag and Gerhard Grüneberg, with technical expertise in crucial policy areas—a development which may well spell trouble in the future for the old guard—for the present they remain fully in agreement among themselves and quite in charge of things in general.

The sixth SED congress recorded only one significant demotion from the leadership. Karl Mewis was ousted from the chairmanship of the State Planning Commission and simultaneously lost his position as candidate-member of the Politburo and his post as first secretary in Rostock as well. Known for his personal vanity, Mewis had made the mistake of playing up the cult of his own personality in Rostock to excess. Work on Rostock's deep sea harbour provided an irresistible temptation for a public display of the local boss's prominence; a display which produced claims on his behalf which dwarfed even those which a late governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts used to put forward on billboards announcing public works projects in that American state. Then, too, Mewis had been one of the prime movers in the campaign to collectivise East German agriculture in 1960. Rostock was the first district to report one hundred per cent collectivisation, well before the campaign had really gotten under way in many other districts of the GDR. The return for Mewis' forced pace came in the form of successive disasters in local agricultural production. As a result of all his efforts in his own behalf and for the construction of socialism, Mewis was appointed GDR ambassador in Warsaw. Evidently the choice did not exactly please the Poles; they elected to keep the ambassador-designate waiting for almost a month before accepting his credentials.

Besides Mewis, there has been only one other recent high level casualty of any real political interest. This is the case of Professor Karl Heinz Bartsch, an agronomist, whose career took a great stride forward at the sixth SED congress when he was elevated to the position of candidate member of the Politburo. Thereupon he was immediately assigned to fill the post of chairman of the newly created State Agricultural Council, with far-ranging responsibility to deal with the all too obvious chaos on that front. He held this position, however, for no more than forty-eight hours. For Bartsch, it turned out, had not only been a Nazi but also a member of the SS. When these facts were brought to light by a semi-private West Berlin agency which follows

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these and other matters in East Germany, Bartsch's fall was immediate and complete. It was not so much his unsavoury past which outraged the party as the fact that he had deliberately and successfully covered it up for so long. The *unbewältigte Vergangenheit* remains a problem even behind the Wall. Small wonder that one of the regime's major public spectacles during the summer of 1963 was the trial and conviction *in absentia* of Hans Globke. How many Westerners who chanced to see the ' GLOBKE-CRIMINAL WANTED ' posters in the East realised the multiple dimensions of the indictment?

THE apparent cohesion and purposefulness which attend the activities of the SED leaders do not really penetrate to its middle and lower level cadres. Closer to popular discontents and enveloped in the frustrations of the party's own bureaucratic network, their morale has never been very high. When they carry out orders from above in a strict and business-like manner, they are officially scolded for a ' heartless and bureaucratic attitude toward the masses '. When they relax and try to be more human, they are rebuked for capitulating to backward prejudices in the population or, worse yet, accused of giving ground to dangerous notions of ' a third way ' between socialism and capitalism. In a word, the average SED functionary is caught in a withering crossfire with shots constantly exchanged between the party hierarchy on one side and the subject population on the other.

These party cadres are the people who have been most seriously demoralised by the public eruption of the Sino-Soviet dispute. They speak openly of the *Zusammenbruch*, a word that came into currency in contemporary German usage with reference to the total collapse of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* at the end of the second world war. Once ideological conviction was their strength and comfort in the face of both the changing line from above and the constant complaints from below. Now, with the fabric of communist universalism rent asunder to reveal strands of nationalist particularism, the inherent anomalies of the SED dictatorship in East Germany can no longer be so easily dismissed.

Although less willing to admit it publicly, the SED leaders are no less distressed by the disintegration of international communism than are the cadres of the lower echelons. Despite the prominence given to speculation to the contrary by reputable Sino-Sovietologists in the West, Ulbricht and his associates have never been pro-Chinese in any serious sense. The only credible evidence of really spontaneous enthusiasm for the Chinese road came from Paul Wandel who, dismissed in 1957 from his position as Central Committee Secretary for Culture and Education on account of his lenient treatment of ' revisionist ' intellectuals, went to Peking for a period as the GDR's ambassador. (As for Grotewohl's seeming endorsement of things Chinese, he, it must be said, has not really had an idea of his own since he led the SPD into a merger with the communists. In any case, Grotewohl has been seriously ill for many years—some say leukemia; others, a nervous disorder.) The

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real SED leadership, Ulbricht and those with whom he has surrounded himself, have always been in close step with the Soviet comrades in the ever quickening march towards a break with the Chinese. This, they have fully realised, was exactly what was required of them. If they have not relished the march, and now find the lengths to which it has gone extremely painful, there are quite good reasons for their discomfort. There can be no forgiving the Chinese for accusing the Soviet Union of willingness to sell out the GDR in order to obtain a nuclear test ban, nor the Albanians for their relentless vilification of Comrade Khrushchev, among other things on account of his alleged 'cowardice' in the Berlin question, nor even the Rumanians for their blatant assertion of their own economic self-interest. For, if nothing else, all of these things point up the SED's utter helplessness to date in its own dealings with Moscow. Much more was behind the vehemence which Kurt Hager, the Chairman of the SED's newly formed Ideological Commission, brought to his indictment of the Chinese, delivered before the July 1963 Central Committee plenum, than the fact that, as he put it, 'the leading comrades of the CCP got their training in the old Chinese society where it was customary to learn by rote such formulas and dogmas as the teachings of Confucius and then to apply them rigidly to daily life.'

HOW does the population as a whole react to all this? At first sight it seems to be a revealing measure of the degree to which the average East German citizen still attempts to resist associating himself with the regime that he will feign total uninterest in the Sino-Soviet dispute or, for that matter, in the recent defection to the West of Professor Hans Meyer, the Leipzig literary historian and critic. 'That is *their* affair, not ours', he will tell you, and then go on to complain of the inequities in the distribution of foodstuffs, the long wait for consumer durables and the like. The subjects which seem uppermost in his mind range from the inability of 'customer lists' at the local shops, the regime's informal rationing system, to guarantee a supply of edible dairy and meat products, to the outrageous prices being charged in the so-called *Exquisit* shops, where luxury items are readily available to members of the new class. (Visitors to East Berlin are advised to look in at one such establishment, *Kunst ins Heim*, on Karl-Marx Allee, formerly Stalinallee, to observe the *objets d'art* for sale there and to note carefully the prices being asked.)

To gauge public opinion in a totalitarian society remains a hazardous exercise, fraught with its own hidden pitfalls. The visitor to East Germany is likely to encounter his share of informants who reject in picturesquely profane language the communist regime and all its works. He will also meet, as if by pre-arrangement, his share of regime enthusiasts, and, if he is lucky, may even be exposed to some people who for reasons of psychological necessity as well as intellectual honesty will try to discriminate for him between the negative sides of their daily

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existence and what is called the regime's ' positive achievements '. Beyond this welter of opinions, pro and con, the inquiring traveller would do well to read the East German provincial press (an embargo has been placed on its despatch to the West since the autumn of 1961), and to pay special attention to the letters-to-the-editor. Such columns regularly contain quite candid expressions of many of the same basic concerns and complaints which East Germans regularly send off to RIAS in West Berlin. (That is a story in itself, for, despite uninterrupted jamming and periodic campaigns against the American broadcasting station, East Germans still manage to tune in. They continue to write to the station as before, mailing their letters under cover to a chance address in West Berlin with a request that they be forwarded. Such is the solidarity of the Berliners with their compatriots behind the Wall that few, it is said, of these letters fail to reach their final destination.)

Several striking points emerge from a consideration of all these sources. First of all, East Germans have recovered from the shock of 13 August 1961. Public morale has climbed out of the depths of despair to which it plummeted in the wake of the regime's action in Berlin and the crackdown which followed in the GDR as a whole. To this day, however, there is a marked difference between East Berlin, where the atmosphere of military siege imposed in 1961 has not fully lifted, and elsewhere in the country. The campaign to tidy up East Berlin and to give it the grace and beauty befitting a capital has done little so far to alleviate the sullen popular mood immediately behind the Wall. Elsewhere, however, the regime's conscious effort to relax internal tensions as part of its ostensible commitment to a relaxation of international tension, has brought better results. This change, which incidentally came only after Khrushchev removed his missiles from Cuba, is reflected in all aspects of public life, with the conspicuous exception of the realm of arts and letters, which is once again in the tenacious grip of official obscurantism.

This is not to say that the population at large has come to accept the Wall or to resign itself to the restrictions which followed. On the contrary, the question with which the party's spokesmen and agitators have had most frequently to deal is, ' why can't we travel freely to visit relatives in the West?' The party leadership, up to and including Ulbricht, have taken to evasive and defensive replies. But by trying their utmost to place the blame squarely on Bonn and the West, they also implicitly acknowledge that the present situation is eminently abnormal and encourage hopes that it may soon be altered. This, in turn, only means more headaches for the regime's propagandists. Gratified as they were, for example, by the genuinely enthusiastic popular response to the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty, they could only be appalled to realise how widespread was the view that the next step towards an international detente should be not a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers, but rather a total reversal of the Soviet Union's previous policy on the German question. Just

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how this is to come about, few East German opponents of the SED regime are prepared to say. On one point, however, there is surprising agreement. If the torrent of letters which have poured into RIAS ever since the first rumours of the possibility of credits from Bonn to the East German regime became public is any indication, there is universal rejection of any policy of concession to Ulbricht. On the contrary, what is proposed is an even tighter embargo on the GDR, in the expectation that such a punitive policy would produce immediate results. 'We will gladly suffer many more deprivations, if only it hastens the end of this regime.' The pathetic lack of realism in such sentiments is perhaps less noteworthy than the regime's evident failure to date to divest the population of its illusions.

Whatever his attitude towards the regime, the average East German citizen is in fact strikingly knowledgeable about the latest developments in the Western world and, however much he may protest his lack of interest, in communist bloc affairs as well. One explanation of the politicisation of East Germany's inhabitants, given especially by SED functionaries who have broken with the regime, is that the Ulbricht dictatorship is the best possible training school for democracy. It teaches people to think dialectically, the argument runs, so that they learn to sift the regime's propaganda, and to recognise and reject its lies. At the same time it somehow inculcates in the population a respect for the democratic values in which that propaganda seeks to cloak itself. In other words, according to exponents of this school of analysis, the experience of communist dictatorship produces convinced constitutional democrats. This assessment, it must be said, seems far too facile and far too optimistic. The most prominent characteristic of what may loosely be called the East German public mind is resentment pure and simple. This resentment may, to be sure, express itself as an assertion of the democratic ideals which lie embedded in the Marxist legacy. But just as often it takes quite different and much more ugly forms, ranging from an understandable but increasingly acerbic bitterness against the West to a blind affirmation, at least among the older generations, of the nationalist and regrettably also racist precepts of earlier periods of German history.

In its own devious way, the regime has succeeded in manipulating popular resentment for its own purposes. It may be far from having inculcated spontaneous support for the SED dictatorship, but it can claim some success in nurturing anti-Western sentiments, different perhaps in precise content from what it would desire, but anti-Western all the same. And closely connected with this, all the protests of individual East Germans to the contrary notwithstanding, is the growing consciousness among the population that for better or worse its own future is inescapably bound up with the powers-that-be in the land. For one thing is certain: So long as the regime remains effective master over its own far-flung network of repression, it need not fear for itself, no

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matter how deep the popular resentment. 'They do not abstain from doing violence to an enemy of the republic . . . who deserves no mercy', wrote Campanella. And the GDR, Herr Wessel assured the readers of *Neues Deutschland* on the second anniversary of the Wall, 'is on the right road to becoming a City in the Sun'.

Communications to the Editor

From Professor Alec Nove

Congratulations on a most interesting fiftieth issue. However, my eyebrows rose when, in your own article, you referred to *Soviet Studies*. You appeared to be asserting that, in the fifties 'it might be thought to resemble an English-language edition of *Voprosy Ekonomiki*', a proposition hardly improved by the words 'as such (*sic*) it had its merits'. Yet by 1956 the list of economist-contributors already included Naum Jasny, Peter Wiles, Francis Seton, Gregory Grossman, Michael Kaser, Donald Hodgman, myself, etc., etc. In its economics the journal was academically strongest and politically respectable. I am well aware that the record of the journal is open to some very legitimate criticism. But two points would, I think, be in order. One is that the editors never turned down a scholarly article submitted to them, repeatedly solicited contributions from people whose views were very different from their own, and printed slashing attacks on themselves (including one by me on the article cited by Victor Frank in *his* criticism of the journal). This must be said in fairness to them. The second point is that you might have found room somewhere for a positive acknowledgment that *Soviet Studies* has made, and is making, some contribution to the study of the Soviet Union. Both you, Sir, and Victor Frank confine your generosity to saying that certain undesirable statements are now not found (or are 'less and less frequently' found) in our pages.

Yours faithfully,
A. Nove
Chairman of Editors,
Soviet Studies.

From Professor Basile Kerblay

Professor Mouskhély has drawn my attention to some unfortunate inaccuracies concerning the Centre de recherches sur l'URSS et les Pays de l'Est, Strasbourg, in my article on Soviet studies in France (Survey No. 50) on two points: (a) the review devoted to Soviet periodicals *l'URSS et les Pays des l'Est — revue des revues*, gives not only abstracts but also detailed analyses of and original comments on the principal articles published in the journals of the USSR and other socialist countries; (b) the annual review *l'URSS, droit, économie, sociologie, politique, culture* is not a digest—as the readers of *Survey* (July 1962) know—but a collection of original articles with a very wide scope, as the title suggests, by contributors from various countries.

Sincerely yours,
Basile H. Kerblay

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A PLAN FOR ALL SEASONS

Second Thoughts on the Czech Economy

John M. Montias

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S third five-year plan was launched on 1 January 1961 and abandoned in the middle of August 1962, three and a half years before term. A seven-year plan was forthwith proclaimed, to run from 1963 to 1970; while the successor plan was being groomed, an interim plan for the year 1963 was approved, intended to correct at least some of the imbalances left over from the defunct five-year plan.

Two basic disequilibria precipitated the crisis that forced the recent slowdown and eventually induced the Czechoslovak authorities to redesign the future development of the country: (1) an increasingly severe balance of payments problem, and (2) an inability to reconcile the total volume of investment outlays with the capacity of the construction sector and of the machine-building industry. The former, as we shall see, resulted mainly from a poorly-conceived investment strategy, the latter from a flagrant overcommitment of resources in the five-year plan. To crown these errors, the collectivisation of agriculture and the decentralisation of the economy that was attempted from 1959 to 1961 aggravated the structural maladjustments to which the economy was already subject.

TO be understood properly, the foreign trade position of Czechoslovakia today must be studied in its historical context. Before 1914, the industry of the Czech lands held a dominating position in the common market of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, whose population exceeded 58 million. Czech industry contributed roughly 60 per cent of the Empire's output of metals, 75 per cent of the chemicals, over 90 per cent of the glassware, virtually all the porcelain, 70 to 90 per cent of the leather products, and over three-quarters of the cotton goods and woollens produced in Austria-Hungary. When the Empire was dismembered in 1918, and the Czech lands, with barely 10 million inhabitants, were joined in uneasy union with Slovakia, with only three-and-a-half million inhabitants, the new State, to sustain what many observers at the time characterised as an 'overdeveloped industry', was condemned to export a large proportion of its produce. This it managed to do, in a remarkable spurt of recovery and development that reached its peak in the late 1920s. At that time over half of Czechoslovakia's industrial output was exported—nearly two-thirds of her glass and ceramics production, 80 to 90 per cent of her enamel ware, 70 per cent

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of her textiles, 60 per cent of her paper output, and three-quarters of her production of agricultural machinery.[1]

Nonetheless, the erection of tariffs against Czechoslovak manufactures in the Danubian area and in other traditional Czech markets placed limits on the recovery of important industries, such as glassware, whose output even in 1929, at the peak of the boom, reached no more than 60 per cent of its pre-1914 volume. With the onset of the great depression, foreign markets contracted and the volume of Czechoslovak trade plummeted. In 1937, when industrial output was almost back to its peak of the late 20s, the volume of exports, measured at constant prices, still came to less than three-quarters of its 1928 level.

With exports hampered by high tariffs, quotas, and the currency controls placed on Czechoslovakia's exports by her neighbours in the 1930s, it had been necessary, in order to maintain an export volume at all commensurate with the country's requirements for food and raw material imports, to alter the structure of exports in favour of a higher proportion of capital goods, which could be sold with fewer restraints than manufactured consumer goods in otherwise sheltered markets. This trend was speeded up after 1945, less from necessity than for ideological reasons. Exports of equipment were 'progressive', in keeping with the priority status of heavy industry in the development programme and with the urgent needs of the other countries of the Soviet bloc for these ingredients of growth.

By 1948, according to official calculations, Czechoslovakia's national income came to within 3 per cent of its 1938 level; yet the volume of exports, computed at constant prices, was still less than half of what it had been in 1937, and imports were one third short of this mark. The 1937 volume of foreign trade (imports and exports combined) was not reached until about 1953–54, the 1928 level not until 1956.[2] From 1948 on, the volume of foreign trade at constant prices rose somewhat faster than national income, but the importance of foreign trade in national income remained substantially lower than before the depression (13–15 per cent in the early 1960s as against 30 per cent in 1929).[3] In industry, the share of the value of output exported was 12 to 13 per cent in the late 1950s, which was still very low by standards of the 1920s. Exports of textiles, leather goods, and paper products accounted for only 13 to 17 per cent of the domestic output of these industries. Exports of porcelain ware, it was revealed recently, were still 40 per cent below 1937 as late as 1960. Altogether, exports of consumer goods, not including foodstuffs, dropped from 37 per cent of total exports in 1937 to 12·2 per cent in 1953. Later on, as efforts were made to export 'at

1 Leo Pasvolsky, *Economic Nationalism of the Danubian States* (New York, 1928), p. 255.

2 *Statisticky obzor*, no. 2, 1959, p. 90.

3 M. Stadnik, *Narodny duchod a jeho rozdeleni se vlastnim zretelem k Ceskoslovensku* (National income and its distribution with special reference to Czechoslovakia) (Prague, 1946), p. 212.

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all costs' to equilibrate the balance of payments, the share of these exports rose again, but never exceeded 20 per cent.

What has been hampering the growth of these traditional exports? Light industry has been starved of investment funds, so that its equipment is outmoded and physically worn, production costs are exceedingly high, and calculations based on comparisons of export earnings with domestic costs put its products at a disadvantage compared to the new, seemingly more efficient metal-processing branches of industry. There are other reasons as well for the decline of the glass, porcelain, and ceramics industries. Many artisans of German origin were expelled from the country in the immediate postwar period. (A few of them later set up shop in Austria and successfully competed on world markets with Czech exports.) Some skilled workers were drawn into better paid occupations in heavy industry. For many years the lack of contact with customers in the West prevented designers from keeping up with trends and fashions abroad; in the meantime Belgian, Scandinavian, and even Japanese firms pushed ahead, thanks to their more imaginative and up-to-date designs, better packaging, more reliable delivery schedules, and generally superior quality. Exports of light industrial products to Western Europe have recently begun to be hampered by economic integration, while intra-European competition has caused prices to fall in certain Czechoslovak markets.

UNTIL the late 1950s, despite the relatively stagnant state of her traditional exports, Czechoslovakia was able to pay for large and growing food and raw material imports by exporting machinery and equipment, the value of which, expressed in current dollars, had gone up from about $115 million in 1937 to $510 million in 1955 and $760 million in 1959. In relation to total exports these figures represented 6·4, 43·5, and 44·1 per cent respectively. The concentration of exports on heavy metal products had two disadvantages: first, they deprived home industries of equipment needed to renovate their obsolete or worn-out assets and thus reduced the competitiveness of other, potentially more advantageous exports; secondly, their *net* contribution to the balance of payments was much less than their gross because so much of the raw materials required for their manufacture had to be imported. The advantage of traditional exports, on the other hand, was that, with the exception of textiles, they were manufactured mainly from domestically produced raw materials.

The delicately poised equilibrium of the Czech balance of payments was seriously upset, from 1959 on, by a number of factors. The imported food bill went up unexpectedly when domestic farm production fell short of targets, due to a combination of poor weather and inefficient management of the collectivised and state farms that now occupy over 90 per cent of the country's arable area. Gross agricultural output rose by 2 per cent in 1960, stayed at the previous year's level in 1961, then fell by 6 per cent in 1962—compared to the 4·4 per cent average yearly

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growth envisaged in the third five-year plan. In recent years, while gross output has been oscillating around prewar levels, net output has remained at least 20 per cent below the 1934–38 average, and possibly as much as 45–50 per cent below this mark, if prewar prices are used to compute production costs and outputs.[3a]

Secondly, trade with China unexpectedly collapsed, leaving the Czechs with cancelled orders on hand, some of them for equipment tailored to specifications that could not be marketed elsewhere. In 1961 alone, exports to China fell from $110 million to $34 million, that is, from 5·7 to 1·7 per cent of Czech exports.[4]

Next, a breakdown of scheduled deliveries 'from certain socialist countries' forced Czechoslovakia to replace these supplies with imports from 'capitalist markets', at a time when the balance with the West was already strained. The only specific failures I was able to discover involved deliveries of Polish apparatus for the organic chemical industry and a fair amount of railway equipment from the Soviet Union.

Finally, the Czech balance of payments has been burdened with large credits to underdeveloped countries and to Cuba, some of which, it appears, were not repaid on time. The third five-year plan called for a doubling of trade with this group of countries, whose share of trade with the capitalist world was scheduled to rise to 43 per cent. From 1953 to 1961, Czechoslovakia extended trade and investment credits to countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America amounting to at least $330 million. This figure probably understates the real amount, since, these loans being unpopular, the Party is reluctant to reveal their full extent.

The combined effect of these adverse elements on the balance of payments was to turn a surplus on trade account with capitalist countries of $50 to $60 million a year, which normally served to settle Czechoslovakia's expenditures for transportation and other charges in the West, into a deficit of about $20 million (not counting the value of exports delivered on credit to underdeveloped countries, which of course tended to widen the deficit). In the meantime, Czechoslovakia's non-convertible surplus with the Communist bloc, including China, declined from about $100 million to less than $50 million in 1961. The combined surplus with both blocs of countries was raised substantially in 1962 (to about $200 million), but this was achieved at the cost of reducing essential imports and forcing exports of machinery and equipment to the detriment of domestic needs. As a result many plants had to operate below capacity for lack of imported raw materials. A rough estimate made at the end of 1962 was that about one-fourth of the capacity of the machine-building industry was unutilised because of the 'lack of harmony between capacity and the production programme'.[5] On the

[3a] Gregor Lazarcik, *The Performance of Socialist Agriculture, A Case Study of Production and Productivity in Czechoslovakia, 1937–38 and 1946–61* (New York, 1963), p. 67.

[4] *Statisticka Rocenka CSSR 1962*, p. 353.

[5] Z. Vergner in *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 11, 1962, p. 4.

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export side, 'there were periods during which foreign trade took away practically the entire production [of an industry] and exported it, without conception or design, in order to ease the trade balance'.[6] Not only machines and equipment were pre-empted for export but also consumer goods, for which there was a strong demand on the domestic market; this led to an increasing disparity between the kind of consumer goods offered for retail sale and the structure of consumers' preferences, reflected in the appearance of queues outside shops selling goods in demand, while other, less desirable goods, accumulated as surplus inventories.[7]

Judging by Premier Siroky's keynote speech of 4 January 1963, which officially introduced the new conception of 'intensive development', we should expect the foreign trade crisis to continue at least for the current year: machines and equipment initially earmarked for the domestic market will again have to be exported.[8] Efforts to intensify development by renovating and rehabilitating traditional domestic industries—with the eventual prospect of rendering them capable of competing on foreign markets—must be postponed until the immediate crisis has been corrected.

THE improvisations of the last two years, the frantic endeavours to 'salvage the plans', the indiscriminate measures to redress the balance of payments—all would seem to testify to the shoddy design and construction of the third five-year plan. Yet there is evidence that the technicians who drew it up put more time and effort into the job, and were more systematic in searching for internally consistent solutions, than at the time the first and second plans had been hastily put together. The institutional reforms that were the indispensable accompaniment of the new plan were more radical than anything that had been tried hitherto. Nevertheless, most of this zeal was in vain because the plan was drafted under intolerable constraints. The ratio of investments to national income—the so-called 'rate of accumulation'—was set too high; the agricultural targets, based on a very optimistic assessment of the benefits conferred by collectivisation, were completely out of line with past experience; the approved policy of forcing machine exports—if necessary by crediting barely solvent customers—was bound to overtax the balance of payments. Whatever the merits or demerits of the original draft plan—from which the 1959 directives to enterprises for elaborating *their* five-year plans were derived—it could not resist the additional pressures of the new assignments that were tacked on to it in the course of the next year and a half. These came in two instalments: first, there were the higher targets set by the enterprises' counter-plans, which were then adjusted upwards by the Planning Commission;

[6] J. Macek in *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 12, 1962, p. 56.
[7] *Rude Pravo*, 9 January, 1963, p. 3.
[8] On this disparity, see M. Kohoutek's informative article in *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 2, 1963, pp. 11–21.

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second, there were the additional, or postponed, investments that the authorities approved for 1961 in order to compensate for the failure to launch or to complete various key projects on schedule in 1959 and 1960.

One important reason for the planners' sanguine expectations was the very satisfactory performance of the economy from 1958 to 1960, or what appeared to be a very satisfactory performance at the time. National income, according to the official index, had been rising at a steady 7 to 8 per cent a year, the gross output of industry at 11 per cent, and labour productivity in industry at around 7 per cent; even agricultural output had been inching up to 2 to 4 per cent per year.

Very few officials, I was given to understand on my recent trip to Prague, had any inkling that these achievements rested on an exceedingly fragile basis: most of them believed that, with certain modifications, the old planning methods would generate satisfactory rates of growth at least for the duration of the five-year plan. The events of 1961–62 came as an unwelcome surprise. The explanation most frequently given for this inability to predict the slowdown is that the economy's ' reserves ' had been suddenly and unexpectedly exhausted. Enterprises, ever since they had been nationalised, had planned with room to spare, but each year they had been forced by higher authorities to cut their safety margins; eventually, they were assigned tasks that could not normally be fulfilled. As we shall see, the exhaustion of the surplus labour reservoir was also involved in this crisis.

IN the new planning system introduced in 1958–59, long-range planning was given star billing. Henceforth, the yearly plans were supposed to be derived more or less mechanically from the longer-range plan, with such minor adjustments as circumstances might dictate. Another distinguishing feature of the refurbished system was a new complex of incentives, calculated to induce enterprises to volunteer more challenging ' counter-plans ' than the directives handed down by their superior authorities. Enterprises received ' normatives of personal stimulation ' and ' normatives of enterprise stimulation ', which were supposed to stimulate enterprise managers to ' uncover reserves ' in the directives and submit ' mobilizing plans '. For example, the system of normatives of personal stimulation that regulated the relation between increases in the average wages paid by the enterprise and its gains in labour productivity provided that if the enterprise volunteered higher labour-productivity increases than the directive called for, it should be allowed to raise wages according to a higher ratio than if it had just committed itself only to fulfilling the directive. The same principle operates in the normative of enterprise stimulation that determined the share of profits that an enterprise could retain for increasing its working capital and for its decentralised investments.

The evidence at hand reveals the authorities' predilection for taut, pace-forcing plans. The directives for 1961 to 1965 issued in September 1959 had called for an overall increase of 50 per cent in the gross value

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of industrial output from 1961 to 1965, which was to be achieved mainly by virtue of a 40 per cent rise in labour productivity. The ministries, on the basis of their enterprises' proposals, drafted plans which, cumulatively, provided for increases of 56 per cent in output and 41·3 per cent in labour productivity over the same period. These counter-plans were not as 'mobilising', however, as the government had expected. Only a minority of enterprises volunteered higher labour-productivity targets than those they had received in the directives.[9] The draft plans of the ministries violated the instructions issued by the Planning Commission which stipulated that at least 50 per cent of any increase in output above the directives should be covered by higher labour productivity. The Planning Commission ratified the 56 per cent increase for industry proposed by the ministries, but proceeded to 'correct' the labour-productivity targets in the ministerial drafts so that they finally averaged out to a 43 per cent rise, which just met requirements. This 43 per cent target was promulgated in the third five-year plan.

The central authorities also complained that the ministries' demands for raw materials were greatly in excess of the limits prescribed in the directives, and these requests also had to be cut down to size. In effect, then, if we may judge by these examples, the reform had not eliminated the defect ascribed to the pre-1953 system of counter-planning. Enterprises were indeed willing to produce more than they were asked to, but only if they could have larger inputs.

The normatives were ineffective in coaxing out 'reserves' because enterprises had too much to lose and too little to gain by raising their ministry's bids: the normatives were not sufficiently differentiated to reward commitments made above the preliminary directives. Most enterprises preferred not to stake their chances on a mobilising plan when they could do almost as well by overshooting the initial targets, without the unpleasant risk of not meeting the plan and losing the right to the bonus altogether. More enterprising managers sometimes also learned that it did not pay to submit mobilising plans which the ministry could use to justify still higher final assignments. Finally, the enterprises were discouraged from taking far-reaching measures for improving efficiency that might pay off only in future years because the long-term normatives were 'adjusted' for each plan-year on the basis of the current year's results.

New assignments, as I mentioned earlier, were also added to the investment programme. In the chemical industry, for example, the plan target for centralised investments for 1960 had only been fulfilled by 91 per cent; to make up for the delay, it was decided to raise the target for 1962 from 135 per cent of the value achieved in 1961 (as the five-year plan had anticipated) to 150 per cent of this figure.[10] Towards the end of the year it was already evident that these targets would not be

[9] See, for instance, *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 11, 1961, p. 1021.
[10] *Hospodarske noviny*, No. 6, 1961, p. 6.

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fulfilled, if only because the machine-building industry could not cope with the new demands thrust upon it.

In industry, trouble also developed almost as soon as the plan started. In 1961 and 1962, the planned consumption of materials was exceeded and production costs were not reduced according to schedule. Labour productivity gains fell far short of target: in industry, productivity rose by 5 per cent in 1961 and by 3·2 per cent in 1962, as against a 7·2 per cent average yearly increase set by the plan. To maintain high growth rates in 1961 and 1962, despite the failure to meet productivity targets, employment limits had to be loosened. More workers had to be drawn from agriculture than had been contemplated, the natural increase of the labour force being too small to satisfy the additional requirements, and this naturally affected farm output. Later on, even this source of recruitment began to dry up and acute labour shortages occurred in the more industrialised parts of the country. The inability of the construction industry to fulfil its scheduled programme in 1962 was in large part caused by a manpower crisis (productivity in this sector rose by only 2·3 per cent in 1962; the planned increase was 9 per cent).

THE difficulties experienced in foreign trade, industry, and construction were closely inter-related. When machinery earmarked for the domestic market was pre-empted for export, it caused delays in bringing newly constructed capacity into production. Industrial consumers who counted on the output from this new capacity to meet their requirements for material inputs were forced to reduce their own production or to adapt the composition of their output to the materials they could get hold of. Enterprises forced to make frequent changes in their output plans received materials they had ordered many months before, which they could no longer use currently. But these surplus materials were frequently hoarded, in case they might be needed at a later time. As a consequence, inventories rose faster than production and tied up critical resources that could have served to rescue the plans of other enterprises.

The conflict between over-ambitious targets and the orderly conduct of the decentralisation was nowhere more apparent than in the difficulties caused by decentralised investments. These were by no means negligible; in the third five-year plan they represented over 50 per cent of total investments, a significantly larger proportion than prevailed in Poland, for example, in 1957–58 at the peak of the decentralisation campaign. Unfortunately, the centralised programme was already so ambitious, it absorbed such a large part of the capacity of the construction industry, that there was just no room for all the decentralised investments that enterprises could finance with the funds left at their disposal: there was not only a shortage of building workers, but also insufficient facilities for designing investment projects or for supervising their execution. Building materials were also in scarce supply. At first, until about the middle of 1961, enterprises had the upper hand and succeeded in deflecting resources from centralised projects to carry out their own

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plans. Later on, the authorities interfered to make sure that centralised projects were given full priority. By late 1961 all sorts of regulations had been promulgated, subverting the original principles under which investments had been decentralised. The distinction between centralised and decentralised investments was formally abolished in the Plan for 1963.

In 1962, according to Finance Minister Duris, only 106 out of 161 centralised construction projects scheduled for completion during the year were actually completed. The record was worse still for decentralised projects. Work on projects that were not completed, for lack of materials, machines, or manpower, continued at snail's pace; investment resources were thus frozen for long periods; it was mainly due to these delays that the average gestation of investments turned out to be about twice as long as had been envisaged in the plan.[11]

ONCE the five-year plan was abandoned, a spate of post-mortem articles appeared in the Czech press, many of which were unusually perceptive and convincing. They gave cause for wondering where all these intelligent kibitzers had been when the initial mistakes in formulating the plan were made and why they did not draw their conclusions *ante morbidi mortem*. The salient points they brought out about the concepts and implementation of the 1959 decentralisation, which has recently received a good part of the official censure for failure of the plan,[12] will now be summarised.

(1) The five-year and longer plans had not provided a stable enough framework for the yearly plans, so that neither ministries nor enterprises had a clear view of the future development of their sector. Frequent changes in the plans upset the long-term normatives, whose effectiveness, in the circumstances was, to say the least, problematical.

(2) The new incentive system had not succeeded in eradicating various malpractices on the part of the management. Managers still concealed 'reserves' in the plans; they applied their initiative and energy to fulfilling their gross-output targets, with the knowledge that their supervisors at higher echelons 'closed their eyes to any abuses so long as they fulfilled this plan'.[13] The quarter-by-quarter variations in the output of enterprises were judged to be at least partly 'speculative'; by this was meant that managers, angling for soft plans for the coming year, reduced their current output in the quarter when these plans were

11 *Rude Pravo*, 25 January 1963; *Planovane hospodarstvi*, No. 12, 1962, p. 5; No. 2, 1963, p. 23.

12 President Novotny, whose speeches of 1958–59 evinced no great enthusiasm for decentralisation, has been among the most vigorous critics of the 'weakening of central direction' and has attributed to it an important role in the failure of the five-year plan. *Cf.* his speech at the twelfth congress of the Communist Party in *XII Sjezd KSC* (Prague, 1962), pp. 12–14.

13 O. Baca, 'Zvysit autoritu statniho planu' (To increase the authority of the state plan), *Hospodarske noviny*, No. 51–52, pp. 1, 4.

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being laid in order to conceal capacity reserves and to give their superiors a lower base on which to peg the enterprise's output tasks for the plan-year; they then more than made up for the shortfall by 'storming' in the last quarter of the year (which often consisted simply in delivering goods formerly stashed away in the form of supposedly unfinished inventories). Producers performed least well in meeting their contractual obligations to 'non-market consumers' (i.e. to other enterprises in industry and construction) because they knew that these deliveries were less closely checked than sales of end-products to the export market and to the trade network for consumer goods.

One critic was candid enough to point out that it was not always the fault of managers when they followed these devious paths: managers put in padded requests for materials because their confidence in the stability of supply plans had been shaken in the past. It was up to the authorities to draft internally consistent plans; as it was, managers were reluctant to inform their employees about the unrealistic plans they had received from above 'for fear that the workers might become irritated'.[14]

(3) Despite all entreaties from superior authorities, ministerial officials kept on representing the narrow interests of their sectors instead of considering the interests of society as a whole, as these interests were interpreted by the Party. Though they might themselves be prone to act correctly in matters directly under their jurisdiction, officials often hesitated to intervene operationally to straighten out enterprises and productive economic units scheming to promote their local interests in unjustifiable ways. This passive attitude was motivated by the laudable but misplaced intention of preserving the reinforced authority of lower organs in the spirit of the reform.[15]

(4) Suppliers did not know their clients' real needs. They often crossed off requests when it was already too late for their customers to get supplies from other sources.

(5) When suppliers and their clients could not solve their differences by direct negotiations, conflicts were 'kicked upstairs' where they took a long time to be settled—when they did not have to be referred to top officials in the Planning Commission. Often, by the time conflicts were resolved, the plans had already been approved and changes had to be made to accommodate petitioners. Ministries were so deluged with these routine conflicts that they had no time to work on the development problems of their sectors, which should have been their main preoccupation according to the principles of the reform. There were also occasions when conflicts between enterprises or between the Planning Commission and the Ministries were not resolved at the highest level and were kicked back to lower echelons, under the delusion that

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[15] B. Kratochvil, 'Zabranit prekracovani mzdovych fondu' (To prevent excess disbursements of wage funds), *Finance a uver*, No. 6, 1962, p. 322.

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somehow things would work themselves out below. Such practices undermined the confidence of subordinates in their superiors. The unquestioning acceptance of impossible tasks by underlings, who then proceeded calmly to ignore the plan, only made things worse.[16] Officials who concealed true conditions from their superiors in order to 'look good' were also to blame.

(6) Officials in the ministries and even in the Planning Commission were labouring under the misconception that the decentralisation reforms had done away with the necessity for the top-level coordination of supply and demand, since consumers were now in direct contact with their suppliers; this misconception had led to the slackening of control over procurement activities and material-technical norms. It was inadmissible that norms should be left to the discretion of enterprises, as had too often been the case in recent years.

(7) The upshot of all the malfunctions listed so far was that the yearly plans lost a part, or all, of their operational significance: 'Some officials keep the state plan in their drawers: they use the plan for negotiations with higher-ups, but on the way down they work with their so-called operative plans'.[17] In other words, the plans were no longer a blueprint to be executed but a front behind which officials managed their sector on a day-to-day basis.

BY mid-1963, a number of palliative measures had been worked out to deal with the situation. The Planning Commission was encouraged to use its operative authority to check disproportions as soon as they arose. Responsibility for balancing and distributing a number of goods recently planned by enterprise was handed back to the ministries. The nomenclature for balancing and distributing essential materials at the Planning Commission and ministerial levels was widened and made more detailed, thus leaving less scope for arbitary decisions by marketing organisations and enterprises formerly charged with distributing their own products. Norms of material consumption were again set and supervised centrally. The normatives of enterprise stimulation were abolished; the normatives of personal stimulation, which determined the size of the employees' bonus fund, were subjected to stiffer controls, in particular by the imposition of an absolute limit on the bonus funds.[18]

These various measures, which so far hardly amount to a new system, clearly represent a decisive retreat from the principles of the 1959 reforms. They have inaugurated a trend back to centralised management, which will probably leave enterprise managers less autonomy and scope for initiative than at any time during the last decade.

[16] On the other hand, it was also wrong for managers of enterprises to tell their staff that the plans could not be fulfilled. This sort of talk 'spreads mistrust of Party and government decisions and saps the authority of the plans'. V. Sterba in *Hospodarske Noviny*, No. 10, 1962, p. 1.

[17] Baca, p. 1.

[18] *Finance a uver*, No. 1, 1963, pp. 25–26.

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This swing back to centralisation will, no doubt, again call forth the malfunctions that prompted a loosening of central controls in 1958-1959. Experience has shown that when the planners seek to embrace too many activities, they fail to keep them in their grasp. 'Spontaneous' activities go on at lower levels, without regard to approved programmes, because the plans are too inaccurate to regulate the detailed operations of producers.

It is interesting to note in this connection that there are also forces making for re-centralisation in a partially decentralised system. In part these forces stem from the upper echelons of the administration, intent on neutralising the negative effects of uncoordinated decisions taken at lower echelons,[19] and in part from the enterprises themselves, which are constantly appealing to superior authorities against adverse decisions on the part of their suppliers or of their functional organisations. The dynamics of a bureaucratic organisation kept under political pressure are such as to cause a larger share of these detailed questions to be referred all the way to an ultimate decision-making authority. In short, the natural equilibrium of a command economy tends to be repelled by both extremes of centralisation and of decentralisation.

Even though it is still not entirely clear whether the defects of the 1959 reforms outweighed their advantages, there is one lesson that the Czech planners should draw from the recent fiasco: a complex system of new institutions cannot be successfully introduced when plans are overstrained. The programme of centralised investments for the third five-year plan should have been kept down when the plan was originally drafted to leave room for the maximum volume of decentralised investments that might reasonably have been expected. If the actual financial resources of enterprises had turned out to be too small to sustain this maximum volume of investments, it would always have been possible to tack on less essential projects, already prepared but so far held in reserve, to the original programme of centralised investments.

But this type of traditional strategy would have no appeal for the tradition-bound planners in the Party apparatus, who seem to operate on the assumption that their plans are immune to the vagaries of chance. The prescriptive nature of the plans, backed up by the sanction of law, reinforces their mental prejudice against programmes providing for alternative courses of action to meet a variety of contingencies, even though unpredictable changes in foreign-trade conditions and in the demand of private consumers, the mutations brought about by technical progress and the vicissitudes of nature all speak in favour of such a probabilistic approach.

* * *

[19] On similar centripetal forces in the Soviet economy, see G. Grossman, 'The Structure and Organisation of the Soviet Economy', *Slavic Review*, No. 2, 1962,

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STATISTICAL data for the first three-quarters of 1963—the latest available when this article went to press—reflect the painful adaptation the Czechoslovak economy is going through in the process of straightening out the disproportions left over from the third five-year plan. Labour productivity in industry in the first nine months of the year was 1·5 per cent lower than for the same period of 1962, 'due to the curtailment of undesirable production, the reduction of the volume of gross output, and difficulties in the procurement of some raw materials, electric power, and other products.' Another reason for the stagnation in output was the continuation of a severe transportation crisis. During most of 1963, the construction industry failed to meet its goals, which had already been scaled down significantly from previous levels. These reverses might have been more serious if they had been compounded by a crisis in agriculture such as occurred in 1962, with catastrophic effect on the external balance of payments of the country. Fortunately, however, weather conditions were favourable, and the 1963 harvest distinctly exceeded the average for the previous five years. Despite heavy food purchases abroad, the foreign exchange situation showed some improvement.

The 1964 plan calls for a 3·6 per cent increase in gross industrial output. Chemicals, metallurgy, machine-building, and electric power are expected to grow by 6 to 9 per cent, while some branches of light and metal-processing industry are scheduled for further retrenchment, as part of the redeployment programme now under way. To carry out this programme, more manpower transfers will probably be effected between industries and between regions. Slovakia, however, will be given favourable treatment in the allocation of resources to avert unemployment and dislocation in that politically effervescent section of the country. President Novotny promised in his speech of 13 December, 1963, that agriculture would receive a larger share of the nation's resources than in the past. However, nothing precise is known about the plans being drafted for 1964 to 1970, which are supposed to permit agriculture to 'catch up' with industry. For the time being, improvisation is still the order of the day. If a detailed strategy for pulling the economy out of its present predicament has been worked out, it has not been laid before the public.

The institutional reforms so far initiated are all clearly aimed at a tightening of central controls. (At the twelfth Party congress in December 1962, Novotny had pinned the failure of the five-year plan chiefly on the weakening of the centralised management of the economy.) This new trend was especially manifest in the governmental resolution issued last September on the reorganisation of material-technical supply: if this resolution is fully carried out, it will reinstate a degree of centralisation comparable to that which prevailed in 1954 or 1955. At the same time, the highest officials, including Novotny himself, constantly reiterate the need to provide suitable personal incentives for both workers and

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management, although they fail to spell out how these personal interests should be reconciled with the 'interests of society.' Among professional economists, a lively discussion is taking place, and many of the traditional dogmas are being questioned. A few increasingly influential economists have been pressing for a decentralised system à la Yougoslave (including an automatic price mechanism). Although this line of thought is clearly at variance with the views of the highest Party functionaries, the pressure from below has been so intense that the Central Committee, at its plenary session on ideological problems held last December, abstained from taking a definite stand on the debate. Nevertheless, barring far-reaching personnel changes in the Party hierarchy, we may expect a continuation of the present centripetal trend, at least until the disadvantages of excessive centralisation will once more have become flagrant enough to warrant another turnabout in the government's policy.

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THE ART OF SURVIVAL

A Czech Writer Looks Back

THIS IS A PERSONAL STATEMENT. It reflects my thoughts, my experiences, and my present understanding of my own situation. It does not speak on behalf of anybody else. The opportunity to write the truth as I understand it is irresistible; the desire *not* to compose a literary piece overwhelming.

I am forty-five years old, a novelist, and a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. But I might also be fifty-five, a scholar, and a member of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I might have been born in Prague or in Brno for that matter. I say this not to baffle the reader; it does not detract from the faithfulness of the portrait I intend to draw, for while the portrait may be a composite one it will be even more truly mine, since—by including here and there situations faced not by me but by some of my friends—it will help me to sketch my own profile in sharper and simpler lines. At the same time this device serves another and less sophisticated purpose: I am writing this in Prague, where it is still dangerous to contribute to a Western publication anything that goes beyond the usual platitudes, so tiresome in their shallowness, so obvious in their intellectual dishonesty. In a year or two, who knows, I may be ashamed of this reticence, but it seems to me today unavoidable, for my own sake and for the sake of others.

* * * *

IN THE THIRTIES, IN PRAGUE (as in so many other cities), to have any creative or, indeed, intellectual ambitions meant to be or to become a man of the left. Many, if not most of our writers were communists or communist sympathisers. The Communist Party represented to me, when I was still a secondary school student, the avantgarde in everything: in human relations, the social order, arts and letters. With a fervour bordering on the religious I used to listen to lectures organised by the 'Union of Non-possessing and Progressive Students' (oh, what a lovely, proud name!), or by an organisation called 'Young Culture', where we were exposed not only to the teachings of Marx and Lenin but also to Negro spirituals and to visions of sexual intercourse unshackled by petit-bourgeois prudery. And while that thick-headed good-for-nothing Prochazka, a school-mate of mine (whose father owned an apartment house in Dlouha trida), collected foreign stamps and on Sunday afternoons went to the National Theatre to listen to *Libuse,* I subscribed to the paperback edition of Freud's collected works and frequented D-34, a progressive theatre directed by a producer of genius, and a communist, E. F. Burian, who introduced me to Brecht's *Beggar's Opera.*

At that time the Communist Party stood against everything that was cruel, stupid, reactionary: against the fascism of Mussolini, Hitler, and

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Franco, against racism, against appeasement, against Chamberlain, against Munich. It fought these and many other evils uncompromisingly and in clear, unambiguous terms—quite unlike the social-democrats (my father voted for them), always pedestrian in their approach, and always, in the end, siding with the other bourgeois parties. The Munich betrayal was to me another confirmation, if any were still needed, that the communists were right, that their ideals were the only ones worth living and dying for, and I joined them.

Throughout the war (part of which I spent in a labour camp in Germany), the Party and the comradeship it offered were a constant source of encouragement; it lent to almost everything I did a sense of mission—which was particularly important in those circumstances, and, I still feel, in any circumstances. Certainly, not everything was to my taste and not every comrade a brother; but whenever doubts arose, comrades in my cell would soon dispel them. In the resistance movement communists stood in the front ranks; if the Czechoslovak struggle against the Nazis was not so memorable as in some other occupied countries, the reasons lay not in the personal but in broader historical and national aspects of the problem.

* * * *

SOON AFTER THE END OF THE WAR I returned to Prague as a comrade tested under fire. Those were exciting days. Even newspaper pictures of the enthusiastic welcome accorded by the people to the liberating Red Army brought tears to my eyes. We communists were given to understand that the time was not ripe for a full-fledged socialist revolution and that for the time being we had to share power with several other political parties: but we shared that power eagerly. For most of us this was a new situation: we were the rulers at last—and we enjoyed every minute of it. The newly created Ministry of Information, the radio, the nationalised theatres, the newspapers, the various branches of the Ministry of Education gave a plushy welcome to communist artists, writers, propagandists—and we flocked to Prague like hens to roost. We rode in official limousines, attended cocktail parties at embassies, occupied spacious offices and pleasant apartments (mostly requisitioned from Germans soon to be expelled from the country) in the good sections of the capital. Through comradely channels we were able to facilitate the issuance of a passport, send people abroad to attend international gatherings, sign special permits entitling members of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers to an additional ration of ground coffee. At times, in front of a worthy petitioner we would lift the telephone receiver, call up a comrade minister and in a few seconds settle a matter that would otherwise require weeks of determined struggle with administrative red tape.

Oh, those were fine and satisfying times! In addition, we still had an 'internal enemy' to fight, within the National Front, and that was good too. For we could uncover him (and unmask his true class face) day in,

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day out, so to say, present his ugly features for everybody to see and call for a determined struggle for the completion of our socialist revolution. Whatever went wrong, wherever nationalisation had progressed slowly or agricultural production had been sluggish—we knew at once who and what had caused the trouble. Thus we continued to represent the forces of progress and to fight the forces of reaction and of the past. I was keen to serve the Party, obey its orders and share its blessings as I had before shared its trials. I had been named cultural attaché in Paris, the city of my dreams and the goal of my student trips abroad. I left Prague a proud and militant communist.

* * * *

THIRTEEN YEARS LATER I AM STILL a member of the Communist Party but a much humbler one. I still believe in communism, but in the way one believes in health or air travel or, I suppose, in democracy. I can still get excited about the Cause but for the most part only about its negative, degrading, cruel aspects. When asked, I reply, yes, I am a communist, in the same way as I would admit that I am alive; and when publicly pressed (abroad) to explain why, I trust to make myself clear with some coherence and a measure of honesty; in private I crack a joke, while among friends I expect the question not to be raised, at least not a second time. Yet I have very little doubt that no self-respecting comrade would recommend me today, even as a candidate Party member.

What has happened in these intervening years? To me personally, nothing much. Although I was recalled from my Paris assignment, I got a good job in Prague as editor of one of the Party weekly magazines; my apartment was returned to me and at times I have been able to attend a writers' conference in Moscow or to enjoy a vacation on the sunny Black Sea coast. And while my petit-bourgeois background was rehashed once more and the fact of my stay in the West (although in an official position) spoke against me, nothing serious came of it. Curiously enough, my labour camp history also became slightly suspicious, as was 'lack of construction enthusiasm' here or an 'ideologically confused' article there. Incidentally, I was once fortunate enough to see my own past depicted in a chart in my cadre report; in red, green, and black pencil up and down again went the lines of my beliefs, my actions, my consciousness, class and otherwise, my failings, and my origin. That was when I realised that in order to survive one had to lie low, be cautious, and wait.

Suspicion and uncertainty were rampant in and out of the Party. Fear was ever-present. It was a time of total, unquestioning, loudly and repeatedly professed faithfulness to the Party and to everything it did or said. And that unwavering faithfulness had to be constantly tested and again doubted anew. The comradely 'we' was replaced by the omnious 'they'. Comrades disappeared from offices or functions and one continued to work in that same office as if nothing had happened. A trusted comrade was proclaimed a foreign spy and we signed petitions urging

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'severe punishment for this abominable traitor' without knowing a single fact, seeing a single proof. A well-liked poet committed suicide. Another (a 'worker' poet) published on the front page of *Rude Pravo* lines which ran in part as follows:

> Stalin, the ever contemplative. . . .
> What is he thinking now, his eyes penetrating so far
> As if in search of something, perhaps of a red star?
> His eyes are full of love, as the sun that caresses the flowers of the fields:
> Oh, how we love Stalin; it is the entire world he shields.

My first impression when I read this was not disgust, but rather the notion that I could write a much better poem about Stalin (as I actually did). But, of course, when one is a worker *and* writes poetry. . . .

Then, with virtually no warning, Stalin was unmasked as a cruel usurper, a murderer who had killed in cold blood and by the thousand. Bit by bit I learned the truth (as often as not from visiting Soviet writers), and the picture of the idol of the best twenty years of my life became more complete and more devastating, devastating to me, that is. I wonder how to convey the depth and the vastness of the shock a communist was exposed to at that time: to compare it with the revulsion of a believing Catholic who learns that the Pope made a mockery of the Saviour and poisoned cardinals on the side, or with the shame felt by a young boy who discovers that his mother is a common street walker, would probably suggest only a fraction of our own shame and stupefaction, our feeling of a paralysing betrayal. Stalin was not only our leader, he was the Soviet Union itself, the embodiment of the cause we believed in so totally. Doubts crowded my mind. From its darkest corners memories long forgotten surged forward, of people and incidents, of the cowardice I had shown and the betrayals I had committed with the greatest of ease: the detached coolness (for it was in the interest of socialism) with which I voted for the expulsion from Party and from job of a personal friend on the editorial board of the magazine, all on the basis of a rather shadowy accusation of 'ideological deviation'; the monstrous efforts I had made, of my own free will, to believe what I had been told about a comrade thrown in jail for treason although I *knew* that he was incapable, morally, intellectually, even physically of such a crime; the self-righteousness with which I had repeated and disseminated slogans which I *knew* were untrue or at least stupid.

* * * *

IN THOSE DAYS OF 1956, as after a great natural disaster or a family funeral, we felt a great urge for activity. Untold damage had been done to the cause of communism; was it now not our duty to cleanse the once proud banner of this cause? Here was our chance and our challenge. And then, had I behaved any worse than so many others? Had I not criticised, between the lines but in terms clear to the initiated, some of Zhdanov's theses long before it had become fashionable to do so?

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Was I not, on numerous occasions, instrumental in softening the cruel hand of bureaucracy and stupidity? Did I not act with the greatest discretion in a number of ticklish cases involving my relatives and friends and their children? And, finally, even *had* I revolted, *had* I written *the* one article I sometimes dreamt of smuggling past the editor —well, what good could I have achieved? What chance was there of finding any followers? And how could I be sure I was right in the first place? Was I more than a tiny wheel in a vast and impenetrable piece of machinery I had long stopped pretending to like or understand?

In June 1956 the Union of Writers convened its second congress; contrary to expectations, it was to become a lively and occasionally quite a moving event. Ironically enough, among the most applauded statements made at the congress was the one which asserted that writers did not write the truth. We all solemnly promised that from then on we would write nothing but the truth. Of course, we did not. Did we write lies? No, not that, either. For one thing, there was hardly any time to examine our initial findings, to face the uncovered realities, to find new bearings. Almost at once the bureaucrats, the regional Party secretaries, the parasites and the stupid, whose number is legion, moved in on us. Scenting danger like animals, they breathed menaces and threats: we were not to endanger the construction of socialism in our country by our loose individualistic talk. If something had been or was wrong, the Party would put it right. And so, sending up an occasional firecracker in the semi-darkness of our mediocrity (a poem here, an exhibition there, or a well-turned ambiguous phrase to be enjoyed over a glass of wine in the Club), we just trod along our road to socialism. Soon we returned to minding our own business, as usual.

* * * *

BUSINESS AS USUAL—that cosy and reliable fixture in the household of our life! For there is always something to be done. If one happens to be a writer and happens to live in socialist Czechoslovakia, there is plenty to be done and, one imagines, even achieved. Even during the darkest days there had been that little additional space to be timidly explored: a dogma to be pricked at one tiny spot of its enormous surface; an idea, foolish to be sure, to be carefully blown up like a soap bubble and sent up to gleam for a while.

For one can never be certain. Years before I had suggested that it was futile to plan for *good* literature; I was reprimanded by the committee of our Union of Writers for harbouring 'subjectivist' views; today it is a commonplace, used by every local propagandist. This exploring, this almost imperceptible testing of what it is possible to state publicly and get away with, has been a great pastime among Czech and Slovak intellectuals ever since 1956. I know intimately these thrust-forward-cover-up-and-wait movements, since I indulge in the game almost daily. Often I would write a long book review, an article on Mayakovsky, or even a short story just to be able to weave in one little

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sentence, to make one incision that might uncover another millimetre of our hidden wounds. One such sentence can give great pleasure, and I wait for the telephone to ring so that I can hear more about it from my fellow-writers.

We have all developed a very refined sense in this respect. We can almost smell such an exploration in the page of print; we know exactly where to place it and how to hedge it in the preceding and following paragraphs. And we are guided by what are now quite automatic reflexes: not unlike city walkers who have learned to stop automatically on the red light and cross with the green, we subconsciously recognise what at any given moment it is permissible to write and what is not, what separates the provocative from the treasonable (in the eyes of district party secretaries), the suggested from the stated, the implicit from the explicit.

In the case of 'questionable' Western literary works to be translated into Czech, the method of submitting them for approval with an introduction criticising (or explaining in historical terms) the author's lack of ideological insight, has worked wonders. Especially when written and signed by notorious dogmatists, these forewords (nobody reads them anyhow) have made it possible for works by a Beckett or a William Blake or a Valéry to be translated and published; invariably they have been first-rate publishing successes.

When the going is especially rough, i.e. when a well-rooted fallacy has to be brought down from untouchable heights to be analysed and debated, the offices of a well-known and left-oriented writer (Aragon, Sartre) are greatly appreciated. He is invited to Prague, and asked leading questions concerning ticklish or as yet unexplored ideas. Since the answers are more honest and less dogmatic than when the question is treated domestically, they can be used at a later date and eventually become part of our own accepted views. Thus another exploration has succeeded, another step has been taken. But in what direction? Toward what goal?

Speaking strictly politically, I do not quite know. All I know is that I refuse to be fooled any more. I consider the 'cult of personality' excuse an insult to the intelligence. I do not doubt for a moment that a rigidly planned and centralised economy cannot function effectively. I think that our current ideas about the management of industry and agriculture, our concepts of the leading role of the Party, of class consciousness, of the outside world in general and the capitalist world in particular, indeed, most of our ideological equipment, are either hopelessly out-dated or irreparably compromised. What is more, I think that what is understood by communism today has already outlived its usefulness, fulfilled its historical mission, and that (with the possible exception of the underdeveloped parts of the world where poverty is rampant and the ruling classes selfishly blind, so that leninist principles of seizing and exploiting power can be applied), the present-day concept

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of communism as an ideology and as a way of life is doomed to a slow death.

Ironically, yet logically enough, this process of decay is being accelerated by the concept of peaceful coexistence between the socialist and the capitalist worlds (which I support), since false ideas can persist only in a quasi-total isolation (Stalin understood this perfectly). In this respect, incidentally, it seems to me undeniable that it is not Khrushchev but Mao who is the true follower of Lenin, and that the present policy of the Chinese Communist Party in its dogmatism and fanaticism follows the original leninist line.

* * * *

AND YET, IN SPITE (OR BECAUSE?) of all that I have said here, I still consider myself a communist. I will try to explain why.

In the West, as we all know, hardly a day passes without some terrible crime being committed against democracy, liberty, justice, and human decency. The great American democracy is today populated by millions of second-class citizens whose rightful demands for equality are fought in every corner both by democratic and undemocratic means; in some parts of the 'free' world women and children are killed because their skin is black; in others they die of hunger while a minority is fat and prosperous. There is corruption, incompetence, stupidity, and selfishness in a score of governments preaching daily the virtues of democracy. Does all this make you less democratic? Does it make you turn your back on democracy? Certainly not. Similarly, we communists remain faithful to communism in spite of the corruption, incompetence, stupidity, and lack of freedom which periodically manifest themselves in our present social order. For me, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to cease to believe in communism. You will argue, no doubt, that democracy is not perfect since man is not perfect, and that there is continuous progress towards greater freedom, broader justice, less intolerance. I say the same for a socialist order. I even say that there still remains a basic value to be salvaged in socialist construction. I am still convinced that society has to protect the poor and the ignorant, the old and the disabled (and I know that socialism, in our country at least, has neglected them all). I believe in intelligent, flexible, and realistic economic planning. I think that incentives are necessary in whatever man does, and I reject the foolish notion that people (under normal conditions) should exert themselves eternally for a 'cause' or, for that matter, for a social order to be realised some day in the future. I believe that the greatest achievement of Marxism was to bring the social question to the front of our attention and care. It should still prove to be worthwhile to retrace our steps to where we went astray and start anew from there. It may well be that *because* of the past the experiment could succeed.

I agree that this will take some doing. Unlike some of my friends, I have no great faith in the application of the inner-party democracy

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principle, although I think that in Party debates everything and everybody should be open to criticism, and the arguments presented should be correctly reported to the public. I feel, however, that such debates can become politically meaningful only if the minority opinion is given a chance to establish itself and strive for majority support. I doubt that such a revolutionary change within the Party is feasible in the foreseeable future; and even if it were, I question its political efficacy. No freedom of political choice can establish itself and prevail in a one-party system, however idealistic and desirable the aims and the goals of the single source of all power in the state. A genuine political opposition, socialist and progressive in its programme of action, must be allowed to exist in a socialist state worthy of the name; indeed, it must become a basic requirement embodied in the socialist constitution. Anything less than this will of necessity sooner or later decay into a bureaucratic and oppressive system, bound to stifle everything that is lively and life-giving in a social order.

* * * *

RE-READING WHAT I HAVE WRITTEN up to now, I find that I have spared myself. Knowingly or subsconsciously I have omitted any mention of what is probably the most painful aspect of my existence. I wish I could evade writing about it, but there is no escape.

The fact of the matter is that I have almost reached the end as a citizen and as a writer. And so have all the writers and artists (including the noisiest of opportunists) who like myself had joined the Party twenty or thirty years ago and went through the millstones of reality. Less dramatically stated: we are tired and worn out beyond repair. All we want now is to be left alone, to do whatever we are doing as best we can, to read science fiction and listen to music. Of late, quite a number of us have become passionate soccer fans. We love and trust our wives in an uneasy, coy mother-son relationship, since our wives generally proved to be more sober and morally much less promiscuous. Yet we hardly miss an opportunity to make love to other women. All of us drink every night, and some also through the day, forever exchanging spiteful gossip and indulging in petty intrigues. We get excited over the prospects of broader cultural contacts with the rest of the world but at the same time we fear this opening of the gates lest our mediocrity as writers and artists should be discovered.

Up to now, here at home, all of us, good, bad, and indifferent, have done well and lived well. We were generously cared for from the day our first slim book of verse was published to the solemn moment when we were given a national funeral, free of charge. Take myself as an example: unlike so many of my fellow citizens, I have no material worries to speak of and the daily routine of life does not tire me out so much as the great majority of others. With my wife's income (she works, as do many relatives of more prominent personalities, in a publishing house) we live comfortably since enough money can buy almost everything. Even when certain food items are scarce we are not

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obliged to wait for hours in queues since (in Prague at least) we enjoy the privilege of shopping and home delivery from a special food store. For necessary repairs of household goods, of the car, of our week-end cottage, we always have enough to bribe efficiently. And while we come under the same free-of-charge health service as everybody else, a personal telephone call or an occasional gift works wonders in arranging for an early appointment with the dentist or a better room in the hospital.

Some of us hold high orders of merit and we are assured every day that, together with the working class, we are the pillars of our society. In other words, we are systematically corrupted by those in power, and we know it.

In return, we are expected to perform. And we do, in various ways and with varying degrees of intellectual dishonesty. Fortunately there still exists the saving notion of 'responsibility towards others' (I used it myself here in excusing my anonymity). Responsibility towards others, this cherished sister of cowardice! A well-known writer, a member of a former old Prague bourgeois family, has recently joined the Party, after years of hesitation. He did so, as everybody knows, to insure his son's university education (class origin is still quite an important fact of life in our country). The unfortunate writer now drinks more than ever, bores everybody in sight with his anti-party views and his endless self-defence. An artist whose most cherished dream during the stalinist era was to travel to the West and stay there, got cold feet when the opportunity at last presented itself: the prospect of uncertainty and of the challenge his art would be exposed to in a new and coldly objective environment scared him; but he never stopped giving us the sweet-sour story of responsibility towards others which made him return home. Not so long ago I was asked to contribute to a textbook an article on life in socialist Cuba. I wrote the piece (a pack of half-truths and drooling sentimentality), mainly to escape the unending telephone calls from the editor. It so happened that a year or so later my younger daughter had to read aloud to her class that particular product of mine ('We are fortunate to have a daughter of the celebrated author right here among us'), and that afternoon she cried hysterically in her mother's lap. It appeared that her classmates were genuinely disgusted and the 'celebrated author' was regarded as something of a prostitute. Awkwardly, I tried to find out what was actually 'so bad about it, if I may ask', playing the innocent. 'Never mind, father', she said, and left the room.

What am I then? A disillusioned revolutionary, a renegade, a fake, a cynic, a coward, a dishonest intellectual who wants to live well and be left in peace? All this and yet not quite all this. What is certain is that as a generation we are now useless; we can do very little good and quite a lot of harm. We are healthily despised, especially by the young generation.

A strange, frightening breed, this new generation, these men and women born during the last war or even later, who never knew any other

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social order and who are the product of our society. Purposeful, tough, smart, resourceful in handling their own affairs, down-to-earth, uncommunicative outside their own group, full of obvious pity for their fathers and their ridiculous manoeuvres, full of energy to get the best out of life, now and for themselves.

To them, ideology and politics and, indeed, any form of public activity are a lot of bunk, just hollow words with little relation to reality. Not that they are anticommunists, a meaningless term in their ears: they just could not care less. They were born into socialism and they live in socialism and what they see around *is* socialism. Pretty dull and shabby, and certainly nothing much to write home about.

They have a built-in sense for phony deeds and empty words; they smell them out in no time and turn away in undisguised if silent disgust. When requested by their fathers, teachers, or comrades in the Youth Union to wave little flags at a May Day celebration or flash happy smiles for publicity purposes, they will quietly oblige and walk away.

If there still is to come the final ignominy of a burial of Marxism-Leninism as we understand it today, it will be effortlessly carried out by these generations already born into socialism. And so it should be! For I believe that these people, these young socialists, will at last realise, because of what we did, that there is no socialism without freedom and that life is far more important than ideology. This, at least, is my hope. The only one I sincerely and truly have.

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SOVIET STUDIES, THE PRESS, AND THE PUBLIC

Leopold Labedz

A generation of the unteachables is hanging upon us like a necklace of corpses. George Orwell

IN his 1936 introduction to *The Revolution Betrayed*, Trotsky noted that 'the bookstalls of all civilised countries are now loaded with books about the Soviet Union'. He complained, however, that the reader 'would seek in vain on the pages of this literature for a scientific appraisal of what is actually taking place in the land of the October revolution.'

In the thirties—the era of the Left Book Club—scholarly works on the subject were indeed scarce. In the sixties this is no longer the case. Publications on the Soviet Union still flood the bookstalls, but after the war a new category appeared, no longer of the 'A Country With A Plan' variety, but which looks through the haze of ideology and propaganda at the actual details of the Soviet scene, or some aspect of it. Unlike their predecessors, these are a result of study and not of impressions or handouts. True, they would hardly have been praised as 'scientific' by Trotsky, who was not deeply concerned with 'bourgeois' academic virtues. But one immediate effect of the scholarly pursuit of knowledge on Soviet affairs has been to circumscribe the area in which solemn nonsense could be pronounced without any loss of intellectual respectability, particularly in the academic field.

No such limitations apply at less exalted levels. Even the serious press still occasionally serves up a mixture of sense and nonsense, as if the Soviet Union were indeed 'a mystery wrapped in an enigma'. Undoubtedly, the situation has improved in the quality newspapers, but even there a glance at back numbers can be a sobering experience. Even more instructive is it to look at the coverage of Soviet affairs in an earlier period, and to see 'what the papers said at the time'.

At all times there is of course a gap between better informed and more popular levels, and over a period of time there is a lag between the acquired and the disseminated knowledge. But in this case the gap was wider and the lag longer because the problem of bridging them was *sui generis*. It involved not so much the sociology of knowledge, as what may be termed the sociology of ignorance. To analyse its causes one has to look not just at the factors affecting positive knowledge, but at the obstacles preventing its emergence in the first place.

Prejudices distort knowledge. This particular gap was due to a special resistance to learning. To live with the Soviet myth was to encounter all sorts of pseudo-certainties, ranging from mild misconceptions to wilful ignorance. Only after Khrushchev's 1956 speech did things begin to change; but the legacy remained.

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WHEN knowledge became more accessible and the myth began to crumble, two tendencies began to manifest themselves: on the one hand a slow erosion of the old attitudes, on the other a continuous display of the familiar stereotyped responses, perpetuating themselves in a more subtle and more attenuated form.

On the left, these attitudes were in the past expressed in their classical form in the *New Statesman*; on the right, the American *National Review* provides a good example of dyed-in-the-wool obscurantism; the third category, the muddled middle, between the Bourbons of the left and the Neanderthals of the right, cannot be identified with any particular journal; it just pops out everywhere. It is not a question of the intellectual level, which may be high, or of the lack of information, which could be obtained with some effort, but of the unwillingness to learn. Self-induced ignorance thus forms an essential ingredient of their reaction to Soviet developments. Any number of illustrations can be given referring to the past of the first category:

On the Soviet attitude to the West: 'The whole attitude of the Soviet Government towards the West has changed since the exile of Trotsky and the adoption of the Five Year Plan.' *New Statesman & Nation*, 4 July 1931.

On the accused in the Moscow Trials: 'Few would now maintain that all or any of them were completely innocent, though there may be many doubts both about the details of the charges and as to the motives or the precise degree of complicity of one or another in this tangled web of treason, assassination, and sabotage.' *Ibid.* 6 February 1937.

On the Soviet-Nazi Pact: '. . . It is not inconceivable yet that Stalin, who has captured the centre of the diplomatic stage, may himself take a hand in calling a halt to the war.' *Ibid.* 26 August 1939.

On the Doctors' Plot: '. . . There is little doubt that American intelligence was using Jewish organizations in Eastern Europe for its own ends in a fairly big way.' *Ibid.* 21 February 1953.

We are of course all anti-Stalinist now, and since Khrushchev's speech this also includes the anti-anti-communist 'liberals'. It may therefore seem ungenerous to recall the pecadillos of the past. After all, the *New Statesman* has changed and is no longer so credulous about Soviet affairs as it used to be. But its present position cannot be understood without the background of its past.

Here again, the *New Statesman* is fairly typical of a wider 'progressive' audience. It has dismissed the bad things in the past from its memory; it has become better informed on the present; and it invests in optimistic hopes for the future. This is not unusual, but instead of admitting that its past attitude on Soviet affairs was simply obtuse, it concentrates its anger on those who were better informed. In Stalin's time it justified its apologetics largely by equivocation or denial of facts; when the facts finally came out in an incontrovertible form, it adjusted

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itself to the new situation by projecting its sense of guilt on to those who had the misfortune of being prematurely right. Edward Hyams' jubilee book on the *New Statesman* (1963) shows how little the 'progressive' mentality can learn from the lessons of the past. The old reluctance to face the facts is now transformed into an internally contradictory position bordering on intellectual schizophrenia. Thus, it is admitted that the 'terrible aftermath' of the Russian Revolution 'made it reasonable and necessary to be anti-communist', but at the same time the contrary practice of the paper since 1931 is approved, with few exceptions for which extenuating circumstances are always present. 'This *New Statesman* attitude, critical but patient, was to infuriate the extremists on both sides.' Thus in retrospect truth itself appears as extremism and its absence as moderation.

The 'progressive' nostalgia, however, coexists with the progressive realisation that the paper's 'failures have almost all been caused by the one single but overwhelming disaster . . . the adoption of Socialist ideas in Russia and the coming into being of the USSR'. If, according to expectations, socialist revolution had been victorious in Germany, he says, all these awkward problems would have been avoided. But history did not conform to editorial convenience, and it is no doubt easier to regret it and to resent the fact that others did not share the paper's illusions at the time, than to approach its past in the spirit of '*amicus Plato sed magis amica veritas*'.

IF the past of the *New Statesman* was strongly affected by angelology, the present of the *National Review* suffers as severely from demonology. In neither case is it a question of the journal being on the left or on the right, but of their attitude to the facts. If the first case shows the necessity for Soviet studies in the thirties, the second shows how limited is their influence in the sixties on the prejudiced mind.

To illustrate this point one may take the coverage of Sino-Soviet relations by the *National Review* (subtitle: A Journal of *Fact* and Opinion). On 5 November 1960 it published a special supplement, 'Bear and Dragon', devoted to relations between Moscow and Peking. The editor, James Burnham, explained in the introduction that 'the purpose of the symposium is not to debate issues of current practical policy, but to assemble and focus a body of relevant data, analysis and interpretation which will be of intrinsic scientific and intellectual interest'.

And indeed, it is of interest, as can be seen from the final paragraph:

> A careful study of the material forming the alleged grounds for concluding that there is a serious Sino-Soviet conflict proves the absence of any objective foundation for such a belief. . . . All statements regarding the existence of serious disagreement between Moscow and Peking on foreign policy, war, peace, revolution, or attitude towards imperialism are an invention. All are the fruit of fertile imagination and unbased speculation.

In the thirties the 'progressives' would not believe in the existence of

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the Soviet forced labour camps; in the sixties, the diehards would not admit the fact of the Sino-Soviet rift.

It is not surprising that after it finally came into the open, the lessons drawn by the latter were no more impressive than those drawn by the former after Khrushchev's revelations. Burnham, for instance, concluded that the test ban treaty 'helps Chinese nuclear development . . . and leaves the way open for Soviet use of Chinese territory and facilities for its own further nuclear advance' (*National Review*, 10 September 1963).

'Sovietology' has to contend not only with the extremes, but also with the muddled middle.

It is difficult to define this attitude very precisely. It is vague, hazy, sometimes non-committal, and often undistinguishable from what finds its expression in a more forceful way on the left or the right lunatic fringe. But it is usually more sophisticated and much more concerned with its respectability. The developments of the last decade make this attitude attractive not only to the congenital centrists averse to sharp definitions, but also to the two other categories, who often camouflage themselves as the third, finding in it a more respectable refuge. On the whole, the muddled middle can absorb the information provided by Soviet studies more easily than the more fanatical categories. But it is in fact often less well-informed than its respectability and/or its sophistication would lead one to expect. It is just muddled.

Strictly speaking, one should not perhaps speak here about a single category; it stands sometimes simply for a kind of disarming ignorance unconnected with any special disposition in the realm of politics, which is however different from the ignorance of the earlier years, because the age of innocence is past. The muddled middle embraces a variety of attitudes. A few examples, all of them from 1963, will suggest the heterogeneity of this category:

A press tycoon on a TV programme asserts that Khrushchev secretly admires capitalists, while another expert assures the audience that he is establishing democracy in the USSR by returning to a more pristine form of Marxism.

A reviewer of yet another book on the forced-labour camps which, he says, 'adds significantly to our knowledge', writes in *The Observer*: 'Unlike most other atrocities in human history, the Soviet forced-labour camps have become known in a curious way: official admissions first, individual testimonies later.'

A front-bench Parliamentarian declares in *The* (Manchester) *Guardian*: 'Perhaps it is the Russians, not the Americans, to whom we are destined to play the role of Greeks, and who will in return subject our democratic freedoms to the rule of universal law.'

BUT if Soviet studies have a long way to go to make a stronger impact on the public mind, this does not mean that they have had no appreciable effect on this level. In fact the contrary is true.

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Most serious papers now have on their staff at least one specialist on Soviet affairs. Not all of them of course are equally competent, and some of them too often sacrifice straight reporting to esoteric speculation, more or less well founded. But there is little doubt that on the whole the amount of information on Soviet affairs provided in papers and journals since the war is greater than before, and its level is higher. Naturally there are exceptions, but by and large this is true, and the development of Soviet studies contributed to this, both directly and indirectly.

Western correspondents in the Soviet Union remain a frustrated lot, but here too progress has been registered, not only because censorship and secrecy are less strict, but because of a more competent performance by the correspondents. One only has to compare the journalism of Walter Duranty in the thirties with the reporting of Michel Tatu in the sixties to grasp the improvement. Admittedly, Tatu is in a class by himself, but many other Western journalists in Moscow, including even communist journalists like Giuseppe Boffa or Arturo Pancaldi, provide interesting factual information. Unfortunately, their conditions of work are such that they are often reduced to the study of the Soviet press, an occupation which can be pursued without travelling to Moscow. Here again, as some correspondents have pointed out, systematic studies of the Soviet Union in the West have helped to improve their work.

Western ambasadors in Moscow and their staffs have become better informed in the same way. When one remembers Joseph Davies and his *Mission to Moscow*, and compares it with the memoirs of diplomats more recently accredited to Moscow, such as for instance *Il Mondo Sovietico*, by Luca Pietromarchi (1963), one is struck not only by the gullibility of the American Ambassador, but by the knowledge of the Italian, who did his homework and read a large number of Soviet studies. Their impact in this sphere is of course more direct and immediate than on the general public, which also has less opportunity to learn and is more prone to be affected by stereotypes and myths.

The question is not so much the persistence of ignorance, which is after all normal, since the general public cannot be expected to know much about other countries, as the degree and character of this ignorance. Soviet studies can affect this only indirectly, and ' terrible simplificators ' will always be more effective than good popularisers, who are scarce anyway, so long as the subject remains highly charged politically, i.e. so long as the Soviet myth persists.

The attitudes of the general public are in fact likely to improve in this respect not when the number of popular books on the Soviet Union increases, but when it falls. Abnormally high interest is a symptom of a situation in which the public is still reacting to the myth rather than interested in reality. The generation of unteachables will probably disappear at the same time as the bookstalls carry fewer publications on the Soviet Union. This is not an immediate prospect, but as

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angelology and demonology become things of the past, popular 'sovietology' will be heading, if not for its own destruction, at least towards a less prominent position in the public eye. Serious Soviet studies will remain, to be read by a more restricted public.

That time, however, is still ahead. In the West, public ignorance has shrunk, and so has its taste for myth. But different countries undergo this process at different rates and in different ways. Mythomania itself may diminish or be redirected. That, however, is another story.

REVISTA SUR

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Vicente Aleixandre: *Bomba en la ópera* (No. 281)
Francisco Ayala: *El pez* (No. 281)
Michel Butor: *Individuo y grupo en la novela* (No. 283)
Jose Luis Cano: *Noticia sobre la poesía española actual* (No. 281)
Jose Maria Castellet: *La joven novela española* (No. 284)
Alberto Girri: *La poesía es el tema del poema* (No. 284)
Jose Agustin Goytisolo: *El oficio del poeta* (No. 281)
Juan Goytisolo: *Paseando por La Chanca* (No. 282)
Graham Greene: *La misión del escritor en la sociedad contemporánea* (No. 280)
Eugene Ionesco: *La lección del teatro está más allá de las lecciones* (No. 282)
Alfred Kazin: *El lenguaje de los "pundits"* (No. 285)
A. W. Lawrence: *Ficción y realidad* (No. 283)
Victor Massuh: *Utopia y realidad en el pensamiento de M. Buber* (No. 281)
Victoria Ocampo: *El Aurens en el desierto de Arabia* (No. 284)
Harold Pinter: *El examen* (No. 281)
Ernesto Sabato: *Algunas reflexiones a propósito del nouveau roman* (No. 285)
Pierre Schneider: *Acceso al espacio* (No. 281)
Angelos Sikelianos: *Via Sacra* (No. 280)
Ignazio Silone: *El escritor en la sociedad* (No. 280)
Wallace Stevens: *Poemas* (No. 284)
Dylan Thomas: *Manifiesto poético* (No. 283)
Wladimir Weidle: *La palabra del escritor en el mundo actual* (No. 280)

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RUSSIA IN GERMAN EYES: 1964

Wanda Bronska-Pampuch

VLADIMIR SOLOUKHIN, the Soviet peasant poet, had a surprising experience when he visited the Federal German Republic in October 1963 at the invitation of the West German Writers Group '47'. The West German people whom he had always heard described as thirsting for revenge turned out to be most pleasant. Almost all the people he met knew a few words of Russian—words they had learnt in the Soviet Union during the war. Many of them had been prisoners of war there. Others had lost their fathers, sons, brothers, or husbands there. But all of them received the Soviet poet with a friendly smile—' as though they had been meeting a good old friend '.

Does this make sense? Did Soloukhin perhaps deceive himself? Or was he being deliberately deceived? By no means. Still, it would be a mistake to draw hasty conclusions from these incidents.

It is of course a fact that many Germans above the age of forty actually know the Soviet Union and the Soviet people from personal experience. Their experience may not have been particularly pleasant, but that is irrelevant in this context. Memory transforms many an experience, throwing a fresh and softer light on much that was harsh and terrible. An encounter with one of yesterday's enemies, especially when one has never before met this particular ex-enemy face to face, can in fact, strange though this may sound, be like a meeting with a familiar old friend. For it is an encounter between two men who, at the same formative period of their lives when they were both still young, underwent a similar ordeal. That is the link. One need only think of the eagerness with which ex-servicemen all over the world (just like ex-inmates of prisons all over the world) talk happily for hours on end about all they have gone through in order to understand this kind of feeling. It stems from a deep, often from a man's very deepest experience, and that alone is decisive.

For the Germans, moreover, meeting Russians has a certain exotic lure. During the war millions of ordinary Germans saw for the first time in their lives something of a wholly different landscape, a wholly different style of life, and a wholly different kind of people. Sometimes, amidst all their sufferings in the Soviet Union, they happened upon things that were surprisingly attractive. Life is never only bleak, and a sudden ray of light in a world of darkness has far greater brilliance than ordinary daylight.

Every second German soldier who during the last war served on the Eastern front says today: 'The people there (the women and girls . . .) are good'. Some say: 'Good, but unimaginably poor'. And many add: 'If we had behaved differently we could have won them over to our side'.

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This last remark in itself leads to the conclusions to be drawn from the great encounter. Whatever it means, it remains in any case a fact, which cannot be stressed strongly enough, that the war brought the Soviet people closer to the Germans. Reality gradually changed the image of the Russians which years of Nazi propaganda had presented to them, and it changed this image in a positive direction. The Russians, it turned out, were neither so lazy nor so stupid as they had been made out to be, and the task of defeating them was obviously anything but a child's game. True, they were cruel—but was that not the Germans' own fault? Was not Russian cruelty merely an understandable reaction to their own German cruelty?

Not everyone of course thinks along such lines. In many cases notions of this kind merely form the background to the transformation which Geman attitudes towards the Soviet people have been undergoing. (The Russians, incidentally, changed in the opposite direction as the result of their wartime encounter with the Germans. The cruelties of the Hitlerite armies destroyed in them, in many cases for ever, the respect and admiration they had once felt for Germany.)

So far as the Germans are concerned, it seems certainly to be a fact that, except for small groups of cranky outsiders, there is nothing left nowadays of that great contempt for the 'sub-human' Russians which was so widespread during the Nazi period. They may hate or fear the Soviet Union, which, since its victory in 1945, has become the second greatest power in the world; they may envy it or feel sorry for it; they may distrust it and either favour or else stubbornly reject any form of compromise and rapprochement—but they certainly neither despise the Soviet Union nor do they ever feel indifferent towards it. Only people wholly uninterested in politics, or those weighed down by feelings of guilt do not share the profound curiosity which the very term Soviet Union arouses among the citizens of the Federal German Republic. Soloukhin stated no more than a fact when he wrote that 'every German wants to visit the Soviet Union'. Nor can this fact be simply explained by the well-known German predilection for travelling in general. A trip to the USSR counts nowadays as one of the most attractive of all possible tours abroad.

More and more people, as a matter of fact, visit the USSR every year. They go with Intourist to watch a football game or the New Year celebrations; they go to Moscow or Leningrad or the Crimea; they travel by rail, by air, or in their own cars, under the more or less strict control of the Soviet interpreters and tourist guides. They see and hear a lot of interesting things, but only in the rarest of cases do they get more than a superficial glimpse of Soviet life. And so what happens in most cases is that the old clichés about Soviet life are replaced by new clichés. People living under the Soviet regime are no longer described as 'desperately unhappy'; they are now said to be 'fairly satisfied'. They are no longer described as 'dirty and slovenly', they are now

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said to have 'changed out of recognition' and to be 'conspicuously clean'.

Short trips abroad always lead to generalisations. Even a country where one can move about freely and independently must be carefully studied before one can begin to understand it. How much more complex then is the understanding of a country as tightly buttoned-up as the Soviet Union—despite or possibly because of the assistance of Intourist! It leaves most of its visitors only the choice of sticking to their old clichés or of devising new ones which only years of unhindered travelling could eventually correct—although, by then, the Soviet people and the Soviet Union could well have changed again several times over.

At the moment, at any rate, West Germans are inclined to say the following (frequently contradictory) things about the Russians: The Russians are a kindly but primitive people. By compulsion and terror, combined with the steady investment of all surpluses, the communist government has somehow managed to industrialise the country, but the absence of personal incentives prevents things from ever functioning properly. The communist government continues to rule the country with the utmost severity and intends to rule the whole world with the same kind of severity. We must therefore be on our guard.

As to what 'being on guard' should mean in practice, opinions differ. There is one group which says that the Russian communists respect nothing but strength, and that an easy-going liberal attitude towards them can only end in disaster. This particular group is deeply suspicious of every hint at an international détente. It wants the cold war to continue, and it protests indignantly against the grain shipments to the Eastern bloc. 'We should starve them and not nurse them back to health', they say, and although this is supposed to refer to the regime, they do not seem to mind if it is the people who actually suffer. Nor do they justify their attitude by arguing that it is the people who create their own political system, for such an allegation would invalidate their image of the communist regime as the 'oppressor of the long-suffering Soviet people'. The mass circulation of the papers of the Springer concern, such as for instance *Das Bild*, provides some evidence that the number of Germans who think along these lines is not small. And it is within this group that the traces of the Nazi hymns of hate have been most stubbornly retained even though they have taken on a new guise.

Another group of the West German population inclines more or less intuitively to the view that only democratic attitudes are capable of making an impact on the Russian communists. Of strength and severity, they say, the Russians have had more than enough at home. A tolerant word, on the other hand, skilfully brought into the conversation, might shake them. This group tends to distinguish sharply between the Soviet regime and the Soviet people. Its members carefully collect all the pieces of evidence pointing to some internal opposition to the Kremlin, and not infrequently they base their hopes for the future on the expected overthrow of the Soviet regime.

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THE two groups have very different attitudes to the Soviet Union's party and state officials. The first group believes that the Soviet Union, after years of propaganda, now has a staff of highly trained officials who are said to prove superior to their Western partners or opponents in any discussion. 'It is therefore better not to get involved in political discussions with Russian officials' (or with Russians generally). 'It would be pointless in any case. The Russians are wrong, of course, but they have learnt to make skilful use of their arguments. (That is "dialetics".) Westerners have no comparable training that would enable them to defeat the Russians in verbal combat. We defeat them, of course, in all practical matters. But in the realm of ideology the West is unfortunately incapable of competing with communism. That is the trouble.'

Others do not accept this. They believe that communist dialectics can be countered by religion. Christianity, they say, is the best answer to communist ideology. Maybe. But who is capable of making use of the Scriptures the way the communists make use of Karl Marx? Who is enough of a theologian for that?

Others again, especially those who favour contacts with the Soviet people at all cost, cautiously suggest that communist ideology can be opposed by the denial that any kind of ideology is necessary at all, by the belief in and advocacy of a free choice of ideals. They plead that Marxism, too, should be among the subjects taught and discussed in the Federal Republic, considering that even Marxist arguments could be used, more effectively possibly than other arguments, in discussions with Soviet communists. (It is largely due to the influence of this particular group that the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin have in recent years been published in the Federal Republic in large new editions.)

IT is one of the results of the Soviet Union's self-isolation that misapprehensions about Soviet family life, the position of women, and general every-day customs have proved most difficult to eradicate. There is the stubbornly held view that Russian women are all little Ninotchkas—forbidding commissars with strongly masculine traits who are interested only in abstract ideas. Educated in the worship of ideas, they are said to neglect their families and to exaggerate the importance of equality.

When a traveller discovers that Russian women use nail varnish he is quick to welcome this as the first defiant assertion of their longing for freedom. It is almost impossible to convince anyone in West Germany that Russian women used lipstick and nail varnish at a time when this was still considered indecent in Germany, that is, during the twenties, and even during periods when there was hardly anything to eat.

The image of the Soviet woman which Greta Garbo portrayed in her film has, so far as I am aware, not even been modified by the wedding photograph of the space woman Tereshkova complete with veil and

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'Western' wedding gown. The exchange of rings, under the benevolently smiling eyes of a fatherly Khrushchev was not enough, apparently, to demonstrate the essentially petit-bourgeois character of the ceremony. Most Germans whose attention was drawn to the inherent incompatibility between space flights and a wedding of this nature saw, surprisingly, nothing at all odd in this, and, notwithstanding the evidence, Tereshkova still remained a Ninotchka for them. Had she not made propaganda speeches for the Kremlin all over the world—from Moscow, to East Berlin and beyond, in the West? Even the notion of the prevalence of free love in Russia (women are everybody's property) still makes the rounds. Somewhat more widespread is the view that Russian women really believe in the superiority of collective education and that they are only too happy to send their children to the state boarding schools (whose number and importance are usually overrated).

Despite the slushily sentimental Soviet films about the mother country which are exported to Germany, despite the lack of discrimination shown by the Soviet importers of West German films, and despite all the many other indications which point in the same direction, Germans still refuse to take note, consciously or unconsciously, of the essentially petit-bourgeois spirit which dominates Soviet life. It is difficult, presumably, for the German philistines to imagine that a communist regime could produce the stuffiness, the prejudices, the taboos and attitudes to art which were once held to be typical of the Germany of Emperor William the First. In their heart of hearts they probably still hanker after this world of yesterday and have not yet freed themselves from the old prejudices and taboos—to say nothing of their attitude to art.

SHORTLY after the last war, when the smoke was still rising from the ruins of German houses burnt out by Russian flamethrowers, a Berlin cabaret made fun of a Russian officer who opened his camera in order to find out 'whether there was anything on the film'. Soldiers from Soviet villages or from the remote steppes of Kirghizia or Kazakhstan who were unable to cope with the technical installations and gadgets in their German occupation zone have succeeded in giving the Germans the idea that the Russians lack all technological aptitude.

But what about the sputniks? What about the space flights and rockets? Don't they believe in Germany that these things actually exist? (In Poland, as it happens, and among certain particularly enraged foes of the Soviet Union elsewhere, some sceptics actually maintained for a long time that the sputniks and all that were nothing but a great Kremlin bluff.) No, in Germany people do not doubt Russia's achievements in space. But many ascribe them to the assistance of German engineers who, in the early post-war period, were deported to the Soviet Union. A number of these engineers, who returned to Germany years ago, have since denied that they gave any such assistance. But such denials seem to have made no difference. People still maintain that 'without the Germans the Russians would never have been able to

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construct their sputnik'. They still tend to think of a Russian as a man who, at the first opportunity, will steal a watch; who does not know what to do with a W.C.; and who tries to start complicated machines with a sledge-hammer. Or that at least is the impression given by German films and music halls, hit songs, and even the better-class cabarets.

Non-experts here in Germany have remained wholly unaware of the enormous advance in Soviet technological training, and Soviet personnel abroad, or at least the Soviet diplomatists, are not the kind of people to combat this ignorance effectively. Nor is the impression which Khrushchev personally gives a suitable counter-weight. There is, on the other hand, at least one group of people in the Federal German Republic which knows all there is to be known about this great Soviet transformation, and which seems to be better informed about Soviet affairs generally than anybody else. This is the group of big business representatives who repeatedly go to the Soviet Union, who have visited large numbers of factories there, and whose interests are geared to the Soviet market. They are fully conversant with the technical equipment of the various Soviet enterprises with which they have dealings and with the technological understanding of their trading partners. Feeling themselves to be among equals, they usually come to a quick understanding with them, often without the knowledge or against the will of the politicians and officials. None of them, however, has shown any interest in publishing his impressions or in publicly drawing political conclusions from them. Their greater knowledge and understanding has therefore at best had only an indirect influence on German opinion about the Soviet Union.

Germans tend to interpret the great Soviet hunger for consumer goods of every description as a hankering after a Western free market economy. As their own affluence is based on private enterprise and as the 'German miracle' would be inconceivable without it, they take it for granted that the Soviet citizen is desperately longing for a similar free enterprise system. With their typical modesty they believe of course that the Soviet Union would not get very far even with a free market economy, considering that its citizens possess nothing to compare with German efficiency, German diligence, and German technical and organisational talents; still, private property remains the essential starting point.

Even assuming that this is true, the conclusions drawn from it certainly are not. The hunger for consumer goods does not by any means lead automatically to a desire for a private enterprise system. What it does produce is a demand for improvements, for rationalisation, and for a modernisation of the state economy. Perhaps it also leads to demands for greater scope for private initiative, but hardly to more. But this, as well as all the other possible variations, combinations, and modifications in the structure of the economy, wholly escapes the average German citizen. He is convinced that the Soviet people suffer most terribly because they have no free market economy and he feels dreadfully sorry for them.

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He believes, moreover, that they also suffer because they do not dance modern dances, have only very little jazz music, and have no free elections. He considers the limitations imposed on religious freedom as a dire misfortune. The Federal German citizen pretends to know that the Russians are by nature a deeply religious people whom the communists have compulsorily turned towards atheism. He knows little, and wants to know nothing, of the countless religious sects in the Soviet Union and their persecution by the state, nor does he know anything about the dealings which the Orthodox Church has had with the state (with which it was closely allied during the Tsarist period as well).

People with this 'hard' attitude towards the Soviet Union are generally not inclined to take the Sino-Soviet conflict very seriously. 'The communists', they say, 'will never completely fall out among themselves. In the last analysis they will always stick together against the capitalist world.' There are even people who maintain that the whole conflict is an artifice, while others draw a sharp distinction between foreign policy and arguments about dogma. In this respect the views of the 'hard' champions of the cold war closely resemble the official communist explanations.

And not only in this respect. Even the view that Moscow still aims at the world-wide victory of communism corresponds fully to the official communist texts. The continuing suspicion with which these people look upon Khrushchev's policy of co-existence and their disbelief in any democratisation or reform of the Soviet system is closely connected with this view.

It is hard to say how deep this Western dogmatism goes in Germany and how immutable it is. At any rate, people are not particularly consistent about it. It happens that those who only yesterday warned their fellow-citizens not to take the Moscow-Peking conflict seriously, today go out of their way to explain that the Chinese, for racial and ethnological reasons, are the natural enemies of the Russians. 'This is above all a quarrel about frontiers', they say, 'the Chinese do not know how to cope with their population surplus, and Siberia is underpopulated.'

THE Sino-Soviet conflict has created an awkward dilemma for a third group of West Germans—those who can be described as broadly pro-Soviet. They are not very numerous, but they exist—as do, incidentally, also those who are thirsting for revenge and who by no means exist merely in Soviet propaganda. These pro-Soviet Germans are not necessarily communists; they are not underground conspirators. In fact, if the communist party became legal in the Federal Republic, their enthusiasm for communism and the Soviet Union might quickly evaporate. Right now, the attraction which the Soviet Union has for them is a reaction largely to the discontent aroused in them by the Federal Republic. They refuse to believe that religion and a free

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market economy are a convincing answer to communism. They are critical of the one as of the other, and they hold that the Federal Republic is badly in need of reform. They oppose the high-handed and legally dubious actions of their own Government; the limitations imposed on the freedom of the individual and the press; the incomplete elimination of the old Nazis; the corruption scandals; the oversized defence budget; the insufficient public expenditure on education, and a great many other things. Soviet theory, which they accept at face value, appears to them to offer a better alternative. Even today the slogans of Marx and Lenin still exercise their attraction in certain conditions—not only on Africans who fight for national independence or on Latin Americans who rebel against the consequences of decades of economic exploitation. The apparent consistency of Marxism-Leninism can have its attraction, too, for Western intellectuals who feel affronted by the reality of the economic miracle and its intellectual emptiness, always provided that they have the right kind of temperament and are capable of thinking in sufficiently abstract terms.

Many of these leftwing intellectuals, or at least the younger ones among them, learn Russian. Some of them have visited the Soviet Union and are not always necessarily disillusioned. Side by side with the contrast between propaganda and reality these particular visitors discovered something in the Soviet Union which the other German visitors failed to discover, i.e. the current forces of reform and revision. Young Soviet revisionists who have been trying to 'humanise' their regime (and that may mean turn it into a moderate-socialist one), have strengthened the pro-Soviet sympathies of these young West German intellectuals. 'At least there is something going on there', they conclude. Things are in motion there and, unlike conditions in the Federal Republic, the situation is not hopelessly petrified, nor are they concerned only with outward trappings. These impressions arouse their enthusiasm, and they do not stop to think that the reformist movement is a reaction against an intolerable reality.

Nor do they like to take note of the weary boredom with which people of their own generation in the Soviet Union react to the empty propaganda slogans which they themselves still find meaningful. They are appalled when they come across young Russians (as some of them have done) who feel suddenly enthusiastic about the old Russian nobility, who are proud to count noblemen among their ancestors, who are interested in religious traditions, and who see the root of all evil in the Soviet form of economic planning.

A young West German left-wing intellectual was genuinely concerned because, as he said, during a visit to Poland, he had failed to discover a single genuine communist. A well-known left-wing West German poet (who happens to reside in Scandinavia) bitterly reproached a Russian refugee writer for having left his homeland. When asked why he himself did not live in his homeland, he replied that 'this was a totally different matter'. True, in settling abroad, he did not choose

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one political regime in preference to another, but merely moved from one Western country to another Western country. But why can't he understand that in reproaching his Russian colleague he is denying him that right to a free choice of domicile which he himself claims as a matter of course?

Perhaps one must have personally experienced that greatest of all evils, the deprivation of liberty, before one can fully appreciate what unfreedom means—the inability to leave one's country and the loss of freedom of movement.

West German intellectuals who occasionally meet their colleagues from East Germany cannot for long remain deaf and blind to this fundamental evil of the communist world. More quickly than the French or British left-wing intellectuals do they come face to face with the problem of the Berlin wall, and the division of Germany keeps their pro-Soviet enthusiasm within bounds, even if they are prepared to swallow Khrushchev's *dicta* against modern art or seriously suggest that censorship in the Federal German Republic is more severe than in Czechoslovakia. (A Slovak poet was completely flabbergasted recently when he heard a West German writer make such an allegation.)

Nevertheless, these left-wing intellectuals do not play a negative role in the Federal Republic. They are needed, not only in order to stir up the public conscience against the still active old and new Nazi elements, but also as a counterweight to the wholly ossified and hopelessly outmoded attitude to the Soviet Union which is still widespread in Western Germany. Soloukhin was right in pointing out that German ex-servicemen tended to greet Russian ex-servicemen like good old friends. But this change in their attitude to the Soviet Union is no more than a hesitant first step. It does not rest on real understanding and it does not create the conditions of a fruitful co-existence. All that still remains a distant goal.

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OSRIC

British Opinion and the USSR

Ronald Hingley

EVEN if full use is made of all the latest scientific aids—questionnaires, hired interrogators, statistical analysis, computers and so on—it is a difficult enough task to assess public opinion. What then is one to say of such a task when attempted by someone like myself who has not used such aids at all—who has, indeed, actually gone out of his way in the opposite direction? For it is a fact that, in the interests of psychological self-preservation, I have long tried to avoid discussing matters Soviet with my fellow-citizens other than specialists in the subject.

If this campaign of self-insulation had been more successful, the present article could not have been attempted. However, fortunately or unfortunately, the campaign has been a failure. Sooner or later, when communing with fellow-Britons—whether on park benches, in trains, public bars, or senior common rooms—my shameful secret is laid bare and I am indecently exposed to view as an 'expert' on Soviet affairs. This has happened often over the years, and the ensuing conversations have followed very similar patterns, until it really has begun to seem as if British public opinion about the Soviet Union forms a homogeneous—almost monolithic—block. Or at least that it has gone far enough in that direction to produce a recurrent nightmare to which I am subject.

In the nightmare I am sitting somewhere in darkness, unable to move or speak. Opposite me a strange figure, more man than sheep, sits with a spotlight playing on its face. This creature (for some reason called 'Osric') is vaguely bleating as if seeking self-expression. Osric, on closer examination, is seen to be a sort of Anglo-Saxon cream-faced loon with a great beaming, moonlike, pasty, hairless face. Gradually the bleats which issue from his slackly flexing jaws merge into a series of peristaltic, grunting pulsations, and words begin to be distinguished: 'Understand the Russian point of view', 'sincere', 'cordial', 'coexistence', 'the Soviet man in the street', 'what the Russians are thinking', 'consumer goods', 'destalinisation', 'trend towards liberalisation'.

I know that Osric is in danger, and try to warn him. But before I can find my voice he is lassooed and trots obediently off, amiably wagging his tail, to the castrating sheds. The words 'Mr Khrushchev's sincere belief in settling disputes by negotiation' are borne faintly on the breeze.

In my subconscious fantasies Osric clearly symbolises a trend in British public opinion about Russia. Obviously the symbol has got a bit out of hand, but it will be the task of this enquiry to consider whether Osric does not correspond to reality at least to some extent.

IN speaking of 'British public opinion' I shall consider mainly the opinions of intellectuals who are not specialists on the Soviet Union.

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Certainly it is among non-specialist intellectuals, if anywhere, that we shall find our Osrics. It is true that even among British specialists on Soviet affairs one does meet the occasional Osric, but these are decidedly exceptional. So are they among non-intellectuals, whether 'working men', 'public house philosophers', housewives, or retired officers. The non-intellectual representatives of these categories are on the whole too ignorant to become Osrics. For it is surely true, if not generally recognised, that real prowess in wrong-headedness, as in most other fields of human endeavour, presupposes considerable education, character, sophistication, knowledge, and will to succeed. One has only to think of Bertrand Russell, Canon Collins, Lord Montgomery or Bernard Shaw.

At this stage we may pause to consider some of the main headings under which, as it seems to me, Soviet propaganda has made headway in Britain.

Soviet propagandists have surely scored more success than they deserve in persuading the British that the essential difference between the two world systems, the Marxist and the Western (assuming that we have a 'system') is one of economic organisation. This is a notable achievement, if I am right in thinking that the true comparison is the extent to which each 'system' has secured freedom and personal prosperity for its individual citizens. Which of us would not rather live under communism if he could be happy and free, than under 'capitalism' if he could not?

It is no small achievement of Soviet propaganda to have persuaded us that our system is properly termed 'capitalist', and that any system so termed is somehow vaguely shameful. It has even been possible to induce British businessmen, preferably while wearing funny hats after some gallant coexistence sally in a Moscow hotel, to go round talking about 'us capitalists' in tones of humorous self-deprecation.

Many of us cannot be called capitalists by any stretch of the imagination, in which case another term of abuse—'bourgeois'—may be made to serve. Thus otherwise sane British citizens have been heard in my presence to preface remarks addressed to Soviet Russians with some such formula as 'speaking as a bourgeois intellectual'.

Such successes represent minor inroads in the process of 'Osricisation', as does also, in my opinion, a trend which was probably inevitable—the setting up of British official or semi-official agencies for the organisation of 'cultural exchanges'. This was excusable because otherwise we should probably have had no cultural exchanges at all. And those we do have, ludicrous as they may be, are preferable to none. However, it is with dismay that one observes the emergence of British cultural officials whose mannerisms are sometimes modelled, however distantly or unintentionally, on those of the opposite side.

'The opposite side', I have said. But do Soviet Russians really represent the opposite side to the British? Not all British people seem quite sure. Perhaps our real enemies are the Americans? Or the West

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Germans? Or (a more recent addition) the French? In introducing some doubt on an issue as plain as this, Soviet propaganda has again attained a modest triumph. We must not exaggerate the extent of this triumph, but at least success has been achieved in concealing from the intellectual Briton the essentially malignant nature of Soviet policy.

That Soviet policy towards Britain and the West in fact is malignant will be an assumption in the present article which there is neither space (nor wish) to argue. I assume it to be self-evident that, in spite of minor tactical concessions and manifestations of 'good will', the Soviet Communist Party is relentlessly dedicated to the overthrow of our society and of its free institutions. Indeed, it seems to me quite impossible for the Soviet leaders, even if they wished, to opt out of this struggle and embark on a period of genuine compromise and cooperation with the West. Their position is such that any attempt to stand still (however much it might attract some of them) would involve them in retreat. They must try to press on—or abdicate. This means that, in my view, 'ordinary' Russians, Ukrainians, Kazakhs, etc. are—in so far as they are loyal Soviet citizens —our 'enemies', however reluctant one may be to say this. And the Americans (if one dare make so outrageous a remark) are our friends. Such are the eccentric premisses on which this article is based, though it is admitted that the situation might change one day—perhaps partly as the result of the developing Sino-Soviet quarrel. But it has not changed yet.

IN view of this I am horrified by one heresy which is unfortunately gaining ground in Britain. This is the kind of neutralism which sees the world divided into two hostile power blocs, the one headed by Russia and the other by the USA, both being more or less equally pernicious. Here your average Osric tends to see himself as a lone island of sanity standing between two fire-breathing colossi—an attitude which is really the height of arrogance masquerading as humility.

An example of this occurred a year or so ago when a group of British nuclear disarmers called on the Soviet Ambassador in London to protest against the renewal of Soviet nuclear tests. The leader of the deputation was interviewed by a journalist on leaving the embassy and was reported as commenting: 'We made it quite clear to the Ambassador that we weren't taking sides.'

In confusing the well-meaning Westerner about which side he is on, the Soviet Peace Campaign has not had much success, having been too absurd even to attract many Osrics. But the word 'coexistence' has done yeoman service—and must be recognised as one of the most effective among the misleading verbal stimuli introduced or popularised by Soviet propaganda in the post-Stalin period.

'The experiment should be interesting', wrote *The* (formerly Manchester) *Guardian* on 5 June 1962, referring to its decision to reprint once a week translated articles from *Pravda* or *Izvestiya* without—a

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typical Osric touch—any agreement for reciprocal arrangements in the Soviet press. 'Whether it will help towards coexistence', the *Guardian* continued, 'remains to be seen. We hope that it will'.

Here the *Guardian* had allowed itself to be taught a Soviet term and to use it 'straight' without apparently realising its ambivalent nature. Peaceful coexistence, Mr Khrushchev said in a speech of 6 January 1961, which may serve as typical of many such quotations, is 'a form of intense economic, political, and ideological struggle of the proletariat against the aggressive forces of imperialism in the international arena'. Was it this kind of coexistence that the *Guardian* wanted to 'help'?

Clearly it was not in any such robust spirit, but in a much more Osric-like frame of mind, that the *Guardian* decided to reprint bits of *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*. However, the decision has probably had an excellent political effect. It is only right that the non-specialist, non-linguist Briton should occasionally stub his mental toes on the knobbly jargon of Messrs Mayevsky, Kudryavtsev, Yury Zhukov, etc. Why should the 'experts' do all the suffering?

Excellent though the by-product may have been (and similar in its healthy political effect to those extracts from Mr Khrushchev's speeches published recently as advertising matter in the British press), one cannot acquit the *Guardian* of Osric-like motives in sponsoring the project. Particularly delicious to the connoisseur was the suggestion, which the *Guardian* made when introducing the series, that 'the articles will help them [readers] to understand what is going on in Russian minds'. Personally I have very little idea of what is going on in Russian minds. But the suggestion that it corresponds to what is written in *Pravda* and *Izvestiya* is surely absurd.

This misconception, incidentally—like many others in the field of Anglo-Soviet attitudes—derives from mentally projecting one's own social and political conditions on to the other side. From the British press deductions can indeed be made about the condition of British public opinion (we are in process of making such a deduction). But it is fatally easy to credit the Soviet Union with a 'public opinion' analogous to our own, just as Soviet citizens so often credit us with an all-powerful secret police, censorship, etc.

ANOTHER field in which Soviet propaganda has befuddled many an Osric is that of comparative living standards. We all know that Soviet living standards are rapidly improving, whereas our own remain disgracefully stagnant. In fact we have known this for a very long time. But why is it that the Soviet hare never actually catches up—or even approaches the British tortoise? That we do not know. It is in any case a question which no true Osric would even ask himself. For he is too dazzled by the Soviet rate of growth, which he has already partly accepted at the back of his mind as a proof of the superiority of the Soviet system over all others (for foreigners only, let us add hastily on

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his behalf). That Tsarist Russia enjoyed a comparably superior economic rate of growth at the turn of the century is also the case. But in those primitive times no one, so far as I know, ever used this as an argument for extending the autocratic system of government outside the Russian Empire.

Meanwhile we all know that the Soviet standard of living is overtaking that of the West. Russians know this too. They have been told about it by Mr Khrushchev, and also by that other regular contributor to the Moscow *Literary Gazette*, Charlz Persi Snou (Sir Charles Snow): 'Your people is now becoming richer than our people from the point of view of the material conditions of everyday life. And when you overtake us we shall welcome you' (*Lit. Gaz.* 24 May 1960). But by now Sir Charles's smile of welcome must be freezing on his face.

The ruthless advance of the great Soviet housing drive has also impressed many. Here for years Soviet spokesmen have been operating a simple statistical trick. They have always laid stress wherever possible on the number of people rehoused or on the number of new flats built, rather than on the size of the new accommodation. It was impressive to read in the Soviet press not long ago that Moscow had in recent years rehoused three million people. It was also impressive to discover lower down that this had involved building as many as twenty million square metres of new housing space. What, however, was less impressive to me was to divide twenty by three and discover that the rehoused persons had been given an average amount of living-space (under seven square metres) approximately the size of the—admittedly large—study table on which I am writing these lines. It was the number of persons rehoused, however, and not the miserable size of their accommodation, which attracted the notice of the British press, some of whose graphs were gratefully reproduced in the Soviet press at the time. Meanwhile I have an imaginary Soviet *domovoy* or house-spirit living on my study table, and can't get rid of him.

Naturally Soviet editors are grateful for all assistance from British publicity, but they might be less so if they were sensitive to the peculiar note of condescension with which even the most extreme Osric is liable to speak of Russian goings on. These are, after all, foreigners—and not the cleaner, more punctual or more reputable type of foreigner at that. They do not of course require the standards of freedom and prosperity which an Englishman is entitled to expect. There is thus something more insulting to the Russian in the condescending pat on the back which he receives from visiting Osrics, than in the more polemical treatment which he gets from us reactionary Cold Warriors. I believe that this is what many Soviet Russians themselves feel. I am sure some of them would rather deal even with me than with an Osric.

That all is not entirely well with Soviet society even the most abject Osric knows—he is not, for example, likely to be greatly impressed with the achievements of Soviet agriculture. Yet, while being conscious of some of the defects of Soviet life, he remains permanently poised for the

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great moment when, somehow, all will change and the dawn of enlightenment, reasonableness, ease, and prosperity will suddenly break. This readiness to believe in a transformation whereby in an instant of time (and with luck as the result of a 'summit conference') a new era of sweetness and light will be ushered in on the international and Soviet domestic arena—this surely is one of your Osric's most pathetic illusions.

Osric, in this respect, is a glutton for punishment as a student both of international affairs and of Soviet domestic arrangements. On the international front he has thrilled in succession to the Geneva Spirit and the Camp David Spirit. And is it too early to hint, in view of the signature of the partial test ban treaty, at an even headier draught—the Moscow Spirit? On the domestic front Osric has seen the bastions of Soviet reaction fall again and again, as the resounding chords of triumphant Soviet liberalism have sent the blood coursing through his veins. Such events as Ehrenburg's *Thaw* and Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*—and then, in more recent years, the antics of Yevtushenko and slabs of epoch-making autobiography by Ehrenburg—have each in turn proclaimed the arrival of this new era of liberalism. (I write this, not to belittle the persons mentioned, but to deplore the disproportionate hopes which these events have stimulated outside Russia. The dawn of Soviet liberalism will no doubt be proclaimed innumerable times again without ever actually arriving. But the fanfares never fail to move Osric.)

IT cannot of course be denied that Soviet society is relatively secure and—if the word must be used—liberal by comparison with the horrors of Stalin's day. But in a way the passing of Stalin has been a bad thing for Osrics. How can we, in these tamer times, recapture the panache and élan of those heroic years when it was possible to dismiss the existence of thousands of Soviet concentration camps and their millions of victims with a wave of the hand and a reference to figments of emigré imagination? (Nowadays you don't even get any decent famines whose existence can be disproved *à la* Bernard Shaw by pointing a triumphant finger at the menu in the Moscow Metropole Hotel.) But Osric has fought a plucky rearguard action over those camps. He never admitted their existence at all until Mr Khrushchev embarrassed everyone by denouncing Stalin in his 'secret speech' of 1956 and letting the cat out of the bag.

Solzhenitsyn's *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* carried further the process of Soviet revelations about the camps—revelations which no Osric had credited before they were authenticated by official Soviet publications. But your Osric is nothing if not stubborn in defence. I remember the BBC programme 'The Critics' in which *One Day* was discussed. The speaker (with whom everyone else seemed to agree) claimed—if I remember correctly—that the novel proved the superiority of Stalin's concentration camps over Hitler's, because there was 'more hope' in them. I believe he thought of Ivan Denisovich's camp as of a rather

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badly organised scout camp. The edifying abstract nouns, with which Stalin's worst excesses were inevitably trimmed, have somehow permanently befuddled Osric.

It has often been commented that other Western European countries have their communists and fellow-travellers, but lack this peculiarly British phenomenon which I term the Osric. For Osrics are not fellow-travellers at all—they are well-meaning, decent, liberal-minded people, often Christians, who have learned that there are always two sides at least to any question and who believe that all human problems will eventually yield to patience, good will, and a spirit of compromise. This attitude must, in general, be respected. But as a frame of mind in which to confront communism it represents the purest folly. If it is absent on the Continent, this is probably due to two reasons. In the first place almost all European Continental countries have direct experience of totalitarian rule—which we lack. And, in the second place, almost all possess Communist parties sufficiently powerful (unlike our our pathetic specimen) to have provided the population at large with a better education in communist methods.

To revert to the good old British Osric, we do find him enjoying one recent advantage which he did not have in the days of Stalin—he can go to the Soviet Union. And he does go. Could such an opportunity for well-meaning blethering on his return ever be neglected? Osric does not know Russian, apart from a few phrases such as *mir i druzhba*, which he takes along with his coloured beads and toothy grin. But this does not matter, for it cannot be said in any true sense after his return, festooned with peace medals, that he has ever really been in Russia at all. He has been conveyed there and back as a piece of 'freight' rather than as a traveller (I believe we owe this happy image to Mr Peter Fleming)—and of some such travellers to communist regions it is also possible to suppose that they have gone round everywhere with labels saying 'This way up'.

On Soviet soil our Osric has been taken over by trained custodians, has been manipulated into and photographed in predetermined postures, and has been pumped full of handout material which he will regurgitate on his return. How are we to explain the success of these manoeuvres? This really does set a puzzle because it is wrong to think of Osric as a fool. He is, as often as not, a highly intelligent man who has made a success of his career. Anyone who tried these methods on him on British soil, and in something affecting his professional life, would get short shrift.

There are two reasons for the success of Soviet processing, I think, and the first derives from unfamiliar habitat. On British soil your Osric has already met plenty of double-dealing and hypocrisy. But the intense concentration of total fraudulence which laps him round in an impenetrable incapsulated cocoon while he is in the hands of his Soviet processers—this is something outside his previous experience. He is prepared

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to believe in what he is told simply because to reject it is to posit a degree of fraudulence in human dealings which seems *a priori* impossible. Also, of course, one must always be polite to one's hosts.

Another reason why our Osric regurgitates Soviet handout material on his return is simply that he has nothing else *to* regurgitate. And regurgitate he of course must. He is, let us say, an expert on education, economics, or medicine. His professional success has been assisted by his readiness to sound off on these topics as and when required—and also, more especially, when not required. When asked on his return what he thinks of Russian education, economics, or medicine, he is not likely to reply, 'Well, I don't know anything about them. You see, I haven't really been in Russia at all.' To reply in this way would be to kick against the professional instincts of a lifetime. Moreover, he is not likely to confine his observations to his own special subject—he may as well take in the whole length and breadth of Soviet life while he is about it. There is something intoxicating about talking pure nonsense, even when it is undigested handout material. We may blame Osric, but social pressures must be taken into account. Under modern conditions it is impossible for any member of the competing (or professional) classes to do the honourable thing and keep his great trap shut. We are all required to pretend to know everything about everything these days—a semi-Soviet habit, the spread of which is to be deplored.

All the same, specialising in Russian affairs has a particular disadvantage. If my own subject were entomology, say, or South-East Asia, I doubt if my fellow citizens would pause from their affairs to instruct me in the methods of classifying insects or the best way of dealing with the Pathet Lao. But Soviet affairs are somehow different. Here is a subject in which the 'expert' exists in order to be instructed—by whatever Osric last stepped off the jet from Moscow. As explained above, I take evasive action when possible, but it is not always possible.

In my experience different professions have stood up with varying degrees of effectiveness to Soviet processing. Though this experience may be quite arbitrary, I should like to record that trade union leaders have come out of it best. I have met British trade union officials who have been communists or fellow-travellers—but I have never met an Osric among them. At the other end of the scale British doctors and businessmen compete, in my experience, for the honour of producing the highest concentration of Osrics.

HAVE I given an exaggerated impression of the extent to which British public opinion about Russia is controlled by Osrics? I do not know. The extent to which they dominate British thinking is hard to assess without the aid of polling techniques such as I referred to at the beginning and which have not been available to me. Though I cannot count our Osrics I will, however, say that even one Osric is an Osric too many and that a decrease in Osrics is very much to be desired at the

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present moment. It is a shameful thing that we should have any at all.

There are also, I am glad to say, many non-Osrics about as well. Happily these include most recognised authorities on Soviet affairs writing in the British press (it may be remembered that I have above exempted specialists in Soviet affairs from my generalisations). I may not always agree with, let us say, Messrs Floyd, Crankshaw, Zorza, Schapiro, and Conquest. But these are all sterling non-Osrics.

Nor is the situation so dismal among laymen as I may have indicated. For every Osric who returns from the Soviet Union it may be that we can count at least one non-Osric in the credit balance.

These are all signs—together with the establishment of a body of responsible professional opinion on Russia—that the future may see and hear less of the ingratiating, toothy grin, of the castrato bleat and of the well-meaning facial workings of that original Anglo-Saxon cream-faced loon.

Finally, since the future is always catching us British on the hop, some provision should surely be made for the day—perhaps far-distant—when the British Isles finally fall under Soviet control. What on earth are our Soviet masters going to do with all the British Osrics then? They are bound to hold in the deepest suspicion people who have been gratuitously helping their enemies without thought of gain—that all this was done in the purest innocence of heart is an explanation not likely even to occur to our new controllers. It therefore seems likely that, if any Osrics survive the crisis, they will have to be kept under some kind of restraint, at least for a time. It is in acting as a—what shall I say?—genial prison governor, chaplain, or understanding warder to Osrics that I discern my own future role. We might instal them in some kind of camp—well, compound—with plenty of healthy out-of-door activity. I can see to it that they keep their hair decently cut, and wash behind their ears, make up their bunks neatly, and so on. And in the long winter evenings it will be a pleasure to explain to them—if necessary at length—exactly how they come to find themselves where they are.

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POLITICAL REALISM IN POLAND

Adam Bromke

THE prudent attitude which the Poles revealed in their 'peaceful revolution' of 1956 perplexed a great many Western observers of the Polish scene, for it did not fit into the widely held conception of the Polish people as ever ready to uphold with arms their right to freedom; all its past history seemed in contrast to the conduct of the Polish nation in 1956.

This did indeed differ substantially from its conduct during the second world war and the immediate post-war years. The upheaval was exceptionally peaceful and its outcome singularly moderate. Apart from the riots in Poznan, no blood was shed, and the Poles showed a great deal of moderation in their political goals. They abandoned their traditional 'everything or nothing' attitude, and showed a surprising ability to compromise.

All appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, this behaviour was not out of line with the Polish tradition. True, it did mark a drastic departure from the idealist trend of political thought which had been dominant in Poland throughout most of the present century, and which reached its climax during the second world war. Still, their prudence did not represent a novel element in Poland's history. In fact, the same attitude was characteristic of the realist trend of political thought which had been dominant in Poland at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. The events of 1956 were significant in that they represented the revival of a political tradition which had long been on the decline.

The conflict between the idealist and realist trends of political thought in Poland is in the first place a psychological one. It was generated by uncertainty and anxiety about the fate of the country, to which the response differed according as it came from 'those who imagine the world to suit their policy and those who arrange their policy to suit the realities of the world'.[1]

The uniqueness of the controversy between political idealism and political realism in Poland is rooted in the fact that throughout the last two centuries the security dilemma has plagued the Poles with unusual persistence and exceptional ruthlessness. Ever since Poland's decline during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, she has not been able to adjust peacefully to her new station in European politics. Because of its central geographic location in Europe the Polish nation was prevented from taking the position which in virtue of its human

1 Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Révolution Française*, p. 474. Quoted by E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1958), p. 11.

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and material resources it could have expected to attain.[2] Power in international politics being relative, Poland was reduced to the virtual status of a small country. Squeezed in between the two great powers, Germany and Russia, she was repeatedly threatened by neighbours ready to deprive her of her very existence.

The dilemma provoked the typical response. The discrepancy felt between Poland's potential and actual position in the international sphere generated the tension between the political order as people think it ought to be and as it is. In these circumstances the endless debate over the course of Poland's policies soon took the classic form of controversy—adapted, of course, to fit the specific conditions of that country—between political idealists and political realists.

Polish political idealists took a rigid, moralistic stand. They claimed that to deprive Poland of her true place in the international sphere represented an act of injustice and insisted that this should be corrected. They argued that restoring Poland to her rightful position was not only in line with Polish national interests, but indispensable for upholding moral order in international politics. Until this could be achieved, they pledged themselves to carry on a relentless battle to overthrow the existing political order, counting on assistance from nations sharing their ideals. Poland's freedom was their major goal and they were ready to make large sacrifices to attain it. They espoused heroism as the highest national virtue.

The political realists adopted a more pragmatic attitude. Viewing Poland's situation in the international sphere at any given time, they strove to make the best of it. They believed that the only way Poland could improve her position was by increasing her internal strength. They repudiated on principle the struggle against the existing political order because they felt that this would weaken rather than strengthen the Polish nation; instead they advocated a *modus vivendi* with their more powerful neighbours. Their primary objective has been to protect the nation from any further blows and to secure for it as much opportunity for normal internal development as possible. They regarded prudence as a supreme national virtue.

Political programmes reflecting these two different approaches to politics crystallised in Poland as early as the eighteenth century. From political idealism developed the programme of 'independence and insurrection, directed primarily towards shaking off the yoke from the East'. The method advocated was 'military action . . . with the help of France'. From political realism emerged 'the programme of seeking Russian support, which in the first place was directed towards defence of the territorial integrity of the Commonwealth against the two German

[2] At that time Poland was not the only great power on the decline. Her case was, however, unique. While the countries located on the periphery of the European continent, such as Sweden, Spain or Turkey, all suffered loss of territory, they retained their independence; but Poland, because of her geographic position, was totally dismembered by her neighbours.

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courts and expected to accomplish the most urgent reforms under Russian protection'.[3]

FROM the Napoleonic wars until the 1960s, it was the idealist school which was dominant. Inspired by the ideas of the French and German romantic political philosophers, it appealed to sentiment rather than reason. 'Measure your powers by your purposes, not your purposes by your powers', the great Polish poet, Adam Mickiewicz, taught his compatriots. In this idealist vein Poland's national interests were identified with those of progressive forces in the West. Hopes for a re-emergence of the Polish state were closely linked to expectations of the victory of the liberal revolution in Europe.

At the same time the realist school, although generally on the defensive, was by no means inactive. A programme of internal reforms under Russian protection was successfully carried out in the Kingdom of Poland by Prince Ksawery Drucki-Lubecki. However, the abortive insurrection against Russia in 1830–31, which led to the abolition of the Kingdom's autonomy, largely destroyed the fruits of Lubecki's work. In the late 1850s a similar attempt was made by Margrave Aleksander Wielopolski, but his work was cut short by another ill-fated rebellion in 1863–64. The results of the 1863 uprising were disastrous. The Russians retaliated with a ruthless policy of assimilation and russification. Even small and purely formal manifestations of Poland's national existence were now eradicated. Still more serious than the marked deterioration of the internal situation were the consequences of the insurrection in the international sphere. The outbreak in Poland was ably exploited by Bismarck for his own ends. By assisting the Russians to quell the Polish rebellion he gained the Tsar's gratitude. Having ensured Russia's neutrality he was free to move against France. The outcome of the Franco-Prussian war, in turn, had far-reaching repercussions in Poland. The very foundations on which the plans of the romantic school rested, namely, assistance from France, were demolished. Worse than that, Poland not only lost an ally but gained an enemy. Confident of their power, the Germans soon launched a repressive policy against the Poles in the Prussian provinces.

Under the combined impact of these three factors—the crushing military defeat, the disillusionment with France in particular and the West in general, and the emergence of the German threat—the programme of political idealism rapidly lost its appeal. In the early 1870s 'hopelessness spread among the broad strata of politically conscious [Polish] society. Only now did the Poles realise that the epoch of insurrection, the epoch of romantic policies, had definitely and irrevocably come to an end'.[4]

[3] Willhelm Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej mysli politycznej* (Warsaw, 1933), p. 2.
[4] Henryk Wereszycki, *Historia polityczna Polski w dobie popowstaniowej 1864–1918* (Warsaw, 1948), p. 16.

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For at least the next three decades it was the school of political realism which prevailed in Poland. In evolving their programme the Polish political realists, like the political idealists in the past, looked for inspiration to the West. Using Comte's philosophy as a basis, they came out with their own theory of positivism. Since for Comte 'positive' meant 'real' as opposed to something imaginary, the Poles used this distinction for their own purpose, changing the concept into a social programme. In Poland, says a prominent Polish historian, Henryk Wereszycki, 'positive' was not a 'philosophic concept as in Comte's writings, but an approach to practical problems, above all, social problems. . . . For the generation of Poles who opposed the romantic ideology, to seek guidance in something that was real and not imagined in the minds of utopians obviously represented positivism. Positivism thus represented a reaction to romanticism in all its manifestations'.[5]

The positivist programme, therefore, was by definition thoroughly realistic. At the root of political realism was the acceptance of foreign rule as unchangeable. 'Historical necessity', wrote one of their most outspoken exponents, Antoni Wrotnowski, 'makes it impossible for the Poles to continue striving for their independent state. This goal could not be attained even through the greatest sacrifices and the most determined efforts of the entire Polish society'.[6]

In these circumstances the Poles virtually renounced political activity, turning their whole attention to domestic reforms. Here they soon evolved a constructive plan of action. Borrowing the term from Spencer, they advanced a so-called programme of 'organic reform' directed at the moral, educational and economic rejuvenation of the nation. 'We believe', wrote an eminent writer and former political romanticist, Jozef Kraszewski, 'neither in revolution nor in Utopias which profess to change society from one day to the next and to cure all its social ills by means of some panacea. . . . We believe in slow and gradual progress [which] by making individuals more moral, by increasing enlightenment and encouraging work, order, and moderation, will accomplish the most salutary revolution, or rather evolution, in the social system'.[7]

The effects of organic reform were commendable. Within a few decades great economic strides were made in Poland, and this in turn promoted far-reaching social changes. The entire structure of Polish society underwent a drastic transformation. At the close of the nineteenth century, the modern Polish nation was clearly in the making.

Paradoxically, the very success of organic reform worked against it. Consolidation of the nation's economic and social strength led to the revival of its political aspirations. The old programme with its renunciation of political activity no longer satisfied the Poles. In

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[6] Antoni Wrotnowski, *Porozbiorowe Aspiracye Narodu Polskiego* (Krakow, 1898), pp. 356–7.
[7] B. Boleslawita, *Z roku 1868 Rachunki* (Poznan, 1869), pp. 21–2.

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particular, the younger generation which did not remember the disaster of 1863 began to look for new political solutions. Despite widespread adoption of its basic tenets, in the 1890s 'positivism' was visibly on the decline.

The programme of political realism was challenged at the turn of the century by the socialist movement, and particularly its militant nationalist wing led by Pilsudski. This group, which soon constituted itself into a separate political organisation, openly reverted to the romantic insurrectionist tradition. Until 1914 its influence was successfully countered by the national democratic movement led by Roman Dmowski, whose programme also went beyond positivism, for in trying to advance the interests of the Polish nation it stressed the significance of political action. It still belonged, however, to the realist tradition in that it stopped short of revolutionary action. In the course of the first World War, Pilsudski's followers prevailed over those of Dmowski. The classic concept of the romantic school—namely, promoting Poland's interests through military action supported from the West—once again gained widespread support among the Poles.

For most of the inter-war years it was Pilsudski and his followers who ruled in Poland, and Poland's foreign policy followed closely the idealist precepts of relying on her own military strength assisted by an alliance with the West in general and France in particular. The romantic tradition also prevailed in Poland during the second World War and in the years immediately after. It was precisely the belief in the efficacy of their armed struggle, coupled with the expectation of assistance from the West which, in the years 1939–45, made the Poles wage unrelenting battle against Nazi Germany, and in the late 1940s to stage desperate resistance to the imposition of Russia's suzerainty over Poland.

IN the long run, however, political idealism also proved to be self-defeating. At one stage or another a weaker nation is bound to cease fighting and to seek some *modus vivendi* with the dominating power. The more the struggle is prolonged, and the greater the losses it involves, the stronger will be the reaction against the policy of resistance at any cost. It seems that some time in the early 1950s a transformation along these lines took place in Poland. The prudence shown in the upheaval of 1956 clearly heralded a profound change in the outlook of the Polish nation. After almost a century of political romanticism, positivism once again seemed to be in the ascendant in Poland. Three major elements can be distinguished as influencing this trend. These are the revulsion against the military struggle—aftermath of a crushing defeat—disillusionment with the West, and the re-emergence of the threat from Germany.

The realisation of the tremendous losses, both in lives and wealth, which Poland suffered during the war led to a revulsion against military action. Over six million Poles (representing 20 per cent of the total population) lost their lives during the war; and Poland's national income

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declined to 38·2 per cent of what it had been in 1938.[8] Particularly heavy was the loss during the ill-fated Warsaw uprising in 1944. In this single battle 250,000 people perished and 55 per cent of the city was destroyed. During the post-war armed resistance to the communist rulers over 20,000 communists and several thousand police and soldiers were killed,[9] while the number of slaughtered anti-communist guerrillas must have been considerably higher.

The Poles have also become extremely conscious of their vulnerable geographical position. They are well aware that any major conflict in Europe is bound to engulf their country, exposing them to new losses and sufferings. Moreover, they have lost faith in their ability to protect their independence by their own military strength. Indeed, in the late 1950s Poland's military tradition was subjected to shattering criticism, and the values once espoused by the political romantics openly derided. Finally, the Poles seem to have abandoned revolutionary and conspiratorial methods of opposing the communist regime. Since the early 1950s there has been no evidence of any serious underground activity in Poland.

Today, as in the 1870s, a strong feeling of disillusionment with the West exists in Poland. In the early 1950s many Poles still believed that the West, and the United States in particular, would eventually gain sufficient influence in East Europe to assist them in shaking off the Russian yoke. The inability of America to intervene, underlined by the outcome of the outbreak in East Germany in 1953 and, still more, by the fate of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, dealt a final blow to political calculations based on hope of western aid. As a result, the overwhelming majority of Poles have become aware that in the effort to improve their lot they can count only on themselves.

Again, as in the 1870s, the Poles today are greatly concerned with the rise of German power. During the struggle against Soviet rule in the late 1940s, defeated Germany did not pose a threat to Poland. In the 1950s West Germany re-emerged as an independent state, and the revival of German military power, coupled with the persistent refusal of the Bonn government to accept the western border of Poland along the Oder-Neisse rivers, made the Poles once again fearful of their western neighbour. With bitter memories of the Nazi occupation, these facts tend to acquire alarming dimensions in the eyes of the Poles, often to the point of exaggerating the actual strength of those elements in Germany which stand for revision of the border with Poland. Moreover, the indefinite postponement of recognition of this frontier by the major Western powers is viewed by the Poles as tacit support of German claims to Poland's territories, aggravating even further their sense of disillusionment with the West. Conversely, the upholding of the present Polish-German border by the communist countries brings the Poles closer to the Soviet bloc.[10]

[8] *Straty wojenne Polski w latach 1939–1945* (Poznan-Warsaw, 1960), pp. 38, 47.
[9] Figures given by Gomulka in 1959. Wladyslaw Gomulka, *Przemowienia 1959* (Warsaw, 1960), p. 421.
[10] France *de facto* recognised the present Polish-German border as final.

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There is another way in which the attitudes of the 1950s resemble those of the 1870s; the programme of action adopted by the Poles today is also in several respects similar to that of the nineteenth-century positivists. They view their political position vis-à-vis Russia in a dispassionate, detached manner, and as a whole are reconciled to the fact that, at least for the time being, there is little they can do about it. Another component of the nineteenth-century positivist programme is also present. This is the conscious effort on the part of the Polish nation to revert to the tradition of organic reform, to concentrate, in the absence of scope for political activity, on promoting social and economic progress. 'Freedom and independence', declared a Polish economist in 1962, expressing the views held by the middle generation of the intelligentsia, 'have become economic concepts. One's independence is related to one's economic strength. The stronger a country's economy, the greater its independence.'[11] The Polish people today are down-to-earth people concerned primarily with looking after their own welfare. They are hardly susceptible to any ideology which offers a panacea for all social ills. 'The attitude of young people today towards life', observed a Polish writer in 1959, 'is shaped by the principle of concreteness. Each motive and each action is evaluated in the light of its results. Only the facts count . . . [They] are preoccupied with work and studies, television and motorcycles, refrigerators and a snack.'[12]

THE striking similarity in the political outlook of the Poles at the end of the nineteenth century and today is not accidental. It stems from the fact that the security dilemma which plagued the Polish nation at the time of Bismarck and Alexander II is still with them. The towering political reality remains Poland's position between Germany and Russia. This is a constant which—as the German historian, Professor Golo Mann, observed—'permits but a few, ever-repeated combinations'.[13] These are the programmes of either political idealism or political realism. As long as the security dilemma persists, the Poles tend to embrace either one programme or the other, whichever they feel serves their interests better at a given time. Hence the remarkable continuity, the recurrent pattern, in the Polish political tradition.

(This article is based on the Sir Casimir Gzowski Memorial Lecture, McGill University, 16 November, 1962. The author is indebted to the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for sponsoring his research on political developments in Poland.)

[11] Juliusz Mieroszewski, 'Rozmowa z anonimem', *Kultura* (Paris), November 1962, p. 53.
[12] Zbigniew Zaluski, *Siedem Polskich grzechow glownych* (Warsaw, 1962), p. 191.
[13] Golo Mann, 'Rapallo: The Vanishing Dream', *Survey*, October 1962, p. 74.

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GERMANY'S EASTERN FRONTIER

Otto Stenzl

NO one who examines German-Polish relations today can pass over the tremendous suffering that the two sides have brought upon each other. Certainly it would be foolish for either side to excuse its own atrocities by the atrocities committed by the other. On the other hand, whenever the charge of the expulsion of Germans from the former eastern provinces of Germany is raised, it should not be forgotten that these expulsions followed the far harsher transfers of population carried out during the German occupation of Poland. An infernal precedent had thus been set, and the hatred of the oppressed created evil in its turn.

Today, nearly twenty years after the end of the war, the memory of these events is still strong on both sides, but bitterness no longer determines their attitude towards each other. In the course of time they have come to see things differently. A rapprochement between the two peoples has, of course, been easier than one between their respective diplomats; and even if contacts are still on a modest scale, they nonetheless play an important part, most marked in the economic and scientific sphere. Of the countries of Eastern Europe, Poland has the most trade with the Federal Republic. The mission of Krupps' representative Berthold Beitz in Spring 1961 shows that political contacts can develop from economic ones. Further, Polish students visit the Federal Republic and German students visit Poland; lecturers and professors from the two countries meet each other; university institutes are in touch with one another. The Universities of Göttingen and Posen have twinned up, for example.

It is true that attitudes on the Polish side are sharply conflicting. The image of the Federal Republic is often distorted, which can be explained both by the Cold War situation and by the Poles' fear of 'revanchism' and 'revisionism' in the Federal Republic. The Poles' sensitivity to Germany's alleged disdain for friendship with them also plays its part. Finally, the absence between the two of diplomatic relations makes it virtually impossible for the Federal Republic to provide a realistic picture of itself and to correct misunderstandings as they arise. There *are* attempts on the Polish side to correct the distorted image of Germany, as in the book by Marian Podkowinski, the former Bonn correspondent of *Trybuna Ludu*, entitled *Are the clocks faster in the Federal Republic?* and published in Warsaw in 1959. 'The Germans have too much to lose,' wrote Podkowinski, 'and so they can no longer afford to deal in imponderables in their politics. . . . There are therefore fewer people in Germany today who still seriously believe that Germany could again indulge in the luxury of military adventures'. The author also banishes the spectre of 'revisionism' of the expellees, pointing out

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that increased prosperity has done a lot to change their attitude. A German counterpart to this book was published recently by Hansjakob Stehle, for many years Warsaw correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, in which he gives a balanced picture of Poland today.[1]

IN the political field, however, there are two obstacles to improved German-Polish relations: the Federal Government refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Poland because Poland has officially recognised the DDR; and while Poland regards the Oder-Neisse frontier as final and unalterable, the Federal Republic holds that by the Potsdam Agreement the German eastern provinces are only under Polish administration and that Germany's eastern frontier will be finally determined only by virtue of a peace treaty with a reunited Germany.

In the first few years after 1949, while the Federal Republic was gradually acquiring some freedom of movement in foreign affairs, an eastern policy was not yet feasible. In particular, so long as Germany had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, there could be no question of establishing relations with her allies in Eastern Europe. This situation changed, however, when diplomatic relations were established in September 1955. Adenauer signed with the reservation (made in a letter to the Soviet Premier) that this implied neither recognition of the German frontiers as they then stood, nor any change in the Federal Government's position that it alone was entitled to represent the whole of Germany, and that it would not recognise the DDR.

The Federal Government thereupon might well have approached the other East European states in the same way. But they did not. In a statement to the Bundestag, Adenauer described the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR as an exceptional procedure; the fact that the Soviet Union is one of the four powers which have to give their consent to the reunification of Germany in no way altered the Government's basic attitude towards other states—namely, that they would in no circumstances accept diplomatic representation of the DDR alongside their own. And he added that the Federal Government would regard recognition of the DDR by other states as an unfriendly act.[2] Thus the Federal Republic refused to establish diplomatic relations with the states of the Eastern bloc which had officially recognised the DDR.

There has been, and still is, much discussion as to the validity of this conception, later called the 'Hallstein Doctrine'.[3] In point of fact, the discussion does not centre so much on the basic principle of the

[1] Hansjakob Stehle, *Nachbar Polen*, Frankfurt/M., 1963.
[2] Proceedings of the German Bundestag. Stenographic reports. 2nd Parliament. Vol. 26, p. 5644.
[3] Professor Walter Hallstein was at that time Secretary of State at the German Foreign Ministry.

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Hallstein Doctrine—non-recognition of the DDR—as on one of the consequences springing from it, namely, the dual representation of Germany abroad. Defenders of the Government's policy declare that what has been possible in Moscow could not be repeated elsewhere without 'opening the flood-gates'. If the Federal Republic were to establish diplomatic relations with states which also recognised the DDR, even if Bonn itself did not, the DDR would all the same acquire additional international prestige. The uncommitted nations in particular would not be deterred by a mere West German reservation from establishing diplomatic relations with the DDR.[4] Critics of the Hallstein Doctrine, on the other hand, maintain that this disadvantage would be outweighed by Bonn's ability to pursue a more active Eastern policy, and to act as an on-the-spot counterweight to the DDR in the states of Eastern Europe. Furthermore, the threat of a formal rupture of diplomatic relations with uncommitted states which recognised the DDR would not be so effective as pressure in the financial and economic field—and this could be exercised quite independently of the Hallstein Doctrine. Once the doctrine had been laid down, it was practically certain that the Federal Republic could have no Eastern policy. In the meantime, public opinion in Germany was pressing more and more for a re-examination of the whole situation. Since the Bonn Government had made an exception to the Hallstein Doctrine by the Moscow Agreement of 1955, its insistence that the doctrine was still essential became less and less convincing. The Government, however, remained disinclined to change its attitude.

AFTER the events of October 1956 in Poland, von Brentano said optimistically: 'I assume that the thaw in the Eastern bloc will help to create a climate that will make our work towards reunification easier. Even the Soviet Union will have to realise one day that the authoritarian regime within the Soviet zone is costing her too dear. With our Eastern neighbour Poland, once she is free to decide for herself, we shall assuredly come to an understanding in a truly European spirit.'[5] But no action followed, and, as time went on, even Bonn grew less happy about its Eastern policy. The discussion of the German question before and during the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1959 helped to bring the subject into the foreground. In the press and among the more thoughtful members of the three large parties the need for a more active Eastern policy and for the normalisation of Germany's relations with the East European states was emphasised. The most pressing advocates of the Hallstein Doctrine, on the other hand, were the expellee associations, who feared that the establishment of diplomatic relations would be regarded as recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

[4] *Cf.* Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit* (Stuttgart, 1960), p. 151.

[5] Johannes Maas, *Dokumentation der deutsch-polischen Beziehungen, 1945–59* (Bonn, 1960), p. 127.

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Poland at the same time could celebrate two triumphs: at a press conference on 25 March 1959 President de Gaulle declared himself unconditionally in favour of the maintenance of the Oder-Neisse frontier, and about the same time President Eisenhower, in a television broadcast on the Berlin problem, stood in front of a map of Germany with the Oder-Neisse line drawn as the German frontier. On both sides this was interpreted as a very significant gesture.

Both events gave rise to lively discussion in the German press. Opinion was split. One group, headed by the associations of expellees, rejected the idea of an Oder-Neisse frontier, even if it were embodied in a future peace treaty; while the other held that the frontier should be recognised in a peace treaty following the reunification of Germany. Representative of the latter group were two of the most prominent German daily newspapers, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The latter wrote (17 April 1959): 'The politicians can choose between two courses: to recognise the Oder-Neisse frontiers *now*, which morally and juridically would be an enormous concession; or to negotiate for a peace treaty in which the Federal Government would finally renounce its claim to the eastern provinces in return for reunification.'

Bonn was not, it seemed, wholly reluctant to adopt a more flexible policy in the East; but when it came to the point, the impulse to act was lacking. In the talks on the Western side preparatory to the Foreign Ministers' Conference in 1959, the Bonn Government, as its contribution to the general relaxation of tension, contemplated offering non-aggression pacts to Poland (with a limiting clause on the Oder-Neisse frontier on the lines of the Moscow Agreement of 1955), and Czechoslovakia. When news of this plan leaked out, the Union of Expellees, the central umbrella organisation of all Germans expelled from former German territories, immediately protested and succeeded in bringing a majority of the Cabinet over to its point of view. Chancellor Adenauer had originally approved of the plan, but now withdrew his consent. 'This shilly-shallying', wrote the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (31 July 1959), 'seems little likely to give the outside world the impression that those responsible for German foreign affairs know what they want and pursue a consistent line of policy.' The paper warned the government not to let its Eastern policy be diverted by pressure from the associations of expellees. The resignation a little later of Ambassador Albrecht von Kessel, as a protest against Adenauer's Eastern policy, showed that even within the Foreign Ministry opinion was divided.

The Americans, too, urged the Federal Government to normalise their relations with Poland and the other East European states; Dulles did so during his visit to Bonn in February, and Herter during Eisenhower's visit at the end of August 1959, but even this failed to move Bonn.

Another example of indecision and of Bonn's wavering Eastern policy is the so-called 'Beitz Mission.' In the summer of 1960

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the Polish Premier Cyrankiewicz invited the top representative of Krupps, Berthold Beitz, to visit Warsaw. Beitz is one of the few Germans who had held high office in Poland during the German occupation and is nonetheless kindly remembered by the Poles. He was managing-director in the Polish oilfields of Krosno, and not only treated the Polish workers humanely, but also saved many Jews from the extermination camps. (Beitz had already visited Warsaw once before at the invitation of the Polish government and had met the Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki.) Beitz flew to Warsaw in December 1960 (after informing Adenauer), as guest of the Polish government. He was received as no other German had been since the end of the war. In an after-dinner speech, Cyrankiewicz declared that 'the Poles are not anti-German; we know that even ex-Nazis have learned their lesson. Besides, the time has come to bury the disagreements of the past'.[6] The Poles let it be understood that they were quite ready for a step-by-step rapprochement, which could begin with improved economic relations. In particular, they wanted a long-term trade treaty with the Federal Republic.[7]

When Beitz returned to Bonn and reported to Adenauer, the Chancellor seemed at first inclined to begin serious negotiations. On 19 January 1961 he asked Beitz to fly to Warsaw again to find out if the Polish government would agree to the conclusion of a long-term trade treaty and of a cultural agreement, and to the exchange of consulates or trade missions with consular powers. (Trade missions with consular powers would establish quasi-diplomatic relations while evading the problems of the Hallstein Doctrine and the Oder-Neisse frontier.) This, however, was accompanied by contradictory official statements. On the 10th January Adenauer declared at a meeting of the CDU Parliamentary Party that it would be a good thing if the Federal Republic improved its relations with Poland, but on the following day his Press Secretary explained that the Chancellor was not to make proposals 'of substance' at this stage, and a few days later the State Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, Carstens, gratuitously emphasised before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag that the Federal Government had no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with Poland.

Bonn should really have grasped that the Polish Government would not accept the German proposals as they stood. It might have agreed to a three-year trade treaty, but would not accept a 'substitute' for diplomatic relations in the form of consulates or trade missions with consular powers. Either full diplomatic relations or none at all; anything else was a slight to Poland. Cyrankiewicz also rejected a proviso on frontiers after the pattern of the German-Soviet Treaty of 1955. On the other hand, he did not demand formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse

[6] Stehle, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

[7] From 1956 to 1960 there were only one-year trade agreements between Poland and the Federal Republic; in 1960 a two-year agreement was concluded.

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frontier, but merely 'a word' from the Chancellor after the example set by President de Gaulle. But the Bonn Government, instead of probing further to see if this was Poland's final offer—for in Warsaw, as in Bonn, there was more than one opinion—soon discontinued the discussions. In the meantime more contradictory statements were put out in Bonn—that Beitz had no political commission, that he had been in Warsaw 'with the Chancellor's approval' and that 'further official discussions' were planned. To confuse the issue further, the Union of Expellees published a speech of Adenauer's on 20 January to the Pommeranian *Landsmannschaft*,[8] in which the Chancellor said that the eastern provinces would not be forgotten, once Germany's 'historic hour' had come.

The further discussions which Bonn had announced did not take place, not even those for a trade treaty. Five times in the course of the spring of 1961 Bonn postponed the opening of negotiations for a long-term trade treaty and then dropped the matter altogether.

In contrast to the Government, representatives of the SPD and the FDP, declared time and again that they were in favour of establishing diplomatic relations with Poland and the other East European states. But here too the influence of the expellee organisations made itself felt. In January 1958 the SPD and FDP jointly proposed that the Federal Government should enter into discussions for the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland. This proposal was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag, who in their turn set up a study group. This met at intervals over three and a half years, and in the end the two parties abandoned the clear-cut wording of their original proposal, which—although it would have been defeated in the Bundestag—would have been a demonstration of their real opinion, and agreed with the CDU members on a much vaguer wording, which was passed unanimously and without debate in June 1961. According to this the Federal Government was to 'seize every opportunity, without jeopardising vital German interests, of normalising relations between Germany and the East European states'. In this connection 'in the case of those countries which had deported German nationals or now had German territories under provisional administration, the relevant reservations customary in international law would have to be observed.'[9]

Naturally, Poland's overriding aim from the start was to have the Oder-Neisse frontier recognised. But she also hoped, by establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic, to improve relations with Germany generally.

[8] A *Landsmannschaft* is an association of expellees grouped according to the province from which they were expelled. *E.g.*, there is an East Prussian *Landsmannschaft*, a Silesian *Landsmannschaft*, etc.

[9] Proceedings of the German Bundestag. Addenda. 3rd Parliament. Vol. 74, paper 2740, p. 12.

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WHILE it is true that Poland's best guarantor of the Oder-Neisse frontier was and is the Soviet Union, and that she cannot pursue a really independent foreign policy, Poland does have an alternative course of action, which has certainly been recognised in Warsaw; to lessen, by her own initiative, the tension in Europe, which so directly affects her position. The Rapacki plan to create an atom-free zone in Central Europe was an attempt in this direction; and Rapacki has always been anxious to show that his proposal is not merely a Cold War move dictated by the Soviet Union. Poland's attempts to improve her relations with the Federal Republic must be seen in the same light.

The period immediately following the Polish October (1956) was obviously favourable for bringing about an improvement in German-Polish relations, but Bonn refused to enter into full negotiations, and so it is impossible to decide whether Warsaw at this stage made the establishment of diplomatic relations conditional upon a resolution of the frontier problem, as Bonn's defenders maintained. But various unofficial statements by Polish politicians suggest that Warsaw would at first have been content with less, namely, with the establishment of diplomatic relations plus a proviso on frontiers similar to that contained in the Moscow Treaty of 1955. In this context it is significant that when, on 2 September 1958, at a demonstration on the 19th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland, General Zarzycki, Polish Deputy Defence Minister, expressed his support for the normalisation of German-Polish relations, provided the Oder-Neisse frontier was officially recognised, the Polish Foreign Office immediately repudiated the General's views and said they were not in accordance with official policy. The Government, they declared, still maintained that the establishment of diplomatic relations would in no way pre-judge any of the issues at stake between the two countries.[10]

Later, mistrust on the Polish side grew. Bonn's rejection of the Rapacki plan, the possibility of West Germany acquiring atomic weapons, and the agitation of the associations of expellees, all contributed to this growing mistrust. The Berlin crisis at the end of 1958 increased the tension, and the two following years were notable for curtly-phrased Polish statements. In May 1960, fifteen years after the former German provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse line had been put under Polish administration, Gomulka spoke of the German '*Drang nach Osten*', and depicted Germany as the traditional and unrepentant aggressor in Europe.[11] In July of the same year the Polish Government sent notes to the member-states of NATO in which they took a speech of Adenauer's to the East Prussian *Landsmannschaft* (in Düsseldorf on 10 July) as a pretext to raise the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier. They maintained that Adenauer had made it clear he was counting

[10] *Die Welt*, 3 September 1958, *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 22 November 1958.
[11] *Die Zeit*, 13 May 1960.

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on NATO support for carrying out a programme of 'revanchism'. (Adenauer had indeed expressed himself most unfortunately. He had said: 'We may therefore hope, if we stand firmly by the principles of peace and freedom, and if we stand by our allies, as they most assuredly stand by us, that the world will be given peace and freedom once more, *and that your beautiful East Prussian homeland will be returned.*'[12]) The Polish Government, therefore, put two questions to the member-states of NATO: (1) Was there an agreement between them and the Federal Republic under which they would back West German claims to Polish territory? (2) How did they view the Federal Republic's claims to the former German eastern provinces in view of the Polish Government's contention that the Oder-Neisse frontier was fixed and final?[13] This time too, as in 1959, Warsaw could note with satisfaction that France did not toe the line. All the other NATO countries pointed out in the customary terms that the question of the Oder-Neisse frontier could only be settled finally in a peace treaty. The French note, however, which was the only one not published (its contents were leaked by the Poles), contained the same statement as de Gaulle had made on 25 March 1959.[14]

The attempt to establish further contacts through Beitz, made on the initiative of the Polish Government, shows all the same that they were still interested in serious discussions, and that the militant statements by Polish ministers and politicians were designed for tactical ends and for public consumption, and did not necessarily reflect quite accurately the politicians' real views. Certainly, Warsaw had increased its demands in the meantime; it would now not allow the Oder-Neisse question to be excluded from negotiations. But has Bonn, apart from the totally unsatisfactory Beitz mission, ever really tried to find out what the Poles actually envisage by Germanys' agreeing to the Oder-Neisse frontier and how far they are prepared for a give-and-take on the issue? Two months after Beitz's second visit to Warsaw, Rapacki, when asked at a press conference in Vienna in March 1961 whether Poland insisted that Bonn formally renounce its claim to the provinces beyond the Oder-Neisse line, said: 'We are not interested in legalistic quibbles, but in political realities.' Official Polish circles, according to the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (14 March 1961), have defined this more precisely: 'The pre-condition for the establishment of diplomatic relations is not that the Oder-Neisse line should be formally recognised, but that the Federal Government should at least implicitly cease to demand in public an alteration of frontiers or officially encourage such demands within the Federal Republic.'

When, therefore, the Beitz mission miscarried, owing to Bonn's hesitancy, the annoyance and disappointment in Warsaw were all the greater. It took a further year and a half before Bonn entered into

[12] Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government, 12 July 1960.
[13] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 28 July 1960.
[14] *ibid.*, 15 August 1960.

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new negotiations, which had become necessary because the existing trade agreement had expired. It is true that these negotiations were of a purely economic nature. They led to the signing of a three-year trade agreement at the beginning of March 1963, which provides for the setting up of a German trade mission in Warsaw, though not one with consular powers.

Within the framework of German-Polish relations this is not a spectacular result. On the other hand, this is the first time since the end of the war that a trade agreement between the two countries has been concluded at government level, and for the first time it is a long-term agreement. With the setting up of a German trade mission in Warsaw, the one-sided state of affairs—Poland has had a trade mission in the Federal Republic since 1948—has at last come to an end. But it has not brought the re-establishment of diplomatic relations any nearer.

THE Hallstein Doctrine and the Oder-Neisse frontier are the two problems which make German-Polish relations so difficult; the second is without doubt the more difficult. Is it an insurmountable obstacle? In his first speech (20 September 1949) as head of the government after the Federal Republic had been set up, Chancellor Adenauer drew attention to the clause in the Potsdam Agreement by which Poland's western frontier was to be finally determined in a peace treaty, and he unconditionally rejected the Oder-Neisse line as a frontier.[15] The Federal Republic declared as null and void the July 1950 frontier agreement between the DDR and Poland, in which the DDR recognised the Oder-Neisse line as the definitive frontier between Poland and Germany: the Federal Republic sees itself as the only legally elected government of Germany and repudiates the DDR Government's claim to speak on behalf of the German nation.[16] Bonn has rightly held to this principle, supported firmly by the Western powers, by all German parties, and by a great majority of the German public. The question of the return of Germany's lost eastern provinces, or of the return of former German inhabitants, however, is quite a different matter. Bonn, it is true, has from the first given repeated public assurances that it would never attempt to recover these provinces by force; but it has made it quite plain that now, as in the past, it still lays claim to them. Adenauer said in his inaugural speech 'We will not cease to pursue our claim to these provinces by an orderly process of law'. In a speech in Berlin on 6 October 1951 he said: 'In our opinion, the land beyond the Oder-Neisse line belongs to Germany',[17] and in a letter to President Eisenhower on 29 May 1953 he wrote even more explicity that 'no German government will ever be able to recognise the Oder-Neisse line'.[18]

[15] Proceedings of the German Bundestag. Stenographic reports. 1. Parliament. Vol. 1, p. 28.
[16] Johannes Maass, op. cit., p. 42.
[17] *Ibid*, p. 55.
[18] Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government, 31 May 1953.

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Naturally, the expellees exercised a considerable influence over the Federal Government. At first they numbered eight million, and later, swelled by refugees from the DDR, they grew to over nine million, that is about 18 per cent of the whole population of the Federal Republic. In the Bundestag elections of 1953 their party received 5·9 per cent of the votes and 27 seats. Adenauer took the party into the coalition government, to neutralise its importance, and the relatively speedy integration of the expellees into economic life did the rest. In the next federal elections, in 1957, their proportion of the votes fell to 4·6 per cent. In the meantime, the electoral law had been changed and political parties gaining less than 5 per cent of the vote were no longer entitled to sit in the Federal Parliament. The expellees' party consequently disappeared from the Bundestag and was represented only in a few Länder Assemblies. It had already withdrawn from the coalition government in 1955. Thus, both through the political action of the Federal Government and through the speedy and satisfactory economic and social integration of the expellees, the danger that the national mood might become more uncompromising and nationalistic was averted.

After this the political interests of the expellees were represented by the two big non-party organisations, the '*Bund der Vertriebenen Deutschen*' (BdV—Union of German Expellees), and the '*Verband der Landsmannschaften*' (VdL—Association of Homeland Societies). These two organisations had representatives in all three big parties. In 1958 the two combined to form the '*Bund der Vertriebenen*' (BdV—Union of Expellees). All local *Landsmannschaften* and other regional organisations belong to the BdV, which with its 2·5 million members represents one of the strongest extra-parliamentary pressure groups in the Federal Republic. Through those of its officers who are at the same time Members of Parliament for the CDU, SPD, FDP, its influence is immediately felt on the national executives of the three main parties.

What are the aims and the demands of the BdV? In the Charter adopted by the Expellee Associations on 5 August 1950 at Stuttgart, they renounced 'revenge and retribution' but demanded the recognition of 'the right to a homeland', that is, the return of the lost German eastern provinces. This charter is also approved by the BdV.[19] It has, however, been interpreted in a variety of ways: in April 1959 the BdV demanded that the question of the former German eastern provinces and of the Sudetenland (!) should be decided by plebiscite. In a statement to the press, the President of the BdV, Hans Krüger, expressed his conviction that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was still valid under international law.[20] The mentality of certain of the radical expellee politicians can lead to strange aberrations: for example, Schellhaus, at that time Minister for Expellee Affairs in Lower Saxony, in a speech

[19] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 September 1959.
[20] *Die Welt*, 16 April 1959.

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at Düsseldorf in July 1962, demanded prison sentences for any German politician who publicly surrendered the claim to 'German soil'.[21]

In the last few years it has become increasingly clear that the views of the officers of the expellee organisations are by no means identical with those of the mass of their members. According to an extensive report on 'Expellees in West Germany', edited by Professors Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding (both expellees themselves), published in the autumn of 1959, [22] the vast majority of the expellees had by this time already become thoroughly integrated into the economic, social, and cultural life of the Federal Republic. Their average income is almost equal to that of the original West German citizens. Their birth rate is even higher than the West German average, and their mortality rate lower.

As the first generation is superseded by the second, the divergencies between the expellees and the officers of the expellee organisations are increasing. Those expellees who have never seen their hereditary homeland have taken their full place in West Germany; while the bitterness of the older generation has disappeared now that they share in West Germany's affluence. 'An ever-widening gap is beginning to appear between the official public standpoint of the expellees and their actual inner sentiments', writes a German journalist. 'The opinion is steadily gaining ground among the expellees that their concern to preserve their national identity and heritage need not express itself in nationalistic politics—although, judging from the tone of their official publications, their spokesmen have apparently not yet taken account of these altered views'.[23]

In October 1959 the FDP newspaper *Das Freie Wort* carried out an opinion poll on Germany's former eastern provinces. Nineteen per cent of those questioned were expellees. They were asked if they wished to return to their homeland. Only 7 per cent definitely wanted to go back, 5 per cent were undecided, and the others answered flatly in the negative. The West German Radio carried out a similar opinion poll in June 1963, and 76 per cent of the expellees questioned said they regarded the Federal Republic as their second homeland.[24]

TO re-annex the lost German eastern provinces today would not only be politically dubious but in every other sense quite impossible. The likelihood of Germany's recovering the provinces, or even part of them, at a peace conference is practically non-existent. It is quite inconceivable that a Polish government, whether communist or not, would or could make such a concession. And it is just as inconceivable that the Western powers would back the Federal Republic in such demands. The French Government has stated, clearly and repeatedly,

21 *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 2 July 1962.
22 *Die Vertriebenen in Westdeutschland*, 3 vols. (Kiel, 1959).
23 *Vorwärts*, 13 June 1959.
24 *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 4 July 1963.

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that it is satisfied with Germany's present eastern frontiers. Officially, the British and the Americans have, like the Federal Republic, stuck to the formula that the frontier question must be settled in a German peace treaty; unofficially, both in the press and by prominent politicians, it has been recommended that the Oder-Neisse line should be recognised as the frontier. Some Germans, too, have recognised the realities of the situation and have begun to draw the appropriate conclusions. For instance, on 6 November 1961, eight prominent Protestant leaders (including Professors Weizsäcker, Heisenberg, and Raiser, President of the National Scientific Council, and Klaus von Bismarck, Director of the West German Radio), drew up a memorandum in which, among other suggestions, they recommended an active eastern policy and the recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. They felt this would 'considerably relax Germany's strained relations with Poland, make it easier for our Western allies to support our remaining demands, and make it impossible for the Soviet Union to play off Poland and Germany against each other'.[25] This memorandum was sent to all Protestant members of the Bundestag. Three months later its contents were leaked to the public.

Professor Golo Mann, the historian, has spoken in a similar vein, and *Der Monat* has published articles on the same theme. When Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag, gave a press conference after his return from the USA in June 1963, he urged the German people to abandon their illusions: it was inconceivable that the 1937 frontiers could ever become a practicable political aim; the expellees might lay claim to their homeland, but it was a fallacy to think that the Federal Government could draw any practical conclusions from this.[26]

Today, nearly twenty years after the expulsion of German nationals, it would be demographic nonsense and a technical impossibility to restore the former eastern provinces to Germany. Over seven million Poles live in these areas today, and only some hundreds of thousand Germans. A town like Breslau is inhabited by almost as many Poles as it once had Germans. The number of Poles born in the areas since 1945 continues to grow: in 1959 they already numbered 2·6 million. Should these millions of Poles be re-settled, or 'annexed' to Germany? The idea is as absurd as it is monstrous, and smacks of the politics of the Hitler era.

For the German expellees simply to return to the former eastern provinces, without the provinces becoming part of Germany again, is no less fraught with difficulties. Is there any point in artificially re-creating the problem of a dissatisfied minority? The time has not yet come, and is not likely to come quickly, when there will be no more quarrels between states and no more problems of minorities. Historical change is often harsh, creating new conditions which must be the starting

[25] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 and 28 February 1962.
[26] *Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 21 June 1963.

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point for the next generation. But it is not the Germans alone who have had to face the hard logic of reality.

Should, then, the Oder-Neisse frontier be recognised before negotiations for a peace treaty take place? Such an anticipatory concession, recommended as a gesture of reconciliation and détente, would serve no political purpose. The Poles practise a realistic, sober diplomacy of barter and exchange, and this school of thought requires that you should not throw away your capital before the deal has got under way. Nevertheless, the present attitude of the Bonn Government needs a thorough overhaul. It must avoid giving the impression that at a peace conference it would insist on a change in the present eastern frontiers. For, despite the many German official and unofficial statements that the present frontiers would never be changed by force, the Poles may well still feel uneasy about the line the Germans would take at a conference. The statements of the former Chancellor and other government spokesmen that Germany will never renounce her claim to the eastern provinces and hopes for their return in the course of negotiations; and the constant reiteration of 'the right to a homeland'—a right which even the expellees admit is of dubious validity under international law [27]—all this must help to give the Poles the wrong impression of German intentions.

It is certainly difficult for the Bonn Government to adopt an attitude unpopular among the expellees. But it would presumably be possible for Bonn, when making official statements on the Oder-Neisse frontier and the eastern provinces, to restrict itself solely to the line that these are questions to be decided only at a conference for a German peace treaty; there should be no reference to the right to a homeland, the 1937 frontiers, or the resettlement of peoples. A further step would be the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland, always provided Warsaw does not insist as a condition on the formal and express recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. At the same time, the Federal Government could privately make it clear to Warsaw that it would not press for territorial revision even by peaceful means. This would at any rate reflect a point of view that is increasingly gaining credence among the West German public as well.

[27] Rudolf Laun, in *Internationales Recht und Diplomatie*, 1958 (2), p. 165.

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POLAND IN SEVERAL LIGHTS

K. A. Jelenski

THE FIRST CROP OF BOOKS ABOUT POLAND written in the West appeared in 1957–58. Naturally enough, they were all inspired by the October events and concentrated on 'revisionism'. Poland still represented, at that time, the boldest 'revisionist' experiment inside the Soviet camp, and Western authors tended to treat Gomulka as a revisionist who was forced to curb the very people who brought him to power in the name of the famous 'reasons of state'. Gomulka was seen as a man holding fast to the essential features of his regime—decollectivisation and truce with the Catholic Church, and yielding—for this very reason—to Soviet pressure in the ideological and cultural field. The Soviet party's desperate attempt in October 1956 to save the monolithic character of world communism by threatening Polish revisionists with Soviet armed intervention coloured the judgment of most Western observers of the Polish scene.

In October 1961, communist monolithism was destroyed by Khrushchev himself, attacking Chinese, Albanian, and 'anti-party' dogmatists, while Gomulka appeared to be one of his most trusted supporters within the bloc. Ever since then, polycentrism—not revisionism—is the key problem of the communist world. The analysis of the Gomulka regime in the light of the 'reasons of state' argument has since become more doubtful if not entirely obsolete. It is therefore characteristic that several new books about Poland should appear in 1962 and 1963. Curiously enough, the divergence of views concerning the Polish situation is much more marked in this new polycentrist period than it was in the revisionist one. Two of the books we are concerned with are written by close observers of the Polish scene: these are Witold Jedlicki's *Klub Krzywego Kola* (The Crooked Circle Club),[1] and Hansjakob Stehle's *Nachbar Polen*.[2] A disillusioned revisionist, a former secretary of the Crooked Circle Club, which was closed down in February 1962, Jedlicki writes from the position of an avowed opponent of the Gomulka regime. Hansjakob Stehle was never a communist, but the five years he spent in Poland as correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, and the generous, nonconformist sympathy he shows, as a German, for the Polish nation, led him to a close identification with Gomulka's policy. Richard Hiscocks, a Canadian professor, author of *Poland: Bridge for the Abyss*,[3] and Richard F. Staar, an American professor, author of *Poland 1944–1962 (The Sovietization of a Captive People)*,[4] have no comparable first-hand knowledge of Poland, although it is obvious that Professor Hiscocks has been in Poland and talked to many Poles, while Professor Staar relied on his University's library. Here, too, judgments diverge. The title of Professor Hiscocks' book expresses his hope that Poland is particularly suited to play a role in

1 Instytut Literacki, Paris, 1963.
2 S. Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1963.
3 Oxford University Press, 1963.
4 Louisiana State University Press, 1962.

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the détente: 'The Poles—he writes at the end of his book—are well qualified to act as go-betweens, owing to their experiences since the War and to their knowledge of each side's mentality'. The blurb of Professor Staar's book gives an idea of his extravagant originality: 'The portrait of Poland that emerges from this book bears an all too striking—and frightening—resemblance to the world of George Orwell's *1984*. Only here "Big Brother" is no mere figment of the imagination: he is everywhere apparent, everywhere watching'.

LET US BEGIN WITH PROFESSOR STAAR'S BOOK: we shall have no occasion to revert to it, since he is unaware of any of the problems debated by Hiscocks, Jedlicki, and Stehle. In the 300 pages he has devoted to Poland 1944–62, the author mentions the crisis leading to the fall of Gomulka in 1948 in eight lines, and seems unaware that Gomulka was ever arrested; he passes over the October events in silence, and makes no mention whatever of the dramatic clash between the Soviet leaders and the Polish Politbureau on the night of 18–19 October 1956. In fact, Khrushchev's name is mentioned only once in his book—in connection with Gomulka's visit to the United Nations in 1960. These revealing silences enable Professor Staar to write that Gomulka 'has more in common with the Moscow-trained Polish communists than with those of the native variety' (p. 203), and also: 'It is certainly true that the Kremlin exerts even closer direction in foreign affairs than in the internal affairs of Poland, particularly since the return to power in October 1956 of Wladyslaw Gomulka, whose policy was also definitely pro-Soviet in the period 1943–48 when he previously headed the Communist Party' (p. 6). The index of Professor Staar's book contains about 800 items, including alcoholism, boy scouts, Argentina, Brazil, and the names of the dimmest local party secretaries, but no mention is made either of revisionism or polycentrism. In the course of the whole book not one single Polish writer is named, and while *Po Prostu, Tygodnik Powszechny, Nowa Kultura,* and *Polityka* figure, strangely enough, in Professor Staar's bibliography, not one single reference to these newspapers is to be found in the text. Similarly, Professor Staar does not evidently consider worth mentioning the writings, or even the name, of Leszek Kolakowski, while the two or three references to Adam Schaff are due only to his being a member of the Central Committee. In fact, Professor Staar's attention seems directed almost exclusively to legal and constitutional problems, as well as to the appointments of minor party officials. One closes his book with a feeling of total unreality: it borders on the literary conceits beloved by Jorge Luis Borges, consisting in the reconstruction of worlds governed by closely knit laws which defy our own. But what are these laws which enable Professor Staar to identify Gomulka with the Orwellian Big Brother, to divide Poland's evolution since the war into three stages 'of its development towards socialism, USSR style': the first (1944–48) being, in his opinion, devoted to 'gradually eliminating all opponents', the second (1949–55) to 'constructing the foundations of socialism', the third, 'begun after October 1956', culminating in 'the final integration of the Polish economy with the rest of the orbit' and in 'openly avowed communist control over Poland'? Paradoxically enough, these are the very laws of Stalinism. Professor Staar is a nostalgic *à rebours* unaware

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of Stalin's death, unaware of the ideological crisis of the communist world, unaware of its divisions.

TO RETURN TO THIS SIDE OF THE looking-glass: how has the image of Poland altered since 1956? One thing seems clear today: while Gomulka never had any 'revisionist' leanings, he always was a 'polycentrist', and before the event. Both Jedlicki and Stehle make a good point in stressing that the more independent Gomulka feels with regard to the Soviet Union, the less 'liberal' he is. In July 1959, Khrushchev gave Gomulka his final blessing, when he said in his Warsaw speech: 'Nobody can ask of the central committee of the Polish Communist party that it should model its policy in solving the problems of Poland's internal life in complete accord with the policy of the Soviet Union'. Three months later, while Khrushchev was accelerating his reformist policy in the Soviet Union, Gomulka eliminated two of the party leaders most closely associated with the October events—Wladyslaw Bienkowski and Jerzy Morawski—and called back to power two of his former enemies—Eugeniusz Szyr, Minc's right-hand man until 1956, and Julian Tokarski, who, as Minister of Heavy Industry in 1956, had been held responsible for the Poznan workers' revolt. The full list of the 'liberals' removed from their posts since October 1956 is imposing: it includes Staszewski, Albrecht, Alster, Komar, Zarzycki, Matwin. They have been replaced by such leaders of the former 'Natolin' faction as Strzelecki, Witaszewski, Tokarski, Gede, Moczar, Ruminski, Pietrzak. All senior posts in the police and army, and in the security and intelligence services, are filled with former 'partisans': Korczynski, Duszynski, Janic, Szlachcic, Kufel, Kokoszyn, Ksiezarczyk.

The key to the factions in the Polish party is represented by two equivocal and uneasy alliances: between the 'Pulawy' group (who were nearly all known as 'Muscovites' in the period 1944–48) and the revisionists on the one hand, and between the 'Natolin' group and the Partisans on the other. Witold Jedlicki gives a highly controversial version of the events leading up to October 1956, but it has the merit of establishing a distinction between 'Pulawy' and 'Natolin'. The Pulawy group are the clients, inside the central committee, of the people who ruled Poland under Stalin: of Bierut, Zambrowski, Berman, and Minc. Most of them spent the war years in Moscow, most of them are members of the intelligentsia, often of Jewish bourgeois origin. The Natolin group consists of younger members of the central committee, mostly self-taught, of peasant or working-class origin. For Pulawy the Natolin group are 'the boors', for Natolin the Pulawy group are 'the Yids'. After Bierut's death, the Pulawy candidate for the party leadership was Roman Zambrowski. But Khrushchev came to the sixth plenum of the central committee in March 1956 and opposed the election of Zambrowski. Just as he got rid of Rakosi in Hungary and Chervenkov in Bulgaria, so he wanted to prevent the election in Poland of anybody too closely associated with Stalin. His candidate was Zenon Nowak, acknowledged leader of the Natolin group. The final election of Ochab, who was not closely associated with either of the groups, was a compromise. According to Jedlicki, the Pulawy group, fearing their days were numbered, decided to stir up Polish public opinion by giving wide publicity to Khrushchev's secret report. This was done by a few younger

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members of the group—Jerzy Morawski, Matwin, Kasman, Staszewski—thus giving birth to the myth of the 'good young Party secretaries'. The anti-Semitism of the Natolin group was exploited by the Pulawy group among the Polish liberal and left-wing intelligentsia, which rightly regards it as the traditional touchstone of 'reaction'. At the seventh plenum of the central committee, the Pulawy group was again threatened: the official Soviet guest, Bulganin, violently attacked the Polish press; the Natolin group turned to the counter-offensive, with Wiktor Klosiewicz's proposal to coopt Gomulka to the central committee and Zenon Nowak's anti-Semitic speech, giving a statistical analysis of the proportion of Jews in high party offices. The sense of Nowak's speech was clear: 'If you want to win public opinion through your liberalism, we shall try to win it through our anti-Semitism—let us see whom the masses will follow'. But, however strong traditional anti-Semitism may be among the Polish masses, their immediate anti-Soviet feelings were stronger, so much so that anti-Semitism itself became 'compromised' as being Soviet-inspired. The final victory of the Pulawy group came when they managed to win over Gomulka. The important factor, underlined by Jedlicki, is that Gomulka had even less sympathy for Pulawy than for Natolin: after all the Pulawy group were the direct heirs of his former jailers. If—wooed by both groups—he finally decided to side with Pulawy, it was only because of the total subservience of Natolin to the Soviet Embassy and to Marshal Rokossovsky.

Jedlicki's version is biased by the emotional reaction of the deceived lover: a former young Stalinist, he became a genuine revisionist after Stalin's death and, like many other revisionists, he believed that the Pulawy group represented a truly revolutionary trend. By reducing the crisis of the Polish Communist party to a mere fight for power between two rival factions, he leaves all the events of 1954–56 unexplained, and gives no satisfactory version of Khrushchev's support of Natolin against Pulawy. Characteristically, he begins his story in 1956. Neither Jedlicki nor Stehle mentions an extremely important turning point, to which only Professor Hiscocks does justice: the defection to the West in December 1953 of Lt. Colonel Jozef Swiatlo, Deputy Chief of the Department of Public Security, and his subsequent series of broadcasts over Radio Free Europe during the autumn of 1954. In them he described how he had been required to fabricate evidence against Gomulka and his associates, how the party leaders spied on one another, the luxurious lives most of them led, the extent of Soviet control over Poland, especially over Rokossovsky and the armed forces. The Swiatlo broadcasts created a great sensation among the public, and greater consternation amongst the party leaders than did Khrushchev's report in 1956, which after all concerned only Stalin. In December 1954, the Ministry of Public Security was abolished and Radkiewicz, the Minister, demoted; soon afterwards all three of his Vice-Ministers and a number of other high officials were dismissed, while one of them, Colonel Rozanski, was tried and sentenced to five years' imprisonment.

LET US REMEMBER THAT MOST of the Pulawy leaders were authentic pre-war revolutionaries, attracted by equalitarian and internationalist ideas. Their total subservience to Stalinism was due not only to opportunism or the desire for power: it was at least rationalised in terms

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of the myth of party monolithism. The kind of men who belong to the Pulawy group—the disillusioned opportunist, the intelligent cynic, the equivalent of the Spanish Marrano who protects his former socialist co-religionists from persecution—all would prefer to rule as enlightened absolutists than as thugs: their ideal would be to retain power while becoming liberal and respectable. In 1954 they reacted to Swiatlo's revelations with a desperate attempt to re-establish contact with the masses, and with this end in view, contracted an ambiguous alliance with authentic revisionists.

The Natolin group was less directly compromised: they did not occupy the key positions in the fields of security and ideology. But their communist record had none of the ideological overtones of the intellectuals: they did not rationalise the acceptance of Stalinist means in terms of ultimate ends; they plainly enjoyed the means. We have already indicated the schematic identity of the Pulawy group and the former 'Muscovites'. No such identity existed between Natolin and the Partisans who, unlike the Muscovites, spent the war years in Poland, where they reconstructed the party on directives from Moscow. The Natolin group shared power during the post-1948 Stalinist period, while the Partisans, for the most part, shared Gomulka's disgrace. But most of them remained in Poland only because they had been at a very low level of the party hierarchy before its dissolution in 1938. Like members of the Natolin group, most of them are self-taught, of peasant or working-class origin. Furthermore, while there were no Partisans in the Pulawy group, some of those who managed to escape the purge—like Szlachcic and Moczar—became identified, in 1956, with the Natolin group. Those who did share Gomulka's fate remained—in spite of their experiences in Stalinist jails—attached to methods of strong rule. In fact, the Natolin group and the Partisans have in common a belief in dictatorial methods, a distrust of intellectuals, and strong anti-Semitic leanings. The only difference is that while the Natolin group were considered in 1956 as Soviet agents, the Partisans are not only nationalistic but have strong anti-Soviet leanings. There is an evident parallel in Gomulka's policy towards Pulawy and Natolin since 1956. Gomulka agreed to be brought back to power in 1956 as an ally of the Pulawy group because they were anti-Soviet at the time. He eliminated their most liberal exponents as a sequel to his fight against revisionism. At the same time he not only placed former Partisans in key security positions, but turned to the Natolin group, whose ideological make-up is similar, as soon as the new polycentrist situation and his own alliance with Khrushchev made the temporary pro-Soviet attitude of the group obsolete.

The banal classification, still often applied in the West to the rulers of the communist countries, as 'Stalinists' and 'anti-Stalinists', is always misleading, but nowhere more so than in Poland. Among Polish communists, the 'liberals' are ex-Stalinists, the 'anti-liberals' are either misled Khrushchevites, like the Natolin group, or former victims of Stalin like the Partisans.

Nor is this the only instance of Gomulka's use of independence in an anti-liberal direction. The changes made in Poland after the twenty-second CPSU congress seem all directed against the more liberal

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wind now blowing from the East. The last traces of independence of the judges of the High Court have been eradicated. The new law on public meetings seems copied from the Spanish one: the organisers of every open meeting must inform the authorities, who delegate a functionary entitled to close the meeting at any moment. The new law on registration of addresses threatens anyone who does not comply with its provisions with two years' imprisonment.

The anti-liberal trend is strongest in the field of culture and the arts. Some Western commentators have interpreted the growing literary censorship, the offensive against abstract art and avant-garde literature, the replacement of *Nowa Kultura* and *Przeglad Kulturalny* by the totally subservient *Kultura*, as a consequence of Khrushchev's speech of 8 March 1963. But while in the USSR the writers and artists condemned by Khrushchev are one by one being 'rehabilitated', the Polish trend is consistently anti-liberal.

IN EVALUATING GOMULKA'S POLICY in the new polycentrist situation, our authors differ. Hansjakob Stehle rationalises Gomulka's policy out of his evident sympathy for order and for authoritarian systems (for Poland at any rate). He sees Gomulka as steering an independent course between the liberal and anti-liberal wings of the party: 'for him what counts is peace, continuity, work'. Unfortunately, he supports his contention by saying that Gomulka has an equal tolerance for the liberal Wroclaw party secretary Matwin and the authoritarian Partisan Gierek in Katowice: since Stehle's book appeared, Matwin has been removed from his post.

The difference between Stehle and Jedlicki is evident in the following comment made by the former on the latter's book: 'Jedlicki is right in destroying several myths (for instance the myth of Gomulka's having ever been a "liberal" in the Western sense), but he creates a new legend, since he writes as if there were (today or even in 1956) a political alternative to Gomulka's course. The "democratic forces" named by Jedlicki therefore make not for evolution, but—logically—for the liquidation of communism; this is why they never had and do not now have any other prospect than to end as the democratic forces did in Budapest'. Need one say that Stehle's 'logic' is only apparent? What Jedlicki says is that only day to day courage, the determined defence of concrete freedoms, can bring the hoped for evolution. What he denounces is the dictatorial, anti-liberal character of Gomulka's road to socialism. Why is Poland today following a less liberal path than the Soviet Union? And he condemns a sophistry to which Stehle falls victim: one cannot at the same time rejoice over the degree of independence from the Soviet Union achieved by Gomulka and conjure up when convenient the spectre of Budapest.

The sympathy—of different orders—which both Hansjakob Stehle and Professor Hiscocks feel for Gomulka leads them to exaggerate the continuity of Gomulka's policy in the two periods in which he has been in power—before 1949 and after 1956.

As far as the first period is concerned, the key to Stehle's error lies in the following passage of his book: 'Soviet policy . . . out of consideration for her Western allies as well as for practical reasons, renounced any formal annexation of East Europe to the Soviet Union such as had

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occurred with the Baltic States in 1940. With the ideologically flexible concept of People's Democracies, Stalin revised the Leninist thesis . . . *Gomulka's conception of "Poland's own road" coincided with this'.*

Now, in the first place, the phrase 'the Polish road to Socialism' was first coined by Gomulka in 1948. It seems absurd to say that Gomulka's policy merely 'coincided' with Stalin's. Stehle invests Gomulka's policy between 1945 and 1948 with an originality it just did not possess. The stages of sovietisation followed one after another in the same manner in Poland as in Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. There were, it is true, wide differences in the language of the communist leaders, and even of the Soviets, towards the Polish people and those of the other satellite states. The communists found it more difficult in Poland than elsewhere to employ their usual tactics, which begin with the 'anti-fascist coalition', proceed to the 'national front', and end with the total domination of the party. In Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania they could pose as liberators of the people, not only from the German occupation, but also from a national bourgeoisie and bureaucracy which had, at least in part, collaborated with the Nazis: it was therefore easier for them to present their fight against 'reactionaries' in a patriotic light. In Poland, where all the political parties had joined in the resistance, and where the Home Army was linked to the government-in-exile in London, the communists were obliged, first, to try to popularise a falsified account of their own participation in the resistance, and, later, to bid higher and higher for the support of nationalist sentiment. It is true that Gomulka, like many Polish communists, was led to analyse the reasons for the failure of the communists to build a mass movement in pre-war Poland, and that he attributed it to their insistence on internationalism and their indifference to Polish nationalism. The merger of the communist and socialist parties in 1948 was used by Gomulka as an occasion for reviving the 'patriotic argument', and he was quite explicit in his condemnation of the old Luxemburgist tradition in Poland and in extolling the patriotic virtues of the socialist party.

However, all that one can say is that Stalin did not like his local agents to take their tactical role too seriously. Stehle himself says (p. 23) —and this in fact qualifies his statements about Gomulka's 'original policy'—'The accusations against Gomulka . . . resulted from the differences which arose suddenly between Gomulka's unchanged course and the changed policy of Moscow, which had switched to one of sovietisation'.

OF ALL THE CLICHÉS APPLIED to the Polish situation since 1956, two are much abused, and they loom heavily over the books of Hiscocks and Stehle: 'reasons of state' and—connected with it—the revival of 'political realism' in Poland. Both these elements played a real and valuable part in the days of October 1956, and I have myself tried to analyse them ('White Eagle Today and Yesterday', *Survey,* January 1961). But between the 'revisionist' and the 'polycentrist' periods, the significance of these catch-words has greatly changed. They were extremely useful under the direct threat of Soviet intervention, when they helped the Poles to avoid the fate of the Hungarians. Since then, they have lost much of their real significance and serve instead to

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rationalise compromises with the anti-liberal policy of the present regime.

THE POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY has come to understand since 1956 that it cannot win Polish intellectual opinion to its cause. For this reason, it does not ask intellectuals to speak the language of communist or socialist clichés. However, it does expect them to express their loyalty by agreeing to the fundamental assertion that Poland is an independent country, placed in such a position that it must be an ally of the Soviet Union. The Communist party wants Poles to consider the alliance with Russia not only as the sole possibility offered to Poland today, but also as a desirable alliance, because of the presumed threats of aggression from Germany on the western frontiers. To reconcile this conception with hopes for the future, the Poles have adopted a line of thought, common enough in the West, according to which both the Western and the Communist world will eventually become more and more alike.

There is a further element which favours the attitude of compromise with the regime characteristic of the Polish intellectuals between 1957 and 1963: this is the curious tendency to believe that historical experience has given them a special knowledge of the world, which nobody else can possess to the same extent. This attitude is made explicit in numerous writings. Adolph Rudnicki, for instance, who publishes a very popular *Diary*, writes in a tone of extreme condescension towards 'the West' which, he says, is concerned only with childish and futile pursuits. His visible contempt stems from the idea that only suffering—such as the Poles have experienced—can give 'depth of thinking'. Still more characteristic—in the same vein—is the long short story entitled *The Rise*, written by Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz as an answer to *The Fall* by Camus. The settings are roughly the same. Both heroes are making their confession. But Iwaszkiewicz's hero laughs at Camus' hero who worries about nothing more than the fall of a woman into the Seine, while he himself has known all imaginable sufferings and degradations. There is a feeling, in these writings, of a kind of monopoly of knowledge, suffering, and historical experience, while the West is considered completely uninitiated into the secrets of life and history.

These rationalisations, combined with this peculiar sense of superiority, accounted for an attitude prevalent among many Polish intellectuals who came to the West in the years following 1956. They emanated a feeling of general self-satisfaction; they believed they had achieved the maximum of what could be achieved; they asked for admiration and help, and wanted to be regarded as true liberals, fighting for freedom, even if they used a language which did not correspond to these claims.

The recent anti-liberal trend in the cultural field is perhaps tending to expose these rationalisations, and to diminish the self-satisfaction of the intellectuals. The party continues to avoid a social-realist vocabulary, but its criticism of the avant-garde in art and literature is leading to a recrudescence of philistine conformism which calls for new resistance. The new party organ *Kultura* has recently published an astonishing document, purporting to be 'Picasso's confession to Giovanni Papini', in which Picasso admits that he is a charlatan who has been able to take in the West because of its bourgeois decadence, but who bitterly regrets that he has been a traitor to his artistic vocation. This article, which

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was intended to provide an ideal propaganda argument against Western art, is in fact one of the numerous fictitious interviews given by the hero of Giovanni Papini's book *Il Libro Nero*. Characteristically, other Polish newspapers were forbidden by the censorship to deny the authenticity of the text, and nothing has been done about it even now, after publication by the French communist literary weekly, *Les Lettres Françaises*, of a refutation of this story (presumably at Picasso's request).

THE great merit of Hansjakob Stehle is his generous and fair analysis of Polish-German relations. His suggestions to the Bonn government are at the same time bold and reasonable. But while his analysis of the problem is accurate, he does not see that the threat of German revisionism serves the party as a pretext to elicit demonstrations of loyalty to the regime. The recent discussion around the great Polish contemporary emigré writer Witold Gombrowicz is a case in point. Last May, Gombrowicz received a grant from the Ford Foundation to spend a year in West Berlin, together with other writers and artists, such as Michel Butor and André Masson. When this became known a barrage of attacks was mounted in the Polish press, where Gombrowicz was denounced as a traitor who had dissociated himself from the Polish cause. Gombrowicz's work is extremely popular among Polish intellectuals, and the cause of anti-German patriotism presented an ideal pretext for fighting his influence.

But there are some indications of resistance on the part of the intellectuals. The Warsaw *Kultura*, the first Polish periodical since 1956 to be directed by third-rate party hacks, is also the first to be consistently boycotted by the best Polish writers. It is significant that the few serious writers who have broken this boycott and contributed to *Kultura* have managed to do so in the disguise of patriotic anti-German indignation.

* * * *

The authors of the books about Poland we have examined here have reached a curious identification with limited sectors of Polish opinion. Stehle writes as a hagiographer of Gomulka. At the other extreme, Jedlicki represents former revisionists who have arrived at a social-democratic platform. Professor Hiscocks' view is that of a Christian who tries to understand Marxists: he expounds the viewpoint of the Catholic 'Znak' group. These identifications have prevented them from drawing the most obvious conclusions about the new situation of Poland in the coming polycentric communist world, which is that the Poles find themselves under a largely independent, authoritarian, anti-democratic regime, which they cannot change but from which they can hope to obtain, by massive resistance on concrete points, certain liberal measures, without inviting the threat of external intervention.

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VIEWS AND REVIEWS

EDUCATION

S. V. Utechin

THE APPEARANCE—ALMOST SIMULTANEOUS—of three new books in English on Soviet education * is a clear sign that the subject continues to attract attention. The interest is legitimate. At the time when these books went into production (which must have been in the summer or autumn of 1962) Soviet schools were approaching the end of the transition period during which the 1958 reform was being implemented. The reform was a highly controversial measure, preceded by the liveliest public discussion of the post-Stalin period, in the course of which distinct trends of opinion had emerged. Dissident voices were muffled after 1958, but many protagonists of educational policies different from the one adopted by the party leadership remained unconvinced and believed that the first results of the reform vindicated their apprehensions.

Some of the effects of the reform were clearly beneficial. It prolonged compulsory schooling from seven to eight years. It helped to eliminate the large-scale juvenile unemployment which had become a major social and political problem in the mid-1950s. It helped to dispose of the idea—deeply rooted in the traditional continental European approach to these matters—that the purpose of general secondary education is to prepare suitable candidates for universities. It introduced an element of diversity into the curriculum of the upper secondary school forms and provided facilities for manual work at school, welcome both as a diversion and for acquiring useful skills. It led to greater flexibility and some experimentation in the methods of teaching. Some establishments of higher education (those technological and agricultural institutes which train production engineers and practical agronomists) may well have benefited from the fact that applicants now have to produce evidence of previous work in practical production. It is also possible that some educational and social advantages will accrue from the constant insistence on the need for school children and students to acquaint themselves with the life of the manual worker.

To be weighed against these and other possible advantages, there are results of the 1958 reform which are deplorable. Pupils of the three top forms of secondary schools have to spend one-third of their school-time on activities which many of them regard as a nuisance and which in fact are often a waste of time and energy—learning a manual trade not of one's own choice and doing 'socially useful' work. (If learning a manual trade is what you really want, then it is better to do it at a vocational-technical school where there is a greater choice, better qualified instructors and a more conducive atmosphere, and where you earn apprentice's wages; if, instead of doing this, you stay on for three years in a secondary school, it is likely that you are not very interested in qualifying as a semi-skilled turner or bricklayer; the ostensibly 'socially

* ***Communist Education,*** ed. by E. J. King, Methuen, 1963; **Polytechnical Education in the USSR,** ed. by S. G. Shapovalenko, UNESCO, 1963; **The Russian Tradition in Education,** by N. Hans, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.

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useful' work often turns out to be either specially invented for the purpose and altogether useless, or else such as could be done more efficiently by a machine or by adult labour easily available.)

The standards of attainment in such subjects as Russian and mathematics have fallen in many schools; partly for this reason and partly because of obstacles put in the way of intending students, some higher educational establishments report lower standards among applicants. The humanities have suffered a severe curtailment: logic and psychology (and Latin, where it had been experimentally introduced after the war) have been excluded from the curriculum of the general secondary school; Russian has become an optional subject in those schools of the non-Russian republics where the local language serves as the medium of instruction, and the local languages are similarly optional in Russian schools (the option in both cases can only be exercised if there are enough volunteers to make up a class); schools using a local language as the medium of instruction are permitted to exclude foreign languages from the curriculum; the syllabuses in Russian literature and in history have been mutilated. The overburdening of school children with work, already outrageous before 1958, has become even worse. There is still no provision (except in a few experimental schools) for specialisation in general secondary schools, any such specialisation (not counting the trade apprenticeship) being relegated to out-of-class or out-of-school activities.

The majority of those young people who, after completing general secondary school at the age of 18, want to receive higher education, must waste more time (at least two years) engaging in 'productive work' before they are even allowed to apply for admission to a higher educational establishment; they are then subject to increasing discrimination in favour of the politically conformist; and arts students, having once been admitted to (theoretically) full-time higher education, have to remain in paid employment unrelated to their subject of study for two or three years and study in the evenings or by correspondence. The 1958 reform made it easier for the authorities to continue to halt the expansion of full-time higher education.

WHILE THE 1958 REFORM WAS BEING implemented, two important developments took place which again changed the outlook for the future of Soviet education. One was a shift of emphasis, in the official circles dealing with education, from almost exclusive preoccupation with 'polytechnicalisation' to efforts to intensify ideological and political indoctrination. The main result so far has been the introduction of new compulsory subjects—'Sociology'[1] in the secondary schools, and 'Fundamentals of Scientific Communism', and 'Fundamentals of Scientific Atheism' in all establishments of higher education (in addition to the obligatory courses on Dialectical and Historical Materialism, Political Economy, and History of the CPSU). These subjects usually act as a soporific, but they make further claims on time and energy, especially during examinations.

[1] Or 'Social Knowledge'—the Russian word used is *obshchestvovedenie*; it was first intended to call the subject 'Fundamentals of Political Knowledge', but the tendency to revert to the practices of the 1920s and early 30s has prevailed, and the subject has reappeared under the name which it had then.

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Of greater importance was the adoption at the twenty-second party congress in 1961 of the new party programme, with a section on educational policy which revived the idea of universal full secondary education (abandoned in 1958), and promised to implement it by 1970 (instead of 1960, as had been envisaged at the nineteenth party congress in 1952), and greatly to expand higher education. This signified the abandonment of the traditional European idea of higher education as a means of producing an elite (whether intellectual or political is immaterial in this context) and a going over to the American practice of mass education at post-secondary level. The stipulations of the new party programme were bound to re-open the question of the content of education, and this is what is happening now, at least in respect of the secondary school.

Hardly any of these problems, though they have exercised parents, pupils, teachers, and politicians in Russia, are of interest for specialists in 'comparative education'—or so it would seem if one were to judge by the collection of articles edited by Dr King. '. . . we have done our utmost to feel and tell what communist education feels like "from inside"', state the contributors in the preface. If that was the intention, it is strange that they should have failed so completely to gauge the educational weather which they encountered on their recent study journeys to Russia.[2] One can feel far more merely sitting in Oxford and reading the Soviet press. But perhaps they had wanted to familiarise themselves not with the present-day winds and currents, but with the climate in general, the more enduring features of Soviet education? With the effects, for instance, of the imposition of an obligatory ideology and of the ways in which the party authorities manipulate it? (What a variety of psychological and educational problems arise from the single fact that absolute validity is claimed for the official standpoint of the moment, however frequently it changes.) Or with the various systems of political and social discrimination applied by the communist party in the field of education throughout the near half-century of its rule? With the effects and after-effects of Stalin's terror? With the ways in which teachers and pupils in Russia cope with the regime of half-truths typical of public life, including public education, during the post-Stalin period?

It seems that the authors of the more serious articles in the volume (Dr O'Connor on educational psychology, Miss Waddington on 'children at home and in school', Miss Adams on the status of teachers, Professor Wrenn on higher education) either did not ask themselves these questions, or, if they did, were satisfied with the official answers, instead of treating them as merely one of the sources to be taken into account. It is obvious that they failed to establish genuine intellectual and human contact with people they met in Russia, and were therefore for the most part unable to learn there more than they could have learned from the existing literature. The reason for this failure also seems clear. Far from 'feeling what communist education feels like "from inside"', they approached it as typical outsiders. They asked questions and looked

[2] I do not feel competent to pass judgment on the articles dealing with East Germany, Poland and China, and leave them out of account here. One notes that a contribution on education in Poland is written by Professor Suchodolski, before the war an enthusiast for fascist education and after the war a fervent philosophical exponent of the 'new, communist education'.

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for answers and solutions relevant to *their own preoccupations at home.* Their articles are therefore useful as a survey of Soviet answers (mostly official) to problems at present engaging the attention of educational theorists and teachers in Britain.

Professor Figueroa appears even more of an outsider, for he undertakes to prove the existence of some forms of selection and differentiation in Soviet education—a fact so obvious that only the more primitive communist propagandist would deny it. How much more valuable his contribution would have been if, instead of trying to prove the existence of selection and differentiation, he had concentrated on finding out more about the extent and mechanism of the various forms they take.

Trying to feel 'from inside' is not the only promise made in the Preface that is broken in the text of the book. The Preface states that the contributors, having returned from Russia, 'collated and checked personal observation with evidence from all available sources'. In fact, apart from Professors Wrenn and Figueroa, the contributors either did not consult literature of non-communist provenance or they reveal a scanty and haphazard knowledge of it. The number of factual mistakes goes in most articles beyond the limit of what is tolerable in an academic work, and justifies John Vaizey's charge (in his review of the book in the *Oxford Magazine*) of 'bad journalism'.

The tendency to slip into bad journalism is even more evident in the way some of the contributors treat their promise in the Preface to let facts speak for themselves. 'The purpose of this entire presentation', the Preface states, 'is not to persuade or convince anyone of anything (except of fact); but it is our aim to present proper material for understanding'. I have already said that much of the material presented is 'proper' only in the sense that it appears relevant to problems in Britain, or in the sense that it reproduces the official views of the communist authorities. Not infrequently, the authors identify themselves with these official views, e.g.: 'By participating in a collective with stated aims a child learns to take over communist morality as his own' (Miss Waddington); 'This . . . drive to link the schools with work and to keep young employed people in touch with the schools is a magnificent experiment . . .' (Miss Adams); the identification is complete in the case of Mr. Smart, whose article on 'The Polytechnical Principle' shows, as far as I can see, no trace of any deviation from the current official communist line (though we are assured in the Preface that 'none of the "Western" contributors is in any sense a communist'). If statements such as these have at least the merit of reflecting the official Soviet position (though it would be helpful if this was always clearly indicated), what is one to think of such passages in the text as 'It is when consideration is given to school practice that the wide social differences between a class and a classless society begin to appear' (O'Connor, the 'classless' society referred to being Soviet society), or 'There is no doubt that the immediate family have not such close emotional ties [in Russia] as they have in the West . . .' (Miss Waddington), or 'Changes introduced into so big an organisation must be resolutely made, and are bound to appear ruthless. . . . In so large a territory with so many languages and cultures the scope for varied and conflicting interpretations of traditions and of present needs is vast, and the country can only be held together by

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government and education if central pronouncements about policy and values are declared to be universally valid and are enthusiastically proclaimed' (Fraser, 'The Traditional and the Distinctive in Soviet Education')?

The worst offender here is the editor himself, who in his introductory chapter entitled 'The Concept of Ideology in Communist Education' presents instead a quasi-ideology of his own, based on dissatisfaction with educational theories and practices in the West, a longing for some sort of holistic *Weltanschauung*, and great ignorance of communist theory and reality. In what sense this phantasmagoria is 'proper material for understanding' Soviet education is beyond my comprehension.

IF THE CONTRIBUTORS TO DR KING'S VOLUME reveal on the whole a very superficial acquaintance with their subject, it is impossible to doubt that Mr Hans knows a great deal about Russian education, both before and after 1917. The weakness of his new book lies elsewhere. The work consists of a series of essays dealing with individual Russian educational theorists and with educational ideas propounded by various ideological and political movements. The material is selected and presented in such a way that it appears, at least to some extent, to support the author's contention that there exists a body of thought and practice which can be regarded as *the* Russian tradition in education. The characteristics ascribed to this supposedly common Russian tradition are most comprehensively stated on p. 151; they are: '(a) its social attitude in distinction from its use for individual purposes; (b) secular education, independent of Church control; (c) the scientific-utilitarian basis of the school curriculum; (d) recognition of the universal-human and European foundation of education; (e) Russian nationality (*narodnost*) as an additional factor to the universal-European education; and (f) productive work as part of general education'. The purpose is obvious—to fit Soviet education into this tradition. It is quite clear, even from Mr Hans' book itself, that what he presents as *the* Russian tradition is in fact at best one tradition among others, or, more correctly, several related traditions. Other traditions (the aristocratic, the classicist, the ecclesiastical) are ignored or glossed over, and the name of Rachinsky, the great protagonist of the Church parish school, is not even mentioned. No, if there was such a thing as *the* Russian tradition in education before 1917, it consisted of the diversity of school forms, administrative arrangements, methods of teaching, textbooks, etc.—and this tradition of diversity has been suppressed by the communist regime.

Of the three books under review, the one published by UNESCO is the most welcome, for it presents, albeit in a wordy and repetitious manner, much detailed information on the present-day Soviet school which is not easily available, at least not in English. Written by members of the staff of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, it is unlikely to contain factual mistakes. Where judgment is involved, the authors follow strictly the official line, without any indication that other views are even imaginable. For my part, I must confess that this additional detailed information has merely confirmed my conviction that 'polytechnical' education in its present form is misconceived and stillborn.

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FATHER OF RUSSIAN MARXISM

John Keep

ONE MEMORABLE ILLUSTRATION in this volume* depicts a sizable crowd proceeding solemnly through the streets of revolutionary Petrograd. The date is June 1918, and the marchers are paying their last respects to Georgii Plekhanov, patriarch of Russian Marxism. To do so they must defy the wishes of the Bolshevik authorities, to whom Plekhanov's memory is already something of an embarrassment. As Lenin's teacher in the school of Marx, he deserves respect; as the opponent of his drive for absolute power, he deserves condemnation. This ambivalent attitude has persisted over the past 45 years. In Stalin's time Plekhanov's name was scarcely mentioned. Today his works are once again published, but only in carefully selected editions. No comprehensive biography has appeared since 1924. Paradoxically enough, a life of 'the father of Russian Marxism' can be written only in the West, by a non-Marxist, non-Russian historian.

Professor Baron is an acknowledged authority on Plekhanov, and his work will be warmly welcomed by all students of the Russian revolutionary movement. Written with sympathy and insight, it traces his subject's career from its romantic beginnings in the Populist movement of the 1870s to its tragic finale, which came soon after a putsch-type revolution such as he had been preaching against for almost forty years. Inevitably, this is in large measure an intellectual biography, since Plekhanov soon exchanged the revolver for the pen and his private life was uneventful. Yet Mr Baron brings the man alive. He tells the story of his courageous fight against tuberculosis. We see Plekhanov toiling over his manuscripts in his sickbed, cared for by the remarkable Rosalia Markovna. It was she who made his political career possible. Yet she received little public acknowledgment. As a determinist, Plekhanov minimised the role of the individual. He thought largely in abstractions. His vanity was a by-word. Yet beneath the frigid intellectual exterior there beat a generous heart. One lays this book down with a clearer understanding of his achievements.

There can be no doubt that his gifts were those of a theorist, not a practical politician. He evolved a coherent system of thought based on the application of Marxist doctrine to Russian conditions. In so doing he left a lasting imprint upon the physiognomy of the infant Social-Democratic movement. Plekhanov had an unshakeable faith in the emergent Russian proletariat, which he believed was the only social force that could lead the revolution to triumph. To the middle classes he allotted a strictly subordinate place in his strategy, the peasants he distrusted as destructive anarchists, scarcely capable of rational political activity. This scheme seemed to set the Russian workers a superhuman task. But Plekhanov maintained that they could learn from the

* **Plekhanov: the Father of Russian Marxism,** by Samuel H. Baron. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. 400 pages. 55s.

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European example, and that Russia's backwardness might prove a blessing in disguise. Her intellectuals could absorb the truths of Marxism ready-made, and guide the workers out of darkness by imparting to them a 'socialist consciousness'. This implied a somewhat elitist approach to politics, which found practical expression in Plekhanov's own conduct as party leader. He was convinced that his own views were correct and dealt harshly with those who dared to challenge his authority. In this way he prepared the ground for Lenin, who took his arguments to their logical conclusion. The two men collaborated uneasily for a time and then parted company; by 1905 they had become bitter rivals. The revolution of that year exposed the defects in Plekhanov's revolutionary scheme, yet he clung to it dogmatically. As Mr Baron says,

> the fifty-year-old revolutionist no longer had the flexibility of youth. He and his revolutionary scheme had become inseparable, his commitment to it absolute . . . Plekhanov had become a doctrinaire, a man so blinded by doctrinal allegiances to the true nature of his world that he was incapable of adapting to it.

The rest of his life was something of an anticlimax, and receives more summary treatment here. Disdainful of the fruitless squabbles among the emigrés, Plekhanov turned more and more to academic pursuits. In wide-ranging studies of literature, philosophy, and history, he applied an anlysis that was strictly Marxist, yet free of the *partiinost* that has bedevilled subsequent communist scholarship. His approach to questions of aesthetics, though utilitarian, still had a humane quality. Of particular interest are his views on Russian history, which he saw as a long-drawn-out conflict between Oriental despotism and Western enlightenment. The old order had been based on State ownership of the land, which gave the central power total control over the lives of its subjects. It had been slowly undermined, first by the Petrine reforms, and more recently by the spread of capitalist enterprise; the working class was to deal the final blow. It was because the legacy of Russia's past still made itself felt that Plekhanov opposed Lenin's demand for nationalisation of the land. He feared that it might re-create the economic basis for a new tyranny. This was a less fanciful idea than it appeared to most of his contemporaries. Mr Baron rightly points out that Plekhanov's *History of Russian Social Thought* deserves to be more widely known: although deficient in many respects, it contains some illuminating insights.

Nevertheless the argument for 'Plekhanov the westerniser' can be pressed too far. There was something of the Jacobin about him—as indeed he admitted to his friends on more than one occasion. Anxious to be fair, Mr Baron gives this factor less than its due weight. At the second party congress in 1903 Plekhanov delivered a dictum that was to become notorious:

> Every democratic principle must be considered not by itself, abstractly, but in relation to that which may be called the fundamental principle of democracy, namely, *salus populi suprema lex*. Translated into the language of the revolutionist, this means that the success of the revolution is the highest law. And if the success

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> of the revolution demanded a temporary limitation on the working of this or that democratic principle, then it would be criminal to refrain from such limitation. . . .

If the party found a Russian parliament impeding the development of the revolution, it should endeavour to dissolve it as rapidly as possible. According to Mr Baron this was a speech which Plekhanov 'lived to regret with every sinew of his being'. There is, however, no firm evidence that this was so. In the last articles he wrote Plekhanov tried to defend himself from the charge of moral responsibility for the Bolshevik dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. But even then he was content to argue in essence that Lenin's action was *inexpedient*: he did not declare himself unequivocally in favour of popular sovereignty as against dictatorship. To the end he remained an orthodox Marxist and an advocate of class struggle (his 'defencism' notwithstanding). More important, his commitment to a scientific outlook cannot be taken very seriously. He ignored empirical evidence where it brought into question the premisses of his beliefs. The temper of his mind was more ideological than rational, as was shown by the virulence of his attacks on the Economist and Revisionist heresies. From time to time Mr Baron more or less admits as much. Yet he does not recognise the extent to which this coloured Plekhanov's whole thinking. For he did much to 'russify' Marxism and turn it from a theory of reality into a dogma. What, one may well ask, did Georgii Plekhanov father: Marxism or Bolshevism? He himself remarked ruefully in 1917 that Lenin could be regarded as his 'illegitimate son'.

This is a matter on which there is room for more than one opinion, The merit of Mr Baron's work is that it enables us for the first time to see Plekhanov in historical perspective.

COMECON

Alfred Zauberman

EVERY STUDENT OF SOVIET BLOC AFFAIRS cannot but be grateful to Dr Pryor for this instructive—indeed indispensable—work on the bloc's trade.* Our debt is the greater as his dedication to scholarship was bought at a high price in personal freedom: while preparing the book he was arrested by the East German secret police and kept in prison incommunicando for six months, without any charge being laid against him.

The book deals with methods in trading rather than trade as such, but the author has amassed considerable factual material which by itself is of great value. His principal interest lies in the institutional framework within which, and procedures by which, decisions are being made and criteria applied; the treatment is not over-technical and well accessible to a non-specialist.

* **The Communist Foreign Trade System,** by F. L. Pryor: Allen and Unwin, London, 1963; 296 pp; index; 40s. net.

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The interconnected last two chapters analyse the policies and techniques for co-ordination of intra-bloc exchanges and the prospects of the bloc's trade. The author believes that there is no reason why the bloc could not slowly improve the existing pattern of production and achieve a more rational division of labour—a defensible expectation provided the accent is put on the word 'slowly'. But he subscribes to what is by now a common consensus of the students as to difficulties encountered on the road of rational integration. He points out in particular that some bloc countries would have to be asked to produce goods in which they have a comparative disadvantage with the West; that the world market prices, which are the basis of intra-bloc trade, might not cover the operating costs—hence the need for some bloc subsidies (where would they come from?); that development towards rationally integrated economies involves transfers of productive factors, capital and labour, and this is hardly feasible on a sufficiently large scale, for political as well as economic reasons. Dr Pryor also remarks that rational specialisation would entail the scrapping of some uneconomical industries which are a status symbol in this era of conspicuous production: and that the integrators would have to take into account the fear of some nations lest they would be relegated to specialise in agricultural and mineral products. On this point Dr Pryor's prediction has been by now well borne out by events. First of all he stresses the need for a theory of foreign trade. I would perhaps stress rather the aspect of *implementation* of the theory: quite a few theoretical models for efficient shaping of foreign trade of centrally planned economies have been by now elaborated.

THE ADVANTAGES OF BACKWARDNESS

Andrzej Brzeski

A WORK RECENTLY PUBLISHED in Poland under the innocent though long-winded title *The Historical Process of Economic Growth: An Analysis of Secular Trends Based on Iron and Steel Production* * unexpectedly made news when no less an authority than the central committee of the Polish Communist party sharply reprimanded its author, Stefan Kurowski. He was accused of using an 'unscientific approach' and of 'faulty logic', as well as of 'fact-twisting' and, worst of all, 'anti-marxism'. That the last offence is treated seriously in Gomulka's Poland is witnessed by the dismissal of the censor and the editor who gave the book its imprimatur.

This incident will probably soon be forgotten. But the book is here to stay (it is to be published in translation by the University of California). For this is a provocative work, equally interesting to the political scientist, historian, or economist. The author sets out to explore the dialectics of economic change over the centuries. This elusive goal he pursues on

* Stefan Kurowski, **Historyczny proces wzrostu gospodarczego. Analiza trendow sekularnych na podstawie produkcji zelaza i stali** (Warsaw, 1963), 432 pp.

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a broad front, cutting boldly across the boundaries of academic specialisation. What he says is highly controversial, not always sufficiently documented, sometimes naive, but fascinating.

He takes iron and steel as indicators of total output and economic power because of their ubiquity, universal applicability, crucial function in capital formation, and connection with technological progress. He substantiates their use as a measure of GNP and industrial production by cross-section and time series correlations. The results, though not perfect, are statistically significant, and pose problems of intrinsic interest to an economic historian; given the incompleteness and notorious unreliability of historical series, the fairly adequate information on iron and steel provides us with *a possibility* of applying the quantitative approach in secular analysis. *Some* measurement is preferable to *none*.

That Kurowski's study of iron and steel is solid and rather impressive was conceded even by his Polish critics (there are 138 statistical tables, graphs, and an extensive bibliography). Spatially, Kurowski covers most of the globe, not forgetting his native Poland. Temporally, he ranges from the Renaissance to plans and forecasts for 1970. In this vast framework he discusses the output and use of his two 'symptom-products': absolute and relative magnitudes, rates of change, geographical distribution, international trade, assortment, composition of demand, stock. Naturally, not all aspects are treated exhaustively. The data are presented analytically, and hence selectively, in a form and scope relevant to the broader objectives of Kurowski's enquiry.

The aim is the formulation of 'laws' governing secular economic growth, but Kurowski undertakes to interpret his laws in a positivistic spirit as predictive hypotheses without claiming ontological validity for them. He proceeds as an empiricist from the analysis of data. Inductive reasoning, from the particular to the general, assisted by crude statistical procedures, leads him to the conclusion that economic growth (measured by its proxy indicator) follows logistic paths, while noting that on occasions the actual growth curves diverge rather significantly from the usual logistic curve. He accounts for the differences by two factors related to the known phenomena of 'growth leadership' and 'growth laggardship': the 'degree of belatedness' (calendar lag between take-off periods), and the 'degree of backwardness' (*per capita* output gap). The later a country's take-off and the larger its relative backwardness, the faster the ensuing growth.

TO EXPLAIN THE ACCELERATED GROWTH of latecoming countries, Kurowski discusses the technological, economic, and socio-political circumstances of backwardness which produce 'developmental tensions'. This he does pretty much along Gerschenkron's lines, emphasising the backlog of advanced technology available to latecomers and their growth consciousness. On the other side, he points to the retardation of growth in 'leader' countries, their increasing technological and organisational conservatism, and the saturation of markets. Most of this argument sounds familiar, but Kurowski succeeds in restating it in a novel manner, adducing much historical material to support it and offering some thoughtful comments. Particularly noteworthy is the attempt to quantify the growth impact of belatedness and backwardness and the use of 'economic time' (measured for various countries from the date of equal

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per capita output) for growth comparisons. In this context, he convincingly criticises some of the Western comparisons of the Soviet and American economies (Nutter) which disregard the acceleration effects of backwardness.

An important corollary of his 'Logistic Law of Growth' is that 'lagging' and 'catching up', so hotly debated both in the East and West, constitute the *normal* pattern of global economic development. Acceleration of growth in 'follower' countries and eventual stagnation of 'leader' countries will, over a long enough period, change the existing balance of economic power. This tendency towards an economically balanced world is upset by technological progress, socio-political transformation, organisational innovation, territorial expansion, and other historical changes which extend the 'demo-space' (environmental universe) in which economic growth takes place. New logistic cycles are thus generated and the uneven process of secular growth continues on a higher basis.

Kurowski traces this process historically and geographically, demonstrating how long swings in economic growth, shifting growth centres, concentric growth waves, and changes in the degree of concentration of economic power can be fitted into his general hypothesis. Open to doubt as it must be in its sweeping generalisations, Kurowski's is a powerful vision of economic history. Even more fascinating, however, are his prophecies.

Extrapolating his view of the past, Kurowski predicts that today's laggards will inevitably catch up with the leading industrial nations. The present growth leaders (Soviet Union) will see the rate of their expansion taper off, while the late entrants in the contest (China) will achieve spectacular rates of growth unequalled in historical experience. Eventually, the belt of economic backwardness in Africa, Asia and Latin America will disappear and the populous countries of these areas will take their place in the industrialised world. Kurowski's secular optimism will bring little consolation to the currently underdeveloped nations, but then this is as it should be: without the present discontent, the future big push would be impossible! Kurowski's prophecies range further than the industrialisation of India or Haiti. He thinks that ultimately the tendency to entropy will prevail, and ours will be an economically balanced, polycentric world carrying on the millenary trend of growth in new logistic cycles, generated by the conquest of space. In this long perspective Soviet-American economic competition and the developmental stalemate of the backward belt are cut down to the size of an episode!

Economic potential, and especially iron and steel, have military and political implications. To these Kurowski devotes much attention. Reviewing the historical record, he finds a one-to-one mapping from the described economic process to military and political events: logistic 'growth paths of national power', shifting power centres, deconcentric waves of change, lagging and catching up, as well as the tendency to eventual polycentrisation and entropy.

Interestingly enough, Kurowski observes that the wars experienced as cataclysmic by contemporaries had only insignificant impact on the secular trend. The Napoleonic Wars did little to change the political

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and economic picture of nineteenth-century Europe: England's expansion was hardly affected. Victorious Russia, having reached the asymptote of its logistic cycle, continued to stagnate, while defeated France, after a vigorous take-off in the 1820s, rapidly became the first continental power. A reverse situation ensued after the first world war (continuing English stagnation and Russo-Soviet ascendancy). Finally, the aftermath of the second world war coincided with accelerated growth in defeated Germany and Japan, coupled with stagnation in the United States. Three great wars interrupted, but did not essentially change, the pre-war trends.

Kurowski distinguishes between 'wars of expansion' and 'wars of equilibrium': the first extending the centre's influence into the periphery, the second fought between peers. The wars of equilibrium are exemplified by the Napoleonic Wars and the Austro- and Franco-Prussian confrontations after the Congress of Vienna. Stalingrad marks the end of the wars of expansion in which the industrial centre of Europe encroached on the East. The present bipolarisation of power resulting from the Soviet growth makes any major future war (including possible inroads into the belt of economic backwardness) a conflict of peers. In the nuclear age such a conflict would inevitably result in universal destruction. Contrary to the philosophy of the test ban treaty, Kurowski envisages progressive deconcentration and polycentrisation of power as the force that will transform the precarious bipolar balance of terror into a more stable 'oligopolistic coexistence'. Let us hope he is right.

Similar reflections suggest themselves with regard to the attempt to establish a relation of social phenomena to secular economic trends. On the evidence of the three European 'logistic cycles', Kurowski found that social peace had been typically associated with expansion, whereas social tension and unrest accompanied secular slack. This explains why social and political changes, such as major reforms or revolutions, usually preceded the take-off into a new logistic cycle of growth. Such changes constituted a response to the tensions of the stagnant phase of the previous cycle. It is a pity that Kurowski's discussion of the social concomitants of the secular trend is so cursory.

THE POLISH PARTY JOURNAL *Nowe Drogi* (August 1963) sees in Kurowski a follower of Rostow. Equally well it could accuse him of being a follower of Gerschenkron, Hansen, Kuznets, Schumpeter, Spengler, or any number of others, including the Gosplan economists of the early Soviet era and the German geopoliticians. For Kurowski is not afraid of eclecticism. He borrows from others freely and with due acknowledgments. One of the book's most admirable features is the novel synthesis of ideas. Hardly anything of major importance to Kurowski's enquiry goes unnoticed, although many problems are mentioned only marginally. Ironically, he owes the greatest debt of all to Karl Marx. Like Marx, Kurowski seeks the 'laws of motion'; his approach to the socio-economic universe is dialectical in the deepest sense of this unjustly discredited word. Like Marx, Kurowski sees the social and economic development historically. And like Marx again, he looks into the past only to see the future. The closing paragraph of *The Historical Process* contains his creed:

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> In this book . . . I have addressed myself . . . to the question: what will be the future shape of the world? The answer to this is of paramount importance. . . . Alas, most of us, entangled in the minutiae of daily living, fail to perceive, or perceive only in moments of mortal danger, that mankind's fate is determined by the historical process. Yet the comprehension of this process is of immediate practical import because it facilitates choice.

The last sentence gives a clue to another Marxian feature in Kurowski's philosophy: although he has an eschatological vision of history, he is an activist, not a fatalist. Kurowski himself stresses his essential agreement with Marxian thought. Among other things, he shares Marx's conviction of the decline of capitalism as *the* dominant institutional vehicle of socio-economic change. But going beyond that, Kurowski predicts an eventual end of the socialist ascendancy. For him, socialism and capitalism represent *alternatives*, not *stages*, in the universal march to entropy of the 'balanced world'. This view questions the premises of the Kremlin's coexistence ideology, and explains why the Polish communists were so disturbed about Kurowski's book.

SOVIET TREATY-MAKING

A. K. R. Kiralfy

THIS WORK* IS BASED on the *Calendar of Soviet Treaties 1917–1957* published by the same authors in 1959 and is divided into four parts. The first part deals with the Soviet and Western view of treaties as a source of public international law; the second part with the Soviet law of treaties, discussing form, entry into operation, interpretation and termination; the third with the policy of the USSR as it appears from its various political and economic treaties and its choice of treaty partners, and the fourth and last part with the East-West conflict as reflected in treaty-making and breaking. The footnotes appear at the back of the book, with an alphabetical bibliography of sources containing a guide to the abbreviations used in the footnotes, and there is also an analytical list of Soviet treaties and a General Index to the book. The documentation is the result of great care and effort and the work is marked by an objective approach, within the obvious limitations of such a possiblity in the sensitive world of East-West relations. The aim of the learned authors is not purely historical but rather to estimate the Soviet record in treaty observance and the prospects for its honouring its agreements in future, and to use the analysis of its treaty policy to throw light on its foreign and internal policies, to which its treaty policy always very closely conforms. Certain points recur in different connections and a summary cannot observe the original order of the book. Instead, some salient features will be noted, to which the authors frequently return, and which they discuss with clarity and understanding.

* **The Theory, Law and Policy of Soviet Treaties,** J. F. Triska and R. M. Slusser. Stanford and Oxford University Presses. 1962. 525 pp. £4 net (U.K.)

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Soviet treaty doctrine in this work appears extremely fluid and opportunistic, following and not guiding practice, and straining even the enormous ingenuity of the skilled communist jurist to explain in general terms. Contemporary Soviet interests dictated the 'legal' interpretation of various rules, e.g. the validity of the imposition of peace terms on the defeated Axis powers was based on their suing for peace, thus satisfying the former Soviet test of 'consent' to prevent a treaty being 'unequal' (p. 55); treaties with satellite States are based on the consent of their ruling group, though backed by Soviet armed might, just as annexations of border States are justified by their acceptance by the authorities set up after annexation. At first all Tsarist treaties were disclaimed by the Bolsheviks, but later it was considered that they remained good if not repugnant to the new socialist regime, so that benefits could still be claimed and occasional burdens accepted (pp. 100, 125).

One of the main themes of the book concerns the violation of treaties. Soviet international legal doctrine has developed quite an important rubric of justifications for the denunciation of treaties: (1) Prior violation by the other treaty-partner (p. 100). Appeasement of the Nazis by the West in 1938 is seen as excusing the emergency measures taken by the Soviets in violation of obligations to Poland and the Baltic States (p. 254), and the encouragement by the West of German re-armament and the entry of Italy into Nato as justifying the Soviet renunciation of its alliance with Britain and France (pp. 120, 121); (2) A treaty is not binding if it becomes inimical to peace or national sovereignty, even if valid when concluded (pp. 118–119); (3) A treaty is ineffective if contrary to the United Nations Charter (p. 121), a document unalterable without the consent of the USSR (p. 124); (4) A treaty ceases to be binding if the other party has disappeared completely, e.g. Poland at the end of 1939 (p. 390); (5) A treaty also loses its force if there has been such a change in the character of the regime in the partner country that observance of the treaty would contradict the objects for which the treaty was made, e.g. if a friendly country breaks off relations with the USSR or begins to follow a policy different from that being followed when the treaty was concluded, as when the Kaiser was overthrown by a democratic revolution (pp. 130, 135). The authors concede that the USSR has a fairly good record in treaty performance because it only makes treaties when they serve its clear interests and is concerned to maintain international confidence.

The political treaties of the USSR with the capitalist world are generally temporary and inescapable, as in the peace settlement after the second world war. The authors believe that hard realities have forced co-existence on a reluctant communist bloc, that they will always seek to extend their borders to remove the attractions of the Western system further from their citizens' eyes, and that they will break their obligations if they become ideologically unjustifiable to them and can do so with dignity and on plausible grounds. This does not mean that in fact conditions need to become worse. Cultural exchanges will be tolerated by the Soviets mainly because of the propaganda value of star performers hand-picked by the State for exhibition abroad. They will

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also co-operate by signing technical treaties which advance international health or improved communications, for simple utility's sake.

The Soviets have a good record in carrying out trade treaties (pp. 358, 400), although the communist regards co-operation with the capitalist world as in principle a bad thing; he accepts it if in concrete cases it advances the interests of the Soviet Union. All Soviet trade treaties are really political in scope, and in many of them economic considerations are subsidiary, e.g. offering unusually favourable terms to an uncommitted country in order to influence its policy (p 328). The economic links with the East European countries are seen not merely as normal exchange but as the first outline of a consolidated economic unit, in which national interests will be subordinated to the interests of the bloc as a whole (pp. 318–319).

The State monopoly of foreign trade in the USSR confers many advantages on the Soviets. Their trade delegations enjoy diplomatic privilege and are directed by the Soviet officials with which firms have to negotiate. They unite the entire buying and selling power of the USSR and need fear no competition, whereas their opposite numbers must compete among themselves and offer better terms (p. 333).

The requirements of military co-existence now mean that a 'trade war' takes its place. This argument is borne out by events. The USSR has been remarkably skilful in not committing Soviet troops in any disputed area, except in the Hungarian crisis, and even then they showed a certain reluctance. On the other hand, they have been ready to use embargoes and cancellations of economic credits and obligations, e.g. against Yugoslavia in 1948 and Israel in 1956 (p. 356), not to mention the more recent measures against its rival China.

ALBANIA

J. F. Brown

IN 1948 THE SOVIET-YUGOSLAV break came as a surprise to every observer, except apparently to the watchful staff of the American Embassy in Belgrade. In the wisdom of retrospect it became, of course, possible to push back the origins of this conflict several years, but, as Professor Ulam has written: 'Any man who, prior to January 1948, would have predicted a break between Tito and Stalin would be entitled ... to be honoured as a prophet with occult powers ... but certainly not as an expert basing his prognosis upon factual evidence.'

The Soviet-Albanian break, on the other hand, was awaited by watchful observers with keen anticipation. The violence of Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Albanian leaders on the opening day of the 22nd CPSU congress in October 1961 was indeed something of a shock, but for 18 months there had been a steadily growing Albanian lobby composed of scholars, analysts, and journalists who had been mapping the conflict until finally they were convinced that the point of no return could not be far away. The Alfred Kohlberg of this lobby was William E. Griffith, and it is highly appropriate that it should be he

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who has written the first serious book* on a conflict which has been the mirror, forerunner, and a significant facet of the much larger Sino-Soviet conflict, a conflict which has destroyed forever the dream and reality of the communist monolith. The book is a triumphant demonstration of how a tremendous mass of material can be sifted, assimilated, and analysed to give a clear and convincing reconstruction of the causes and course of the dispute. This is done in about 180 pages and is followed by the full text of 34 key documents which were the main milestones along Albania's road out of the Soviet camp. These documents are of great interest and value, and many of them, for example Hoxha's famous 7 November 1961 speech, make excellent reading, being first-class examples of both political abuse and cogent reasoning.

Until the unlikely day arrives when communist archives are thrown open to the public, this book will not be superseded. As each side publishes the odd document to blacken the other's case or reputation it will inevitably have to be amended, but for the present it can hardly be improved upon. Not only is the material well organised, but Mr Griffith has avoided the obvious trap of getting Albania lost in the folds of the Sino-Soviet dispute. He gives enough of this to put the smaller problem in perspective, but the importance of being Albania is always to the fore. Its importance is never magnified, but Mr Griffith is surely right in his argument that the significance and implications of Albania made it much more than simply a pawn in a dispute between giants.

Since so many things are still hidden there are bound to be some points of disagreement with Mr Griffith's interpretation. For example, he argues that 'it is doubtful, and certainly not demonstrable, that Hoxha wanted to take sides totally with Peking and against Moscow; more likely he preferred to receive the substance of Chinese support while avoiding the risks of total hostility to the Soviet Union. It was Peking, not Tirana, which initiated the rift with Moscow in June 1960; thereafter Hoxha had no choice but to declare his colours'. This may be true, but it seems equally arguable that Hoxha, ever since the Yugoslav attempt to unseat him in April 1956, had been waiting for the kind of anti-Soviet ally which China was eventually to become. He, along with Rakosi and Chervenkov, was probably on Tito's demolition list as part of the 1955–1956 reconciliation between Tito and Khrushchev. Rakosi and Chervenkov were ousted and a serious attempt was made on Hoxha. Subsequently the Hungarian rising and the Yugoslav's Ljubljana Programme in April 1958 gave him a period of quiet when he could hope that Khrushchev had learnt his lesson about the Yugoslavs. But in 1959 his suspicions began to be confirmed once again and this made him turn to the promising development in Peking. Any hesitation on his part may have been due to his not knowing how far Peking was prepared to go, not to uncertainty about how far he himself was prepared to go in support of Peking. Secondly, a smaller point, Mr Griffith implies that the Albanians in the autumn of 1959 were not sincere in their protestations of support for a Balkan and Adriatic nuclear free

* W. E. Griffith, **Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift**, M.I.T. Press, 1963.

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zone but that they actually wanted Soviet atomic rockets. Again it can be argued that, while the Albanian leaders are ferocious they are far from foolish. If they got rockets then Greece (their No. 2 enemy), Italy, and perhaps even Yugoslavia (their No. 1 enemy) would also demand them, a situation which would work very much against Albania's security. What the Albanians did object to was the Bulgarian proposal for complete disarmament in the Balkans. This they evidently considered would leave them wide open to a surprise attack from north or south, or both.

These are two points of difference; other analysts may have more. But it seems that no one, on the basis of the present evidence, could argue with the book's main theses and no one will repress admiration for the masterly way the evidence has been hunted down and handled.

THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT IN THE OPEN

Leopold Labedz

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE Sino-Soviet conflict was a gradual affair, but its exoteric phase can be dated from the publication of the Chinese letter of 14 June 1963 entitled 'A Proposal concerning the General Line of the International Communist movement.' Of the two books under review, the first, edited by Alexander Dallin,[1] provides an analytically annotated documentary record of the immediate background to the split, between 1961 and 1963, when the rumblings were already near to or on the surface, but had not yet erupted into open mutual abuse. The second book,[2] by David Floyd, covers a longer period and is intended as a short history of the Sino-Soviet conflict. There is little overlapping between the two; they should be regarded as complementary.

We were already indebted to the Russian Institute of Columbia University for the two volumes giving the documents on the destalinisation campaign and the events in Eastern Europe in 1956. Now that revisionist troubles have given way to polycentric troubles, we are given a collection of documents essential to an understanding of their background. The value of such collections becomes even more apparent as time moves on and they become historical documents. They are an indispensable reference book for everybody concerned with the subject. It may be argued that this bulky collection of over 850 pages errs by including too much, particularly as the articles published in the world communist press after the rift came into the open, and which could not be included, are more explicit on the issues and therefore more interesting. This to my mind is not a valid criticism. For the historian, as well as for the political scientist, it is necessary to have not just the open record, but also the fumbling manoeuvres which failed to prevent the rift from passing to its exoteric phase, and probably accelerated it. Besides, a juxtaposition of what we know now with what we knew then, gives an insight

[1] Alexander Dallin (Edit.), **Diversity in International Communism,** A Documentary Record, 1961–1963, Columbia University Press, 1963.
[2] David Floyd, **Mao Against Khrushchev,** Pall Mall Press, 1963.

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into the process itself and helps to reveal the not-so-mysterious ways of esoteric communication among the communists. As the authors of the introduction to the volume, Alexander Dallin and Zbigniew Brzezinski, rightly point out, its deciphering is not an insurmountable task, and their analysis of the documents amply confirms this.

To select documents while the process is unfolding is horribly difficult, as anybody who tries to follow them must realise, if for no other reason than their sheer bulk. But if communist doctrinal and political polemics are not a model of clarity, the annotated and shortened version of the documents presented here comes as near to it as is possible in the circumstances. The volume ends on the brink of the open rift. It is just as well, as the next phase should be dealt with in a separate volume.

David Floyd's book is for a more popular audience. It follows the development of the conflict chronologically, clearly delineating its main stages and analysing its causes and some of its effects. It will give the reader a fair overall picture, and for those who are patient enough to brood over the ideological duel, and to read small print, the second part of the book provides a useful selection of the main documents. Two which have been included, the confidential Chinese memorandum of December 1962 (pp. 338–39) and the Soviet January 1962 answer to it (pp. 362–67) seem to be either badly summarised or of doubtful authenticity, for they contain expressions and references which find no place in communist Chinese and Soviet vocabulary. But this is a minor blemish in an otherwise very useful book which brings the story fairly up-to-date and includes material from the open phase of the Sino-Soviet exchange.

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IN BRIEF

Merle Fainsod: **How Russia is Ruled.** Harvard University Press/Oxford University Press, 1963. 684 pp. 50/–.

A second, revised and very much enlarged edition of a book that has been accepted as the standard work in its field; all but the introductory historical chapters have been rewritten in the light of events in the post-Stalin era.

Janet G. Chapman: **Real Wages in Soviet Russia since 1928.** Harvard University Press, Oxford University Press, 1963, 395 pp. 90/–.

A most detailed and painstaking pioneering work, providing the full documentation for the preliminary results of this study, published ten years ago in the *Review of Economics and Statistics*. The information that has come to light since has been included and has made a valuable extension of the study possible.

J. M. Bochenski: **Soviet Russian Dialectical Materialism.** D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1963, 185 pp. Dfl. 18.50.

A new edition of a critical study of Diamat as taught in 1956, with an appendix on some more recent developments.

Max Hayward and Leo Labedz (eds.): **Literature and Revolution in Soviet Russia 1917–1962.** Oxford University Press, 1963. 235 pp. 25/–.

Some of the contributions to a symposium held at St. Antony's College, Oxford, in 1962, under the auspices of the College and *Survey*.

Arthur E. Adams: **Bolsheviks in the Ukraine.** Yale University Press, New Haven, London, 1963. 440 pp. 65/–.

A detailed account of the Bolsheviks' second campaign in the Ukraine from November 1918 to June 1919, and their attempt to build an administrative system and an army during the civil war.

Louise Nalbandian: **The Armenian Revolutionary Movement.** University of California Press, London, 1963. 48/–, 247 pp.

A history of the Armenian revolutionary movement and its armed struggle against the Ottoman government from the first major disturbances in 1862 to the massacres in 1896.

Josef Korbel: **Poland Between East and West.** Princeton University Press, Oxford University Press, 1963. 321 pp. 52/–.

A study of Soviet and German policy towards Poland between 1919 and 1939, based largely on hitherto unpublished documents such as the Seeckt papers and the Stresemann *Nachlass*.

Bohdan B. Budurowycz: **Polish Soviet Relations 1932–39.** Columbia University Press, 1963. 229 pp. 45/–.

An account of the relations between the two countries from the non-aggression pact in 1932 to the fourth partition of Poland in September 1939.

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Paul E. Zinner: **Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia 1918–1948.** Pall Mall Press, London, 1963. 264 pp. 42/-.

The first history of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in English, dealing in particular detail with the preparation of the coup of February 1948.

Alexander Dallin and others (eds.): **Russian Diplomacy and Eastern Europe 1914–1917.** Columbia University Press, 1963. 305 pp. 41/-.

A collection of papers on Russian policies in Poland and the Balkans during the First World War, including studies on Bulgaria, Poland, and Russian war aims towards Germany.

K. P. S. Menon: **The Flying Troika.** Oxford University Press, 1963.

Ambassadors' memoirs usually tell us as much about the countries of their origin as about the countries where they were accredited. The political diary of India's ambassador to Russia is no exception. Dealing with the last period of Stalin's life and the eight years of destalinisation, the book gives us a better picture of the neutralist mentality than of the scene of his mission.

Stanislaw Kot: **Conversations with the Kremlin and dispatches from Russia.** Oxford University Press, 1963. The Polish ambassador to Russia from September 1941 to July 1942 should be read for the light he throws on Stalin's policies during the war and on the character of various Soviet personalities. The book provides additional evidence about the Soviet responsibility for Katyn, and also reveals the obtuseness of those Polish officers who were ready to follow Stalin's anti-semitic suggestions, which made his game with the Polish government in London easier. The less said about the quality of the translation of the book, the better.

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